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The role of verification in international relations is liked with the urge to verify 
which is evident throughout human history. This study focused on the evolution of 
this role in light of political circumstances and technological progress. Several 
different approaches to verification can be identified – bilateral, regional 
cooperation, global arrangements, and individual national efforts. Moreover, several 
themes characterize the existing verification regimes. These issues – namely the 
sharing of intelligence, managing compliance questions, and the integration of 
different regimes – present themselves as the negotiating ground for future years. 
One of the important results of the paper is that it demonstrates how the concept of 
verification, once a contentious political instrument, is encompassing anew actors, 
new frameworks, new technologies, and new fields. 
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Chapter 1 The Theory and the Technology of Verification  
The urge to verify is evident throughout human history. In the Bible, one finds the 
example of St. Thomas whose disbelief in the Resurrection was only assuaged by 
examining Christ's wounds. The checks and audits of today's commercial world can 
be traced back to the Tolomei and Medici banks of the fifteenth century. And in 
military history, Xenephon records show an example of verification that occurred 
nearly 2400 years ago as the Greek army left Persia: 
“The more carefully the two armies observed one another the more mutual 
distrust mounted and the more palpable tensions grew. The Greek commander 
fearing a new outbreak of hostilities and bloodshed called upon his Persian 
counterpart 'to put a stop to these suspicions.” 
“I observe that you are watching our moves as though we were enemies, and 
we, noticing this, are watching yours too. On looking into things, I am unable 
to find evidence that you are trying to do us any harm, and I am perfectly sure 
that, as far as we're concerned, we do not even contemplate such a thing; and 
so I decided to discuss matters with you, to see if we could put an end to this 
mistrust. I know, too, of cases that have occurred in the past when people, 
sometimes as a result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the 
strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their 
anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done irreparable 
harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm at 
all.”1 
Xenophon goes on to describe the Greek General approaching his Persian 
counterpart in the hope of clarifying mutual intentions, thereby impeding the other 
side from striking first out of fear or ignorance. Unhappily during the banquet, which 
had been arranged to discuss the matter, the Persian's slaughtered the Greek 
commanders. 
Thomas Schelling, commenting on Xenophon's account, writes: “It is the other side's 
confidence that each side is primarily concerned to build. Facing a potentially hostile 
enemy what one wants is not to be confident, but to be as confident as the true state 
of affairs justifies.”2 The fatal flaw in the Greek general's strategy was not that he 
had been lacking information about his Persian escorts but that his confidence had 
lain in the wrong assumptions as to their intentions.  
                                                 
1 An Athenian-born writer, student of Socrates, and mercenary soldier, Xenophon left a rich 
legacy of military and political history based largely on his own experiences. After his exile 
from Athens in 401 B.C., he joined an expedition of some ten thousand Greek mercenaries 
involved in a Persian civil war. After the betrayal and execution of his officers, Xenophon was 
one of those elected to lead the Greeks out of Asia Minor, a trek detailed in his Anabasis. 
Although this memoir lacks the grand themes of most Greek historical narrative, it provides an 
unusual and detailed account of the rigors of the march as experienced by the common foot 
soldier. Following his return to Greece, Xenophon settled on an estate near the Spartan frontier. 
He spent the rest of his life in the service of the Spartans, whom he admired, and in writing 
several works on the history (including the wars) of his own time. Xenophon wrote his 
Anabasis, his account of the Greek expedition into Persia, in the fourth century B.C. Anabasis 
(Greece, third century b.c.) by Xenophon. 
2 T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge 1960. 
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In the twenty-first century, one sees that the principles of military verification3, 
which were in place earlier, are much the same today. The history of the first half of 
the twentieth century offers only two practical experiences of verification, both were 
as a result of wars in Europe. After Versailles, the Allies established an Inter-Allied 
Control Commission to verify that rearmament do not take place on the territory of 
vanquished Germany (1920-26) and after the French defeat of 1940, both the 
Germans and Italians established commissions (1940-42) to oversee French 
disarmament according to the Armistice.4 It is interesting to note a few points that 
these two experiences have in common: 
1. In both cases, the processes were enforced by the victorious party; 
2. In both cases they failed: Germany rearmed nearly openly after 1923 and so 
did the French – both in Northern Africa and in France (although not quite so 
openly) 
3. In both cases, clandestine activities had the approval of regional or national 
authorities – materiel was concealed and personnel were trained in a systematic 
way with the connivance of local authorities.5 
The lesson is evident – verification is powerless against an organized will to cheat. 
World War II reawakened the concern about verification of compliance concerning 
agreements to limit armaments. After the rejection of the Baruch plan to place all 
nuclear material under international control, discussion was renewed mainly towards 
plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD) under United Nations (UN) 
auspices, and separate negotiation for a complete ban on nuclear testing took place in 
the early 60's. However, the East-West confrontation proved a formidable barrier to 
the conclusion of any meaningful arms control agreements with acceptable 
verification measures.  
The progress recently made in clarifying verification's role within the arms control 
and disarmament process needs consolidation, dissemination, and institutionalisation. 
With the rejuvenation of East-West arms control in the second half of the last decade 
has come a series of publications on the process, and on treaty compliance. At the 
same time each country and international organizations concerned have stated their 
own views.  
States have taken a fragmented course, dealing with verification in a variety of ad-
hoc manner and building verification regimes, sometimes in the final months of 
rushed, politically motivated timetables. Academic and government writings have 
elaborated upon the spectrum of means available to states and organizations; they 
                                                 
3 The Oxford English Dictionary defines verification as “the action of demonstrating or proving 
to be true or legitimate by means of evidence or testimony”. This definition, although focused 
on the function of verification as a provider of evidence, already hints at the complexity 
inherent in verification. While it is most frequently associated with proving the compliance or 
non-compliance of a state, verification also provides an opportunity for a state to demonstrate 
its compliance when suspicions are raised, thus also serving a reassurance function.  
4 A.J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at 
Versailles, 1918-1919, New York 1967. (a detailed and authoritative account of the Versailles 
Treaty negotiations). 
5 J. Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, 2. ed., Thousand 
Oaks/London/New Delhi 2002, p. 20. 
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have created elaborate mathematical models quantifying concepts such as “certainty” 
and “intrusiveness” and a library of theories and terminology.  
Studies of state negotiating practices and treaty verification provisions would seem to 
indicate that administrations have rather muddled through according to a very 
politicized process. However, recently there has been a remarkable convergence on 
the concept of “adequacy” of verification, as is demonstrable in on-going arms-
control and disarmament negotiations. “Adequacy” is defined here as a level of 
verification intrusiveness sufficient to convince treaty signatories that other 
signatories cannot cheat in a militarily significant manner without such non-
compliance being detected in sufficient time to negate any advantage gained by the 
violator.  
The discussion of verification during the period of 1945-1993 was too often an 
abstraction: how to go about detecting and determine cases of non-compliance. But 
the reality is not so clear-cut and is more political.6 The centrality of politics to 
verification has been represented most obviously in its frequent usage in the past as 
an obstacle to the whole arms control process. As stated above, decisions as to the 
degree of verification and intrusiveness necessary are never apolitical. Nevertheless, 
states have frequently made impossible verification demands as a means of stalling 
or killing arms control negotiations that they feel detrimental to their security or 
other interests.  
The reason is evident: it is more acceptable to public and international opinion to 
debate minutiae of a verification regime endlessly than to pronounce oneself against 
the entire negotiations. In cases such as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
(MBFR) talks, the USSR had to sit at the table to secure the Helsinki Accords, but 
perceived no interest in negotiating away its massive conventional preponderance in 
Central Europe. Rather than state this and endanger relations with Western Europe it 
simply insisted on the then seemingly impossible demand that manpower and 
equipment ceilings be verified through national technical means (NTMs) alone, thus 
ensuring non-productive talks for thirteen years. “The degree of verification required 
by the United States was based upon its perception of the threat posed to national 
security by the arms in question and the likelihood of undetected violations. For 
example, the United States accepted the limited (and in U.S. opinion largely 
symbolic) verification provisions contained in the Biological Weapons Convention 
and the Environmental Weapons Convention, because it did not think it was likely 
that weapons of this nature would be developed for modern arsenals. Verification in 
these conventions consisted of procedures for cooperation and consultation between 
parties and recourse to the Security Council in case of unresolved complaints. The 
United States rejected similar proposals for verification of a chemical weapons 
accord, noting that the threat posed by these weapons, already in the arsenals of some 
states, demanded stricter, more assuring verification measures, including on-site 
inspection.”7 
                                                 
6 “Verification is not just a question of technical capacity but of the political will to reach 
agreement on the application of technologies and techniques.” 
7 E. Morris, The Superpowers and Verification in the United Nations Committee on 
Disarmament, paper written for Government of Canada, DSS File No. 21T.080-4-003, Serial 
OST84-00123, October 1984, pp. 43 ff. 
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The MBFR talks are a classic example of how demands for obviously inadequate 
levels of verification intrusiveness can obstruct arms control. At the other end of the 
spectrum, demands for excessive levels of verifiability can be used equally well as 
instruments to prevent agreement. By requiring absolute certainty of treaty 
compliance or “iron-clad” verification, US President Ronald Reagan ensured that no 
superpower arms control was finalized for six years. By proclaiming any violation, 
no matter how minor, to be militarily significant and demanding the absolute right to 
inspect “anytime, anywhere”, a state can make the costs of intrusion outweigh the 
benefit of any conceivable treaty. The Reagan Administration dropped its rigid 
verification requirements during the INF negotiations, but the same political 
posturing has plagued many other negotiations, such as those for a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
The success of a verification regime in deterring treaty violations not only imports 
upon that treaty and related security issues, but on the whole arms control process. 
This is observable in the role that questions about verification and Soviet non-
compliance played in preventing US ratification of SALT II. During the Presidential 
campaign of 1979-80, the Republicans were able to cast doubt upon the Carter 
Administration's ability and willingness to detect and respond to non-compliance and 
succeeded in convincing many that anything less than absolute verifiability implied 
“trusting the Russians”. To the extent that “trusting the Russians” thesis was believed 
in and not simply a conscious strategy to obstruct a policy line, the verification issue 
succeeded in altering US positions on arms control at the policy-making levels. 
In reality, verification in no way involves trust. Rather, it involves accepting a certain 
degree of uncertainty with regards to compliance in exchange for increased openness 
and predictability in the other sides' activities, limitations or cuts in their activities 
and forces, and the knowledge that the costs of concealing these systems or activities 
under the verification regime will be sufficiently high to dissuade non-compliance. 
The accompanying verification regime together with clear policies for dealing with 
violations can thus enhance security regardless of the international climate or 
perception of the others' trustworthiness.  
The problem with SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not so 
much with verification. NTMs succeeded very well in detecting each significant 
violation and circumvention. The problem lay rather in the loose wording of the 
treaties, the lack of an agreed database, the lack of clarity in counting rules, 
definitions and a variety of other clauses.  
A hurry to conclude arms control agreements as a sign of detente, together with 
deliberate vagueness to circumvent severe disagreements backlashed against arms 
control in the late 1970's. In this backlash inadequate verification, poorly defined and 
all-inclusive was unfairly diagnosed as a cause of the perceived decline in US 
security. All of which leads us to the first lesson of early arms control experience: 
even an adequate, functioning verification regime cannot protect the principles of 
arms control and international law against weakly defined treaties and the damage 
caused by governments unwilling or unable to react effectively and responsibly to 
non-compliance.  
It is the aim of this work to give an overview and summarize the role of verification 
in international relations. Attention will be focused on the evolution of this role in 
light of political circumstances and technological progress. Several different 
approaches to verification can be identified – bilateral, regional cooperation, global 
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arrangements, and individual national efforts. Moreover, several themes characterize 
the existing verification regimes. These issues – namely the sharing of intelligence, 
managing compliance questions, and the integration of different regimes – present 
themselves as the negotiating ground for future years. Yet, one conclusion cannot be 
denied: the concept of verification, once a contentious political instrument, is 
growing to encompass new actors, new frameworks, new technologies, and new 
fields. 
1. Historical and Theoretical approach of Verification 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a solid intellectual framework for 
understanding the theoretical questions of verification: what are the standards and 
strategies involved in establishing and implementing verification regime? How do 
the ongoing technology developments affect verification regime?  
First, it provides a basic historical development of the concepts: arms control, 
disarmament and verification. It will define a broad conceptual framework for 
understanding the verification process. An understanding of the basic terminology 
that is used throughout the work will provide a context for examining the policies of 
verification during the period of 1945-1993.  
Secondly, it briefly describes and analyses international relations theory and their 
respective applications in verification regime. The purpose here is not to provide a 
detailed, authoritative account of international relations theory but rather to explain 
the strategic drives of building a verification regime during the period of 1945-1993.  
Third, this chapter outlines the complex relations between verification and 
technology. Because of their close connection, understanding this relation is 
fundamental to understanding the role of verification in international relations.  
2. Historical development of arms control and disarmament terminologies 
and definitions 
The term disarmament is often used interchangeably with that of arms control, but 
the two terms should be considered as separate concepts. Disarmament is both a 
process and an end state. As a process it involves the reduction, removal or 
elimination of identified weapon systems. As an end state it involves the 
establishment of a disarmed world and the prevention of rearmament thereafter. 
Arms control, on the other hand, restrains the acquisitions, deployment and use of 
military capabilities.  
Arms control analysts of the early 1960s were in agreement that the objectives of 
arms control were threefold: reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the political 
and economic costs of preparing for war, and minimizing the scope and violence of 
war if it occurred.8 Even though disarmament and arms control are not the same they 
nevertheless intersect.9 
                                                 
8 T. Schelling, comments at the authors’ conference for this book, McLean, VA, 12 July 2001; 
also remarks made by Schelling in a “Roundtable in Honor of Thomas Schelling” at the 97th 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 31 August 2001. 
9 H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, 
New York 1961, pp. 4-5. 
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Disarmament has a longer legacy10 than arms control and was a common theme in 
international relations literature during the 1950s. The advent of atomic weapons 
during World War II gave further impetus to advocates of disarmament. Many 
prominent writers, intellectuals, and policy activists supported efforts to “ban the 
bomb”, even if this entailed unilateral disarmament. Nuclear disarmament became 
for many a moral imperative, for the stakes at risk seemed nothing less than the 
extinction of the human species. Consequently, the leaders of the superpowers gave 
considerable attention to arms control during the Cold War.  
During the Cold War the core goal of security policy was enhancement of stability. 
The alternatives were presented as either nuclear Armageddon or appeasement. This 
reinforces the case for focusing on deterrence theory. The logic of deterrence 
suggested that if either side pushed the other too far, they would set for a trail of 
nuclear escalation leading to universal ruin11. In the early 1960s international 
security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term 
disarmament. 
However, by the late 1970s, this tapestry was becoming a little frayed at the edges. 
Public opinion was uneasy about endorsing a never-ending arms race to an 
exponential expansion of the Peace Movement in Europe. It was within this setting 
that a seminal document in the evolution of the concept of security was published in 
1982 “Report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 
titled Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival” (normally referred to as the Palme 
Commission Report, after its chairman, Olof Palme).12  
The report was driven by the idea that arms racing were wasteful, harmful to the 
prospects for development in the Third World, and – above all else – dangerous. 
According to the Palme Commission, there was a 'drift towards war'; the world 
seemed to be 'marching towards the brink of a new abyss'.13 The Report noted that: 
“nations must strive for objectives more ambitious than stability, the goal of 
the present system in which security is based on armaments. For stability based 
on armaments cannot be sustained indefinitely. There is always the danger that 
the fragile stability of an international system based on armaments will 
suddenly crumble, and that nuclear confrontation will take its place. A more 
effective way to ensure security is to create positive processes that can lead to 
peace and disarmament. It is essential to create an irreversible process, with a 
momentum such that all nations cooperate for their common survival.“14  
                                                 
10 One of the best examples of disarmament before the twentieth century occurred in Japan. For 
almost two hundred years, beginning in the middle of the 1600s, the Japanese eschewed the use 
of firearms as weapons for combat. Throughout this period of self-imposed disarmament, the 
sword remained the dominant weapon. This changed in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
when outside great powers threatened intervention in Japanese affairs. With the end of Japan's 
isolation within the international political system, disarmament also came to an end.  
11 A. Butfoy, Strategic Studies and Common Security: A Critical Analysis, London 1997, chapter 
five; and A. Butfoy, Is Arms Control approaching a Dead-End?, in: Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 52/3 (November 1998). 
12 The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A 
Blueprint for Survival, New York 1982; hereafter referred to as the Palme Commission. 
13 Palme Commission, p. 1. 
14 Palme Commission, p. 7. 
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A relaxation of tensions in superpower relations, or détente, was widely viewed to 
coincide with arms control agreements, such as the conclusion of the first round of 
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1972, the INF (intermediate nuclear 
forces) agreement in 1987, and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in 1991.  
As states do not wish to rely blindly on each other’s compliance with an international 
agreement15 and as modifying one's behaviour according to treaty affects security, 
compliance needed to be ensured by standards and technologies. Verification regime 
is required to ensure that the treaty is not being abused in order to diminish security, 
to avoid varying interpretations as to a regime's effectiveness and to covert cheating 
and undetected significant military activities.  
Verification is thus central to any agreement affecting a state's security. Verification 
and monitoring may be applied to the whole range of elements that constitute a peace 
implementation process, ranging from the military aspects, through electoral 
monitoring and human rights monitoring, to the monitoring of local police using 
international civilian police. The monitoring and verification of the military aspects 
of peace agreements has the longest lineage historically: ceasefire agreements have 
often called for monitoring by impartial international observers. In comparing the 
main fields of international cooperation16 one can observe that the verification 
problem appears to be most pronounced in arms control and disarmament 
international treaties.17 
3. The Concept of Verification 
“Verification” is, according to the Webster’s dictionary, “the act or process of 
verifying or the state of being verified; the authentication of truth or accuracy by 
such means as facts, statement, citations, measurements, or attendant circumstances, 
confirmation by evidence in law.”18 Although this definition does not seem very 
applicable to arms control and disarmament treaties, we can apply to it the idea of 
positive and negative verification.  
SIPRI defines verification as a process, specifically established or approved by a 
disarmament agreement, carried out by individual state parties to the agreement, 
either reciprocally or not, or by an international body established or empowered to 
carry out the process, by personnel or by technical means, in order to determine the 
degree to which the parties to the agreement have implemented its provisions and 
thereby observed or discharged their obligations under the treaty.19  
A Group of Qualified Governmental Experts that have been appointed by the United 
Nations Secretary-General20 added in 1995 emphasising that verification can be 
generically defined as a process in which data are collected, collated and analysed in 
order to make an informed judgement as to whether a party is complying with its 
                                                 
15 T. Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation, Dartmouth 1993, p. 219. 
16 See D. Ruloff, Weltstaat oder Staatenwelt? Über die Chancen globaler Zusammenarbeit, 
München 1988.  
17 T. Bernauer, op. cit., 1993, p. 219. 
18 P.B. Gove, Merriam-Webster (ed.), Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Springfield, 
Mass. 1966, p. 2543. 
19 A. Karkoszka, Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security, London/New York 
1977, p. 13. 
20 UN Resolution A/51/182 (See Annex I).  
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obligations: Verification as “the action of demonstrating or proving to be true or 
legitimate by means of evidence or testimony”.  
This definition, although focused on the function of verification as a provider of 
evidence, already hints at the complexity inherent in verification. While it is most 
frequently associated with proving the compliance or non-compliance of a state, 
verification also provides an opportunity for a state to demonstrate its compliance 
when suspicions are raised, thus also serving a reassurance function. MacEachin 
identifies the “defining objective” of on-site verification as denying “a potential 
treaty violator the means for concealing proscribed programmes under the cover of 
legitimate activities” thus highlighting a third function of verification, namely 
deterrence.21 This definition introduces the concept of verification as a process, 
ideally a cooperative one.22 
For the purpose of this work, it is necessary to add the definition of verification by 
Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham that “Verification is the inverse of trust. In a 
system based upon mutual trust and understanding, verification of compliance would 
be both necessary and contrary to the spirit of the relationship. Indeed, in such 
circumstances requiring verification would be a contradiction in terms”.23  
Four conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.  
Verification is a process.  
Verification consists of two elements, which are closely interrelated: monitoring and 
verification.  
Verification targets two actions: positive verification (verifications on actions that 
the subject perform) or negative verification (verifications on actions the subject is 
forbidden to perform).24  
A fourth element, sanction, even though it does not form an integral part of 
verification but is closely related25 and an important aspect of effective 
implementation of verification. 
Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of 
achieving arms limitation and disarmament and should promote the implementation 
of arms limitation and disarmament measures build confidence among States and 
ensure that all parties are observing agreements. 
Considering these facts verification implies two functions: 
to deter cheating on an arms control agreement and  
to build confidence between the parties to an agreement.  
                                                 
21 D. MacEachin, Routine and challenge: two pillars of verification, The CBW Conventions 
Bulletin, no. 39 (March 1998), pp. 1-3, available at 
www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb55.pdf 
22 Idem. 
23 G. Evans, J. Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics. A Reference Guide to Concepts, 
Ideas and Institutions, London 1992. 
24 For instance, in the field of nuclear weapons, negative verification would implay providing 
assurance that subject is not producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosive. 
25 T. Bernauer, op. cit., 1993, p. 220.  
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Verification measures include:  
1. National Technical Means (NTMS), such as satellite surveillance, radar 
surveillance from locations outside the boundaries of the countries monitored 
(SIGINT), radioactive air sampling, tele-seismic geo-physical observations, 
and communications interception (SIGINT) [including telemetry monitoring]  
2. Cooperative means, such as the deliberate opening of certain features of 
military systems to surveillance [including military expenditure levels], 
specific channelling of military products through agreed checkpoints, and non-
interference with means of verification [such as non-encryption of telemetry];  
3. On-site Inspection (OSI) [various levels of intrusiveness]  
4. “soft” methods of verification, such as using agents (HUMINT), interviews, 
and analysing information leaks.26 
Verification “system” comprises institutions, arrangements, techniques and 
technologies. In the case of agreements between two states, it may be enough for 
each to verify the other’s compliance, using what are known as “national technical 
means”, such as satellites. When agreements involve multiple parties or aim at global 
membership, a more elaborate international organisation may be required to establish 
and manage a verification system. It will usually include a technical secretariat to 
handle the monitoring technologies and inspection arrangements, an executive 
council of selected member states to oversee the system and a conference of all states 
parties to set policy and review the operation of the treaty. Verification systems use a 
variety of techniques and technologies. Some of the most common elements are as 
follows. 
Declarations and data exchanges are often the first step in implementing a treaty. 
Typically, parties declare the numbers, location and characteristics of the weapons 
they possess that are to be banned or limited. Verification will seek to confirm such 
“baseline” data. Most treaties like NPT provide for periodic updating or even 
continuous provision of data. 
Remote monitoring by satellites, aircraft and other off-site technologies and 
techniques are used to detect treaty violations.  
Inspections are one of the most valuable verification tools, as they permit direct 
human observation. They may be used to witness a specific event, such as a military 
exercise, or to monitor a site continuously, such as a chemical weapon destruction 
plant. On-site inspectors have a balance of rights and responsibilities. While 
inspected states are required to co-operate with them as fully as possible, inspectors 
have, until now, never been permitted literally to roam anytime. Since the 
verification agency may have to adjudicate competing claims, impartiality and good 
intelligences are an advantage and requires the capability to monitor what the parties 
are actually doing, as opposed to what they are saying. Since the verification agency 
                                                 
26 G. Duffy, Compliance and the Future of Arms Control, Report of a Project Sponsored by the 
Center of International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, and Global Outlook, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1988, p. 4. 
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may have to respond to non-compliance, a repertoire of sanctions is also an 
advantage.27 
4. Theoretical framework of Verification Regime 
This sub-section provides simplified analyses of basic international relations theories 
and their contribution to the explanation of the role of verification regime in 
international relations. The purpose here is not to design a theory of verification 
regime but rather to identify the factors that are relevant in the different theories of 
international regimes and to explain the process and the purpose of verification 
regime in international relations. This work consists mainly of empirical arguments, 
and is thus not a theoretical exposition of the role of verification in international 
relations. 
Until the Second World War, the most influence book on strategic studies is the Carl 
von Clausewitz's legacy’s unfinished book:28 that war is a continuation of political 
activity by other means, remains the basis for the study of war as a potentially 
rational pursuit. This assertion was the starting point for investigation into the 
strategic implications of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie was the first to popularise 
the notion that these weapons were so fearful that they might actually serve to 
prevent another total war through the workings of deterrence. The experience of the 
Korean War suggested that wars could be kept limited in their means (non-nuclear), 
so long as their ends were also limited, a theme picked up by Robert Osgood and 
Henry Kissinger in the mid-1950s.29 
During the Cold War, the central question was how to avoid both war and 
appeasement. The mainstream agenda for international security studies were 
formulated in a sense of order – “deterrence”, “containment,” “flexible response,” 
and “detente”. Soon the Cold War became both less dangerous, in the aftermath of 
the crises in Berlin and Cuba of the early 1960s, and more aggravating, as the United 
States followed the imperatives of anti-communism into the quagmire of Vietnam. 
The former development left strategic studies less vital; the latter tended to discredit 
it. Consequently, research during this era was characterized by a heightened degree 
of skepticism, with analysts warning of the limits of deterrence and coercion 
(Alexander George), the distorting effects of bureaucratic politics (Graham Allison), 
and the perils of misperception (Robert Jervis).30 
                                                 
27 See J.B. Wiesner, Arms Control Verification. The Technologies That Make It Possible on the 
comparismes of national systems and international systems of inspection and verification, 
1997, available at ic.media.mit.edu/projects/JBW/articles/arms/arms.htm. 
28 The most accessible version of Clausewitz's On War remains that of Michael Howard, Peter 
Paret, and Bernard Brodie, Princeton, NJ 1976. Martin van Creveld discusses the inadequacy 
of the Clausewitzian legacy in The Transformation of War, New York, NY 1991. 
29 L. Freedman, International security: changing targets (includes related article on US 
international security concerns)(The Frontiers of Knowledge), in: Foreign Policy (Spring 
1998). The first classic of the nuclear age was Brodie's, The Absolute Weapon, New York, NY 
1946. H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York, NY 1957 was the first 
“bestseller”. Among works of the golden age, H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ 
1960 is still worth looking at as a period piece, but T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 
New York, NY 1960 has remained the most durable. The nuclear debates are discussed in L. 
Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed., London 1989. 
30 Alexander George was responsible for two of the more important critical works on American 
strategy. He and a number of co-authors produced The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, 
Cuba, Vietnam, Boston, MA 1971 of which a new version was published in 1994, and co-wrote 
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Early theorists studied arms control and disarmament treaties in the broadest sense to 
refer to all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of 
ensuring international stability. As Hedley Bull put it, arms control is “cooperation 
between antagonistic pairs of states in the military field, whether this cooperation is 
founded upon interests that are exclusively those of the cooperating states themselves 
or on interests that are more widely shared.”31  
The new theoretical approach for arms control and disarmament discussion is 
cooperative security, a concept that has grown in popularity and use since the end of 
the Cold War. One commonly accepted definition of cooperative security is “a 
commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and 
operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.”32 
Thus, the term collective security is slightly different in meaning than the terms 
cooperative security or collective defence. Collective security is “a political and legal 
obligation of member states to defend the integrity of individual states within a group 
of treaty signatories.” Collective defence is more narrowly defined: “the commitment 
of all states to defend each other from outside aggression.” By contrast, cooperative 
security can include the introduction of measures that reduce the risk of war, 
measures that are not necessarily directed against any specific state or coalition.33 
The greatest policy interest lay in efforts devised to get out of the Cold War, or at 
least to mitigate its most dangerous aspects, through arms control. Studies in this 
field tended to have a technical bias, although these widened as academics and 
policymakers gained an increased appreciation of the political role that arms control 
negotiations were playing in East-West relations. The debate over SALT II 
negotiations in the late 1970s was not so much about the arcane of the military 
balance, though it was often conducted in those terms, than the prospects for detente 
with the Soviet. 
                                                                                                                                          
with Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, New York, NY 1974. Graham 
Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, MA 1971 
established the importance of bureaucratic factors in policymaking and Robert Jervis' 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ 1976 drew attention to 
the dangers of assuming that states understand each other. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice 
Stein provide a sustained, though somewhat overstated, critique of deterrence in We All Lost 
the Cold War, Princeton, NJ 1994. 
31 H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, 
New York 1961, p. xxxv. 
32 A.B. Carter, W.J. Perry, and J.D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, 
Washington, DC 1992, p. 6. Other good works on this subject include J. Nolan (ed.), Global 
Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, DC 1994; A.B. 
Carter and W.J. Perry, Preventive Defence: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington, 
DC 1999; J.D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security, Washington, DC 2000; and D. 
Caldwell, Cooperative Security and Terrorism, paper presented to the annual meeting of the 
International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association, Whittier, CA, 
27 October 2001. 
33 One can envision four rings of security that make up collective security writ large: individual 
security, collective security, collective defense, and promoting stability. For more on this 
argument, see R. Cohen and M. Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for 
International Order, Marshall Center Papers No. 3, Garmisch, George C. Marshall European 
Center for Security Studies, April 2001. 
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4.1. International relations theories and Verification regime 
For the purpose of this work, it seems appropriate to keep in mind the recent 
publication on: “Theories of International Regimes”34. In this book, Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger divide the theories of international regimes into three schools, 
power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based theories. Power-based theories of 
international regimes can be described as “neo-realist theories of cooperation”. Not 
only conflict but also cooperation is explained by power and the distribution of 
capabilities among states. The interest-based theories are the mainstream of regime 
theories. It “emphasizes the role of international regimes in helping states to realize 
common interests”.35 The focus is on situations where the constellation of actors' 
interests is such that they can only achieve beneficial outcomes through 
institutionalized cooperation. The knowledge-based theories stress ideas and 
knowledge as explanatory variables. The focus is partly on how “causal and 
normative beliefs form perceptions of international problems and thus demand for 
regimes”.36 
Stephen Krasner’s definition of international regimes in a special issue of the journal 
“International Organization” in 1982 indicate that: “International regimes are defined 
as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area”.37 “Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or postscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice”.38  
There is also a difference in the literature on whether the research is focused on 
explaining the existence of regimes, or on the effects of regimes. The emphasis of the 
regime literature has moved from the first to the latter question.39 The empirical 
discussion in this paper will primarily be related to the effects of regimes. It then 
seems important to distinguish how the regime improves conditions for cooperation 
and the “degree to which a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted its 
creation”.40 In the case of verification this would be the difference between how the 
discussion on the standards of verification on arms control and disarmament 
facilitated the creation of effective arms control and disarmament regimes and the 
extent to which this rule-based cooperation leads to international cooperation.  
                                                 
34 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge 
1997. 
35 Idem, p. 4 
36 Idem, p. 137. 
37 S.D. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variable, in: 
International organization, 36/3 (1982), pp. 185-205. 
38 Idem, p. 186.  
39 D.H. Claes, What Do Theories of International Regimes Contribute to the Explanation of 
Cooperation (and Failure of Cooperation) among Oil-Producing Countries?, ARENA 
Working Papers WP 1999/12. 
40 M.A. Levy, O.R. Young and M. Zürn, The study of international regimes, in: European Journal 
of International Relations 1/3 (1995), pp. 267-331. 
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Two aspects of the concept have to be clarified. First, verification is a part of sub-
group of international institutions dealing mainly with arms control and 
disarmament.  
The second aspect of the concept of the verification regimes that is mentioned is its 
underlying normative core. Levy, Young and Zürn41 (1995:271) expresses this when 
they write: “given the basic thrust of regime analysis as a tool for understanding 
international cooperation and the role of norms in the pursuit of cooperation, there is 
a need to go beyond merely reutilized or patterned behavior. The principal claim of 
regime analysis is that states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that 
affect their behavior and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate 
deviation”. If the observed cooperation is explained by patterns of complementary 
interests and underlying distribution of power, regimes have no effect and thus, in 
such cases, theories of international regimes does not contribute to the explanation of 
cooperation.42  
Even then, turning to traditional regime theories offers no immediate or plausible 
account for the understanding of the drive and dynamism of verification regime. All 
three classes of theories – power-, interest-, and knowledge-based – have some 
potential to contribute in constructing a comprehensive realistic explanation on the 
discussion of the role of verification in international relations.  
4.2. Conclusion of the actual theoretical framework of verification regime 
This paper claim that the explanatory factors discussed so far have had an impact 
regarding the behaviours and drives of states in the negotiation process of the 
verification regimes but have limited impact to factors related to the structure of the 
regime, and factors related to the effective implementation of the regime: standards 
and technologies and constellation of interests among states. Verification standard 
and technologies are important for the success or failure of arms control and 
disarmament treaties, or more precise the probability of success or failure of arms 
control and disarmament treaties.  
5. The Theory and Practice of Standards in Verification Regime 
One of the major verification issues during the negotiation of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties of arms control and disarmament is the question of standards of 
verification. Standards of verification: “absolute”, “adequate,” or “effective,” play a 
major role throughout the verification process. Standards of verification are not pure, 
well-defined theoretical concepts but represent a range of purely subjective, 
conflicting assessments of how much uncertainty in verifying is acceptable.43 For the 
purpose of this work, table 2 describes the different standards that have been 
developed by Canadians F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman44 and discusses the most 
accepted standard of verification “adequate verification”. 
                                                 
41 O.R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, 
Ithaca 1994. 
42 D.H. Claes, op. cit., 1999, p. 3. 
43 W.F. Rowell, Arms Control Verification, Cambridge, Mass. 1986, pp. 73-100. 
44 F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman, A Conceptual Working paper on Arms Control Verification, 
Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Report 
No. R 79, Ottawa, Canada Aug. 1981, pp. 9-11. 
 
 20 
5.1. Standards of verification 
Table 1: Standards of verification 
Standards of verification Description 
Absolute verification A regime under which no doubt is left in determining treaty compliance. In 
practical terms, however, the achievement of 100 % verification is unlikely. 
Adequate verification A level of verification intrusiveness sufficient to convince treaty signatories that 
other signatories cannot cheat in a militarily significant manner without such 
non-compliance being detected in sufficient time to negate any advantage gained 
by the violator. In this regime, adequacy would include the ability to respond to 
possible violation. 
Limited verification In this regime, the limitation in verification capability is defined in real terms 
and is created by the inadequacy of technology available to contracting parties. 
Symbolic verification A regime in which the verification capability is known in advance to be 
inadequate through a combination of lack of technology and/or of low 
probability of compliance. 
No verification A regime in which the treaty or agreement is signed with no provision for 
verification. 
While the concept of adequacy as the logical and attainable verification standard may 
have obtained multinational support within the United Nations at an earlier date in 
1978,45 it only won a large consensus with the successful implementation of the INF 
Treaty. Until President Mikhail Gorbachev led a redefinition of the Soviet 
conception of their national interest and security,46 the USSR refused adequate 
verification where it included on-site inspection (OSI) 47 of Warsaw Pact countries 
on the ground that this constituted “legalized espionage”.  
Once the Soviet Union's leadership came to realize the need for reduced defense 
spending, its attitude toward arms control and verification changed. With arms 
control set to play a larger role in Soviet security, the desirability of increasing 
certainty about compliance became increasingly obvious. Consequently, in both the 
Stockholm Agreement of 1986, which reinforced the importance of confidence and 
security building measures (CSBMs) and the INF Treaty of 1987, verification 
regimes including on-site inspections (OSI) were established and operated to the 
satisfaction of everyone concerned. 
The choice of verification standard depends more or less directly on the degree of 
strategic importance of the agreement proportional to the technical capabilities of the 
verifying countries – the military cost of inadequate verification and the political 
costs of cheating.48 Assessments of these three elements vary according to 
perceptions of each party about the other, assumptions about the state of relations 
between the parties and perceptions of the domestic political elements within each 
party. On these criteria then, verification can be said to be a process of determining 
                                                 
45 See First UN Special Session on disarmament (UNSSODI) paras 31-91-92 of final document, 
May-July 1978. 
46 For a historical view of USSR policy on Verification see R. Timerbayev, Control of Arms 
Limitation and Disarmament, Moscow 1983. 
47 MacEachin identifies the “defining objective” of on-site verification as denying “a potential 
treaty violator the means for concealing proscribed programmes under the cover of legitimate 
activities” thus highlighting a third function of verification, namely deterrence. D. MacEachin, 
Routine and challenge: two pillars of verification, in: The CBW Conventions Bulletin 39 
(March 1998), pp. 1-3, available at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb55.pdf. 
48 I. Bellany, How Much Verification? Unpublished manuscript (1990) and author's interview at 
the University of Lancaster May 1990. 
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compliance with the terms of an arms control agreement to the extent deemed 
adequate to safeguard 'national security'.49 
The term, as defined by Richard Nixon relates to the ability to “identify attempted 
evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we 
can do so in time to mount a sufficient response.”50 The term also appears in the 
Basic Principles of Negotiations in 1973.51 
Today there is a general appreciation of the fact that less than adequate verification 
discredits the arms control process. The Geneva Convention of 1925 prohibiting the 
use of chemical agents in war contains no measures to aid verifiability and no 
procedures for dealing with allegations of such usages. There is little doubt in 
anyone's mind that chemical agents and toxins have been used in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, in the Iran-Iraq war and elsewhere. Any number of rationale for 
avoiding the Convention have been found, with the result that it has lost what little 
influence it had as a statement of international norms. With only usage in war 
prohibited – but not testing, manufacturing, or stockpiling – the Convention has 
basically no validity. It merely acts to encourage creative treaty interpretations and 
foster disrespect for arms control. The example this may have served should be 
distinct from mere political statements. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START I) there is a clear division between the treaty, with every measure verifiable 
and the attached political commitment to adhere to ceilings on air- and sea- launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) with no verification provisions. The benefit of 
this approach is that no future suspicion as to violations of these ceilings can be aired 
without necessarily calling into question the whole START package. When one 
considers the importance of START's cuts to superpower relations and curbing the 
arms race, it is of course highly desirable that non-verifiable provisions not be 
allowed to destroy the remainder. 
In arms control or partial disarmament discussions involving the retention of treaty-
limited items (TLI), adequacy is now the guiding principle in verification regime-
building. From the Contadora Peace Process, through START, the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, and discussion 
of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, acceptance of the adequacy concept is allowing 
arms control to progress.  
This acceptance makes the determination of verification provisions more of a 
practical exercise, rather than simply an item to control the scope and content of 
negotiations. Adequacy as a principle in no way ensures smooth or simple 
negotiations of verification provisions; only that the range of debate is considerably 
narrowed from that of the early 1980's: the “legalized espionage” vs. “iron clad” 
verification impasse has been replaced by the determination of what adequacy means 
in real terms. 
                                                 
49 Idem. 
50 Richard Nixon's instructions to the SALT I negotiating team quoted in M. Krepon, Arms 
Control: Verification and Compliance, New York, NY 1984, p. 38. 
51 Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, 21 June 1973 
signed by Nixon and Brezhnev Article 4. 
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In 1988 the United Nation Assembly in its Resolution A/RES/43/81 (B) endorsed 
sixteen Verification Principles:52 
1. Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms 
limitation and disarmament agreements. 
2. Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of 
achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements. 
3. Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and 
disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that 
agreements are being observed by all parties. 
4. Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different 
techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and 
international procedures, including on-site inspections. 
5. Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from 
greater openness. 
6. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit 
provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed 
methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally 
recognized principles of international law. 
7. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit 
provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment 
measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement. 
8. To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, 
an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures 
and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for 
such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment. 
9. Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage 
of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements. 
10. All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international 
verification of agreements to which they are parties. 
11. Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of 
providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or 
non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential 
ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties. 
12. Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific 
methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions 
of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the 
context of that agreement. 
13. Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation 
and disarmament agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms 
limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization at the request and 
with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign 
right of States to enter into such arrangements. 
                                                 
52 These Principles were prepared by a Working Group at the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the 
United Nations Disarmament Commission and endorsed by United Nations General Assembly 
in Resolution A/RES/43/81 (B), 7 December 1988. 
 
 23 
14. Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an 
arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal 
component of the verification process. Such requests should be used only for 
the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid 
abuses. 
15. Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, 
in accomplishing their purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal 
affairs of States parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic, 
technological and social development. 
16. To be adequate and effective, a verification régime for an agreement must 
cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities.53 
5.2. Conclusion on the concept of verification 
Arms control and success in verification are too often assumed to be dependent upon 
goodwill. Decision-makers and publics alike need to know that good arms control 
agreements with functional verification regimes are possible and maintainable 
regardless of how much atmospherics vary. The ability of the US and USSR to 
conclude acceptable and effective verification regimes under the hostile conditions of 
the Cold War is an example to all. No goodwill existed between Egypt and Israel 
when the Sinai agreements were signed and implemented. The verification regime 
was able to cope with each minor violation that occurred so that the demilitarized 
zone contributed visibly to each country's security. This in turn provided the time and 
inclination to pursue further improvements in the bilateral relationship, ultimately 
resulting in a peace treaty.  
Verification is thus clearly not only dependent upon goodwill, although successful 
regime operation can have the effect of building goodwill and trust. Should relations 
deteriorate as a result of other matters the arms control process itself might slow or 
stop. The proven verification regimes in place, however, serve to deter states from 
allowing the deterioration to spill over into a regularized part of the relationship. 
Unless the deterioration is so severe as to result in treaty abrogation, areas covered 
by the treaty could remain verifiably unaffected.  
Verified treaties can thus serve to limit military competition even in time of poisoned 
relations, limiting the damage to mutual security and making it easier to steer the 
relationship back into a positive direction. The 'tolerated costs' of arms control and 
intrusive measures should thus not be weighed simply against the expected gains at 
the time of the ratification, but also against the benefits of having the relevant area of 
the relationship under verified constraint in any future period of ill will. 
6. The Technology of Verification 
Technological development, itself responsible for the greater availability and 
affordability of weapons themselves, is also a critical element in verifying their 
control. Before examining existing verification regimes, a brief overview of the 
technological possibilities and their respective qualities and drawbacks is warranted. 
This section will look at the role of national technical means (NTM) and other 
cooperative measures of verification. It will examine their strengths and the 
weakness with respect to the purpose and role of verification regime.  
                                                 
53 UN publications Verification in All Its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the 
Field of Verification (A/50/377, 22 September 1995). 
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6.1. National Technical Means 
National technical means (NTM) represent the method of verification most 
commonly used in international agreements thus far. One state verifies that another 
state is complying without entering the other states territory.54 NTM incorporates 
non-intrusive types of technological ability to observe the activities of another state, 
including image- and signal- collecting satellites, submarine and air platform 
observation and signal-collecting abilities. Technical means include seismic 
detectors, nuclear radiation detectors, radio waves, radar, and visible infrared light.55  
However, as their name implies, NTM are those of individual states and while this 
trait may have offered more credibility to their inclusion in bilateral regimes, their 
unilateral ownership is a contentious – or potentially so – issue within multilateral 
regimes. 
NTM can be roughly divided into two forms of intelligence gathering: IMINT 
(image intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence). 
IMINT primarily refers to observation satellites56 that transmit collected data to 
ground-based receiving stations and to the abilities of national intelligence agencies 
to process and interpret this data. The spacecraft may carry a variety of sensors and 
in some cases carry equipment to record data, but in general this information is 
passed on in digital form to the receiving station where it is converted, interpreted, 
and even enhanced through the use of other information sources and previously 
recorded images.  
Satellites can collect useful images of the Earth's surface through many means, active 
and passive, and in much of the electromagnetic spectrum, from shorter-than-
ultraviolet wavelengths through thermal infrared and reflected radar waves. Many 
features may be considered in characterizing the usefulness of a satellite imaging 
system (inclination, revisit time, spectral sensitivity, and imaging capacity, for 
instance), but resolution is one of the most commonly invoked. Discussions of 
resolution can quickly become highly complex; for present purposes, however, it can 
be understood as the minimum separation between two similar objects needed for an 
imaging system to distinguish the objects as two rather than one.57  
                                                 
54 S. Lubensky, Verification of Transparency Treaties, University of Pennsylvania Model United 
Nations Conference, Philadelphia 2000 and A.S. Krass, Arms Control Treaty Verification, in: 
R.D. Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 1, New York, NY 
1993. 
55 Radar is based on radio waves, infrared light is not visible, I would suggest the following 
technical means: seismic detectors, nuclear radiation detectors, optical surveillance, radar, 
radio surveillance. 
56 Only six countries – France, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, Russia and the 
United States – currently operate remote – sensing satellite systems. 
57 Presidential Directive 23 (PDD 23), issued in 1994, states that dissemination of imagery with 
resolution of one meter or less might be harmful to U.S. national security. J.T. Black, 
Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?, in: Naval War College Review 52/1 (Winter 
1999). For a more detailed discussion on satellite imagery and the technical aspects of 
resolution measurement, see A.M. Florini, The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites 
and U.S. Security, in: International Security (Fall 1998), pp. 103-23, and Gupta, pp. 94-125. 
PDD 23 has never been published in its entirety, but a press release discussing policy based on 
it is available at 
www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uries/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/3/11/3.text.1. For a 
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Generally, optical and radar sensors are carried on separate observation satellites. For 
example, the French SPOT, the Indian IRS-1C and the US Landsat have optical 
sensors only while the European ERS and the Japanese JERS series of satellites and 
the Canadian Radarsat carry only a radar sensor. While the SPOT satellites carry 
both panchromatic and multispectral sensors, the range and the spectral resolutions 
are not as good as those of the US Landsat satellites. However, the latter does not 
have a panchromatic sensor on board. On the other hand the Indian IRS-1C carries 
both panchromatic and multispectral sensors, the latter being as good as the Landsat 
TM sensor with the exception of the thermal IR sensor. The IRS-1C has no thermal 
sensor. Consider first optical multispectral images only.58 The American U-2 flights 
will increase the speed of the inspections in two ways. First, data will be available 
sooner. The UN does not have real-time access to satellite data, but the U-2's have 
large, steerable satellite dishes on top, meaning images could be beamed back live.59 
The U-2's camera will provide 15 cm resolution – about the size of a petri dish – and 
can sweep up swathes of imagery, 120 km wide and many hundreds of kilometers 
long. The commercial imagery that commentators believe UN weapons inspectors 
are using at present, has 100 cm resolution – if they can afford it. A single set of 
commercial images covering Iraq costs about $10 million.  
The value of these images in interpreting data is primarily contingent on the 
resolution of the image, defined as the distance two objects must be from one another 
to appear distinctly in the image.60 Depending on the type of sensor used, the 
resolution of an image can be contingent on the level of technology, the height of the 
platform, and environmental conditions.  
The idea of the use of commercial observation satellites is becoming very attractive 
because the quality of such satellites has improved by a factor of at least 80 and it 
continues to improve. In 1998 of the over 2,400 satellites in Earth orbit, only about 
one hundred are operated by nongovernmental organizations or private companies.61 
That situation is changing: in 2008 as many as a thousand more commercial 
communication satellites will be placed into orbit.62 Commercially available images 
are intent on providing the highest-resolution images that money and technology 
could allow.63 They are rapidly driving their systems to one-meter resolution and 
while US military satellite capabilities are not public, it is certain that resolution 
capabilities are well below one meter.  
                                                                                                                                          
discussion of PDD 23, see B. Sweetman, Spy Satellites: The Next Leap Forward, in: Jane's 
International Defence Review (January 1997), p. 30. 
58 B. Jasani, Role of Satellites in Arms Control Monitoring by Year 2000 and Beyond, Paper 
presented at the ESARDA (European Safeguards R&D Association) Symposium, Montpellier, 
France, 13-15 May 1997. 
59 D. Carrington, Spy planes “significant” boost to weapons inspections, in: New Scientist 
(February 17, 2003). 
60 Technically speaking, spatial resolution is the ground area displayed in a single pixel (picture 
element). 
61 U.S. Space Command, “Satellite Boxscore”, 14 January 1998, avaible at 
www.spacecom.af.mil/ usspace/boxscore.htm (18 January 1998). 
62 R. Ropelewski, Satellite Services Soar, in: Aerospace America (November 1996), p. 26. 
63 J.T. Black, Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?, in: Naval War College Review 
52/1 (Winter 1999). 
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According to Miasnikov,64 due to modern commercial satellites capability of taking 
pictures of any place on the globe with a resolution sufficient the NTM capabilities 
have grown in the meantime. 65 
Remote-sensing satellites66 offer the possibility of collecting images in many parts of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, each of which may have a particular attraction or 
weakness depending on the verification task. Within the range of visible and 
reflected infrared light, one can “photograph” a greater range of spectral light than 
that observed by the human eye. One particularly useful capability is that of 
distinguishing between healthy vegetation (which greatly reflects infra-red energy) 
and what might be simply green-coloured camouflage material.67  
However, because these images are dependent on the use of light already present at 
the scene, they are of little use for observation at night and are unable to penetrate 
heavy cloud cover.  
Another limitation to images in this range is that the sensitivity of photographic film 
lessens significantly for longer wavelengths. Very small electro-optical detectors 
called charge-coupled devices (CCDs) can overcome this problem to some degree. 
CCDs convert photons into electrical signal forming an image out of “pixels” 
(picture elements), which can be recorded and restored as a visual image by the data 
interpreters. These images have the advantage of requiring much less exposure time 
and because they are directly available in electronic format they are easily 
transmitted, processed and enhanced by computer.  
The thermal infrared range offers the possibility of obtaining images when natural 
light is not available, at night or under cloud cover. Satellites are equipped with 
sensors that record amounts of heat energy given off within a given band of 
wavelengths that is not absorbed by the earth's atmosphere and ozone layer. Thus, 
images will portray sources of heat that are substantially above ground temperature, 
including operating vehicles and heated buildings. 
Radar measurements can also be made from remote platforms. By artificially 
illuminating a target with electromagnetic waves, radar can “see” in the dark of night 
and by employing relatively long wavelengths, it is not seriously impeded by cloud 
cover. One drawback is that radar would require an antenna several kilometers long 
in order to collect images of any useful resolution. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is 
able to overcome this obstacle by using the movement of the satellite to mimic the 
effect of a long antenna.  
                                                 
64 Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at 
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Russia. Bulletin 21 – Lessons from Control 
Regimes: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control. Lessons for a Future Multilateral Verification 
System, available at www.inesap.org/bulletin21/bul21art25.htm. 
65 International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European-Russian Framework 
of Cooperative Security Berlin (Germany), January 24-26, 2003.  
66 B. Jasani, Role of Satellites in Arms Control Monitoring by Year 2000 and Beyond, Paper 
presented at the ESARDA (European Safeguards R&D Association) Symposium, Montpellier, 
France, 13-15 May 1997: Information derived from imaging radar, such as a synthetic aperture 
radar (SAR), is very different from that obtained from optical sensors. This is because a SAR is 
particularly sensitive to the geometrical characteristics of the surface and the object being 
monitored as well as to their dielectric properties.  




SAR has the added advantage in the sense that, the resolution of collected images are 
not necessarily hindered by higher altitudes.68 However, the power requirements for 
necessary computer functions and for the emission of sufficiently strong radar signals 
have often been considered prohibitive to conventionally-powered satellites.69 
A number of SAR sensors are now in orbit operated by various countries. A multi-
channel radar exploits the fact that the interaction of microwave beam with matter is 
influenced by frequency and polarization of a radar beam. The response of the latter 
to different shapes or scattering elements of an object will depend on the selection of 
horizontal or vertical polarization. The US SIR-C/X-SAR experiments during April 
and October 1994 generated such multi-parameter SAR data from space. The 
greatest advantage of a SAR sensor is its ability to provide all-weather day and night 
information. 70 
Signals intelligence satellites (SIGINT) are designed to detect transmissions from 
broadcast communications systems such as radios, as well as radars and other 
electronic systems. The interception of such transmissions can provide information 
on the type and location of even low power transmitters, such as hand-held radios. 
However, these satellites are not capable of intercepting communications carried 
over land lines, such as under-sea fibre optic cables (nor can they detect non-
electronic communications, such as the spoken word).  
SIGINT is a second category of NTM, and consists of several categories. 
Communications intelligence (COMINT) is directed at the analysis of the source and 
content of message traffic. While most military communications are protected by 
encryption techniques, computer processing can be used to decrypt some traffic, and 
additional intelligence can be derived from analysis of patterns of transmissions over 
time. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is devoted analysis of non-communications 
electronic transmissions. This would include telemetry from missile tests (TELINT), 
or radar transmitters (RADINT).  
Commonly known for its reconnaissance uses during World War I and II, SIGINT 
can be a valuable tool for the verification of arms control agreements because access 
to both communications and electronic signals would provide clear signals in the 
case of any covert weapons development or testing.71  
SIGINT can be evaded by encrypting transmitted signals or by recording them and 
dropping them to designated receivers without transmitting through the air. However, 
the SALT agreements set a precedent that included a facilitating agreement not to 
evade SIGINT in these ways. It has become a general standard that encrypted 
signals, if proven to pertain to a treaty-limited arms system, are a sure sign of illegal 
activities. 
                                                 
68 When images are made from a position directly vertically above a target, resolution actually 
increases with distance above the ground. 
69 The US Lacrosse radar satellite, launched in December 1988, has perhaps disproved the 
accepted conclusions that SAR would require a nuclear power sources. Lacrosse is suspected 
to collect images below 1 meter in resolution. See R. Kokowski, National Technical Means, in: 
R. Kokoski and S. Koulik (eds.), Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: 
Technological Constraints and Opportunities, Westview Press 1990, p. 20-23 and J.T. 
Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space, New York 1990, p. 218-228. 
70 Jasani, op. cit., 1997. 
71 Data from a weapons test is normally transmitted via radio waves. 
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This description of NTM capabilities in the verification context is not 
comprehensive, but it does suggest some unique assets to this means of verification.  
First, they offer global coverage, as well as the possibility of focusing on particular 
areas through the use of satellites in geostationary orbits.  
Second, “downlinking” satellites makes the collected data available for analysis in 
near-real time.  
Third, the use of satellites for verification purposes is an accepted principle that is 
not considered a violation of national sovereignty.  
Thus data collection can take place wherever and as often as desired without the 
sensitive process of requesting access. Lastly, the secrecy in which the information 
are held, the exact capabilities and specific operating procedures for satellites means 
that “inspected” states are unaware of how they are being observed and thus less 
likely to be able to avert detection of any particular activity.72 
6.2. Aerial overflights 
Less intrusive than on-site inspections and less expensive than NTM,73 “aerial 
overflights can be used where resources or circumstances prohibit the use of ground 
inspections or ATM, but they work most effectively in conjunction with other 
methods.”74  
The signature of the Open Skies Agreement has highlighted the possible uses of 
airborne verification technology, in particular the cameras and sensors permissible 
under an agreement and the freedom to fly over land at a given altitude.  
Political factors emerging during negotiation of this type of verification regime 
determine the constraints on the technology. For example in Open Skies treaty 
negotiations, fears regarding the collection of data unrelated to arms control treaties 
dictated the amount of time an airplane may spend over a given piece of ground and 
common level of technological development and budget constraints determined the 
selection of equipment mentioned in the treaty. However, a broad array of aerial 
overflight technologies exists and suggests the flexibility of this method. 
Several types of cameras exist for this purpose. Optical cameras can be bought “off-
the-shelf”, providing a simple and inexpensive means of collecting high resolution 
images, subject only to the constraints of altitude from which the photos are taken,75 
atmospheric and light conditions, and film processing quality. Framing cameras take 
pictures vertically, limited area coverage being compensated by flying back and forth 
in a grid-like pattern to cover every piece of ground.  
                                                 
72 F. Partlow, Jr., The Verification Triad, in: M. Krepon and A.E. Smithson (eds.), Open Skies, 
Arms Control, and Cooperative Security, New York 1992, pp. 55-56. 
73 To be clear, the aerial platforms are less expensive to build and operate than artificial satellites, 
although it is likely that satellite imagery can be offered at a price competitive with that of 
aerial imagery. 
74 J.P. Tracey and A.E. Smithson, Sensors and Platforms for Aerial Overflights, in: Krepon and 
Smithson, (eds.), opt. cit., 1992. See also J. Altmann, The Potential of Technology for the 
Control of Small Weapons: Applications in Developing Countries, in: SAND98-0505/16, July 
2000, p. 13. 
75 Resolutions from a few inches to one foot are possible from a height of 1000 to 3000 feet, 
Ibid., p. 74. 
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Three-dimensional stereoscopic images can be produced by combining the first 
vertical photo with one taken from a different angle, allowing accurate height 
measurements of objects on the ground. Oblique cameras are pointed at a non-
vertical angle allowing greater area coverage, but producing different scales and 
levels of resolution for different parts of the image. Panoramic and multi-lens 
cameras produce images for a 180 degree area below the plane.  
Multispectral cameras, infrared sensors, and radar sensors are more expensive than 
their optical counterparts but offer the same advantages during overflights that they 
do for NTM images but with the added bonus of a much lower altitude and thus 
much higher resolution. 
Remote air monitoring is possible by sampling and analyzing air from different 
points above the ground. Air samplers allow particle collection or “precipitation 
scavenging” – the collection of cloud droplets, rain or snow. New cryogenic 
samplers, for example, allow the collection of whole air samplers without 
concentration. Then with various analysis techniques, it is possible to determine the 
presence or level of toxins in the sample and weather patterns are analyzed to track 
the location of any toxin's source. 
6.3. On-site inspection technology 
To describe all of the instruments useful for the conduct of an on-site inspection 
would be an overly ambitious project. First, on-site inspections vary significantly in 
technical difficulty. In many cases, the task is only to observe the destruction of an 
item, something that may require only a set of binoculars and a clipboard, such as in 
some inspections within the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). In 
contrast, an on-site inspection to verify the absence of a small, mobile item or small 
amounts of a banned substance in a certain area may suggest the need for a more 
sophisticated array of instruments.  
However, the choice of verification technology made within each regime is 
contingent not only on technical qualifications but also on the political and financial 
perspectives of the parties. In many cases, the parties' perceptions of adequate 
verification stops short of the technological possibilities available. The added cost-be 
it monetary cost or the loss of privacy incurred by further intrusiveness- involved in 
the use of high tech instruments is deemed higher than the value of the additional 
confidence in the verification task. For this reason, several designs which exist for 
verification instruments have never been implemented in an actual regime.  
The most common technologies used for inspections are, thus, simple instruments 
whose uses need no explanation: cameras, tape recorders, rulers, flashlights, 
binoculars, X-ray devices, etc. In some cases, the manner in which these may be used 
is limited by prior agreement. Locks and seals are also common items which are 
valuable because they can be examined for tampering or any other signs of illegal 
access.  
Tags are another type of technology that can prove very useful to verification 
projects, but have not as yet been included in any agreements. A tag marks an object 
uniquely. A seal or a lock links two objects. Both indicate whether an object has been 
tampered with. There are many different forms of tags, seals, and locks.76 Tags and 
                                                 
76 See, for example U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 
Verification Technologies, Washington, DC 1992. 
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seals are currently being considered for use in securing key elements associated with 
the Chemical Weapon Convention, weapon dismantlement, and the containers 
designated to transport and store U.S. and Russian special nuclear material.77 In 
general, suggested tagging systems would include some kind of label for each treaty-
limited item (TLI), along the lines of the serial numbers that are now used to identify 
the different items in CFE dismantlement projects. Once a tagging system is 
implemented, any untagged or improperly tagged item that is discovered is clearly a 
treaty violation.  
Even small random samples chosen for inspection would statistically offer high 
chances for detecting a violation.78The advantage of more sophisticated tagging 
technologies is that, unlike most painted-on numbers, they can be designed to 
prevent counterfeiting, “spoofing”, or unobserved tampering. “Fingerprint” tags, 
such as those developed by the Argonne National Laboratory and Sandia National 
Labs would create a unique signature for each TLI, so that chances of detection 
would reach 98% for even a minor violation at a single site.79 Electronic tags could 
even be given the capability to emit signals so that they might be read by inspectors 
from a distance of several meters or even by airborne sensors, decreasing the 
intrusiveness of inspections. The possibilities are endless80 and vary in price 
according to their level of sophistication. While not yet implemented in an active 
verification regime, these products are being marketed and will continue to emerge 
as choices in future verification efforts.  
6.4. Perimeter or portal monitoring 
Ground sensors placed at strategic points, such as entry and exit points to a facility; 
offer an efficient and non-intrusive method of verification. Perimeter monitoring 
scouts prohibits traffic at a given installation and can be verified by simply sealing 
unguarded entrances and checking soil for vehicle traces or it can be monitored with 
more costly, yet still simple technology such as infrared detectors, television 
cameras, pressure-sensitive cables, seismic sensors, short-range radar or 
light/microwave beam interruption devices – all of which are commonly used in 
civilian security systems. 
Point controls can regulate the traffic through a certain point, for example to insure 
that treaty-limited items are not being covertly transported.81 Objects can be 
monitored to ensure that all traffic passes through given points and then various 
techniques are available to verify the contents of that traffic. Simple weighing 
stations can be used to indicate vehicles that contain items of a suspicious size and 
weight. Geophones, or ground vibration sensors, can be installed to insure that this 
type of sensor is not circumvented. An induction loop built into a road surface can 
                                                 
77 Sandia's Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Programs, FactSheet 13. 
78 For example, according to one calculation the probability of detecting a single violation in a 
sample of 20,000 tanks at 50 different sites within one year would be 50%. See S. Fetter and T. 
Garwin, Tagging, in: Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, op. cit., p. 143. 
79 Ibid. 
80 For a more detailed description of existing tag designs, see P.M. Lewis, Technological aids for 
on-site inspection and monitoring, in: J. Grinn and H.v.d. Graaf (eds.), Unconventional 
Approaches to Conventional Arms Control Verification, New York 1990, pp. 223-241. 
81 For example, the INF Treaty employs portal monitoring at production plants to ensure that 
given categories of missiles are being transported from the facility. 
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detect the type and length of a vehicle, which will cause changes in loop inductivity 
as the metal axles pass above. 
Likewise, pressure-sensitive cables can measure axle weight as a vehicle passes. 
Light-beam interruption devices can sense the profile of a vehicle and closed-circuit 
TV cameras can be used to record an image of any passing vehicles.  
If any suspicious vehicles are discovered, verification would have to become more 
intrusive. Either the vehicle could be opened to authorized inspection, which would 
generally involve further measurements of the items being transported or X-raying 
devices can be used to gather further information about the contents.82 
6.5. Monitoring underground explosions 
Various types of underground sensors possess specific relevance to the verification 
of nuclear test bans or limitations. Based on the same equipment used to evaluate the 
severity of earthquakes, this technology can be used to verify the size or occurrence 
of nuclear test explosions by placing sensors within strategic distances of suspected 
or known test sights. These sensors measure the seismic waves that radiate from 
underground explosions, using either seismic or hydrodynamic methods to determine 
the size of a given explosion. 
Seismic monitoring involves the measurement of underground waves at seismic 
stations (observatories) and the comparison of recorded data with known geological 
conditions at the estimated site of explosion to determine the source and size of an 
explosion. “Teleseismic surface waves” travel along the Earth's surface and can be 
recorded from over 2,000 kilometers away while higher-frequency “body waves” 
travel within the Earth's crust and outer layers are observable over shorter distances 
such as from “in-country” seismic stations. 
Hydrodynamic measurements, known by the acronym CORRTEX83 can estimate the 
source and size by observing the velocity of a seismic shock wave in the rock in the 
immediate vicinity of an explosion. CORRTEX measurements require the placement 
of a cable in a “satellite” hole very close84 to the actual emplacement of the nuclear 
explosive. This type of measurement is far more intrusive because it requires the 
presence of observers and equipment so near to the test site and can reveal sensitive 
data about the explosive device itself. Meanwhile CORRTEX is unable to detect the 
occurrence of an undeclared explosion because the site must be known ahead of 
time. However, CORRTEX may be more precise than seismic monitoring in 
verifying accurately very low yield explosions.  
6.6. Conclusion on the role of technologies in verification regime 
Not every one of the technologies described above is applicable to every regime, nor 
is any single method necessarily a sufficient means of verification. However, as will 
be seen in the description of existing verification regimes, combinations of 
verification methods, legal provisions and institutional frameworks seek to reinforce 
the accurate interpretation of collected data. This layering of technological means 
and supporting treaty provisions is known as synergism and is a critical element to 
the success of any verification regime. 
                                                 
82 Such as the Cargoscan X-ray at the Votkinsk missile production facility within the INF regime. 
83 Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiments. 
84 Within 25 meters of the site of a 150 kiloton explosion. 
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Chapter 2 Frameworks of Verification: From Bilateral to Global 
So far the examples used to describe the role of politics and the definition of 
adequate verification have been limited primarily to bilateral agreements between the 
United States and USSR. That two countries as antagonistic as these during the Cold 
War can make highly intrusive verification regimes work supports the credibility of 
verification regimes in many other areas of disarmament and in other parts of the 
world.  
As will be shown the number and character of participants and negotiation fora is as 
numerous and diverse as the objects of verification: 
Treaties concluded in the bilateral, East-West forum of negotiations such as the 
SALT accords, the INF Treaty, START II, and I and the Test Ban treaties 
demonstrate the evolution of verification regimes in one complex rivalry.  
Multilateral regimes, such as those established for the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in 
Antarctica, the Sea Bed, and Outer Space, for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offer examples of a global definition 
and the practice of international verification.  
The realm of regional agreements suggests the applicability of verification principles 
and practice in nearly every area of the world and in many different forms including 
bilateral regimes, regional organizations, and third-party arrangements.  
The broad span of UN activities, marked particularly by the activities of UNSCOM: 
monitoring and verification of Iraq in order to assure that Iraq did not reconstitute or 
retain its prohibited chemical and biological weapons and missiles with a range 
greater than 150 kilometres.85  
Finally the multiple export control regimes exemplify the need for and advantages of 
a layered approach to verification. 
The following chapters will discuss the development of existing verification regimes 
within bilateral, multilateral, regional, and UN frameworks and will show the 
strengths and weaknesses of various methods and institutions within these regimes.  
1. Bilateral Verification 
The ancient roots of the concept of verification were noted in the introduction and 
later chapters on multilateral and regional agreements will indicate that modern ideas 
of monitoring compliance with agreed principles are by no means limited to the 
context of bilateral superpower agreements. However, the recent history of 
verification does in many ways parallel the chronological developments of 
                                                 
85 By resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, the Security Council approved the Plan for 
establishing such monitoring in the chemical, biological and missile areas. Two reports drawn 
up by the Special Commission: one on the current state of affairs with respect to the 
disarmament of Iraq's proscribed weapons; the other on ongoing monitoring and verification in 
Iraq, 25 January 1999. The mandate of UNSCOM, as described in resolution 687, included: 
Carrying out on-site inspections of Iraq's chemical, biological and missile capabilities; Taking 
possession of Iraq's CB weapons and all stocks of agents, all sub-systems and components, and 
all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities, and to destroy, remove or 
render harmless of all these items; Supervising the destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150 km together with related major parts; To undertake the 
further monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance its unconditional obligation not to use, 
develop, construct or acquire any of the above mentioned weapon categories.  
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superpower arms control. Rapid technological progress in verification technology, in 
great part motored by the arms race and consequent attention to sophisticated 
weapon technology, as well as the backing of the two states with a virtual monopoly 
on global political power have opened the door for the formal elaboration and 
implementation of verification regimes.  
Many aspects of today's extensive verification regimes were first made acceptable 
through bilateral agreements.86 Partly, this is because the weapons limited by early 
arms control agreements were the exclusive possessions of the United States and 
Soviet Union. More importantly the bilateral format allowed the two parties to keep a 
tight rein on the negotiations over their nuclear weapons, the most critical elements 
of their national security strategy. No other format would have been acceptable.  
Whether the evolution of bilateral verification provisions – from mere recognition of 
national technical means of monitoring compliance to complex and intrusive on-site 
inspections – was a recognition of mutual interest in confidence that agreements 
were being upheld or was a diplomatic “accident” that found both parties surprised 
that the other was accepting such extensive proposals, they established precedents. 
Just as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War may be seen as 
stepping stones to a “new world order” based on multilateralism and globalism, the 
concepts established in the SALT, INF, START and Test Ban talks can be seen as 
stepping stones in the broadening application of principles of verification. 
While the era of bilateral agreements between two nuclear-armed superpowers seems 
to have expired, the complex arms control environment left in its place still derives 
valuable lessons from the successes and failures of the original efforts to limit 
strategic weapons.  
1.1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, ABM Treaty and SALT II) 
The SALT Agreements imposed the first ever actual limits on strategic hardware and 
thus mark the first time the two hostile superpowers broached the subject of 
“effective” verification of each other's treaty compliance. The regime that was 
established can be considered the first step in the development of the bilateral 
approach to verification and the lessons learned have been reflected in the 
development of subsequent regimes. Of SALT Agreements,87 actually a series of 
documents signed during the course of the 1970's, one speaks most often of three of 
the accords:  
1. The 1972 ABM Treaty – accompanied by its 1974 Protocol – placed numerical 
and qualitative restraints on ballistic missile defense systems and technology 
for an indefinite duration.88  
2. The 1972 Interim Agreement – together with the ABM Treaty, known as 
SALT I – imposed a five-year quantitative limit on each of the superpowers' 
                                                 
86 See G.T. Allison, O.R. Cote Jr., R.A. Falkenrath, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, in: The 
Washington Quarterly, 20/3 (1997), pp. 185-198. See also, J. Cirincione, New Initiatives 
toward a world with fewer nuclear weapons, in: disarmament forum 20/2,3 (1997), pp. 18-31. 
87 G.C. Smith, Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator, 
Lanham, MD 1996, pp. 174-175. Treaty details from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Washington, DC 1996. 
88 The 1972 Treaty limited the USA and USSR to two ABM systems each, this number was then 
cut to one each in the 1974 Protocol. Moreover, the parties are not permitted to test or operate 
any other system in a manner that serves the purpose of ballistic missile defences.  
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intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs) or more precisely on their launchers. 
3. The 1979 SALT II Treaty limited the number of total strategic missile 
launchers and warheads or re-entry vehicles per missile. Although it was never 
ratified and legally brought into force, both parties respected their obligations 
until at least 1986.89  
Table 2: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements  
 SALT I SALT II 
Deployed Warhead Limit Limited Missiles, 
Not Warheads 
Limited Missiles and Bombers, Not 
Warheads 
Deployed Delivery Vehicle 
Limit 
U.S.: 1,710 ICBMs & SLBMs; USSR: 
2,347 ICBMs & SLBMS 
2250 
Status Expired Never Entered Into Force 
Date Signed May 26, 1972 June 18, 1979 
Date Entered Into Force October 3, 1972 Not Applicable 
Implementation Deadline Not Applicable December 31, 1981 
Expiration Date October 3, 1977 December 31, 1985 
Verification provisions of the three are based on the use of national technical means 
and a common framework of consultation, but there are differences between the 
various agreements that reflect the technological and political environments in which 
they evolved, and in the case of SALT II, the experience drawn from its preceding 
agreements. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT) known as the Moscow Treaty concluded by United States and Russia, on 24 
May 2002 has no verification provisions. 
1.2. SALT Verification regime 
1.2.1 Characteristics of the verification regime 
The SALT verification regime rests solely on the use of "national technical means" 
(most importantly, satellite observation and SIGINT90) to monitor treaty compliance. 
While the purpose of the SALT talks was to limit the number of strategic nuclear 
missiles in each party's possession, the agreements actually focused on the number of 
launchers for these missiles. The launchers being a much larger object and much 
more difficult to conceal, yet essential to the use of any strategic missiles, national 
technical means were agreed to be a sufficient way of monitoring the numbers and 
locations of these missiles. The legitimacy of NTM as the sole method of verification 
was strengthened by two significant factors.  
First, a mutual understanding had long existed between the US and USSR as to the 
acceptability of satellite monitoring of national territory. Unlike aerial 
reconnaissance, remote sensing is not considered a violation of national sovereignty 
and thus has the benefits of being a highly “unintrusive” means of verification.  
Second, "rules and principles" were established for the implementation of the treaty 
in order to increase the verification abilities of NTM. Memorandums of 
Understanding were attached to each treaty specifying agreed definitions of treaty 
limited items, including the stage of production at which limitations begin to apply. 
                                                 
89 In 1986, President Reagan announced that in response to alleged Soviet violations, the US 
would no longer consider itself bound by the SALT I or II agreements, with the exception of 
the ABM Treaty. 
90 “Signals intelligence” will monitor military communications in the Soviet Union. 
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Counting rules specified agreed methods for tabulating the number of missiles held 
by a party by relating them to an easily observable item. For example, a silo observed 
by NTM was considered to contain the maximum number of missiles it could hold 
and counted towards aggregate totals accordingly. Notifications were required of 
certain activities, such as ICBM launches.91 Functionally-related and externally 
observable design features were required to distinguish between “look-alikes”, those 
objects limited by the treaty that closely resemble an unlimited item. In this way, 
prior agreement to principles, allowed assumption (as long as they were not proven 
wrong) to compensate for dependence on a limited number of monitoring methods. 
Importantly, these rules and principles were placed in attached Agreed Statements 
and Common Understandings separate from the accords. Under SALT I they were 
thus unsigned and not legally binding; SALT II derived lessons from this ambiguity 
and incorporated even more detailed wording, this time signed and binding. One 
particular issue made this accomplishment significant. During the 1970's a huge 
debate had erupted over the Soviet encryption of telemetry during missile test flights, 
with the US insisting that this was a violation of the SALT principle against 
“deliberate concealment measures which impede verification” of compliance by 
NTM and that failure to resolve the issue would jeopardize Congressional ratification 
of the treaty.92 
The creation of a Standing Consultative Committee93 (SCC) is a second innovation 
of the SALT verification regime which has had a profound effect on bilateral and 
multilateral approaches to verification. The SCC is a joint body made up of delegates 
from each of the two parties and a staff as considered necessary, meeting as 
requested by either party but at minimum twice a year. It has no legal or 
jurisdictional authority but rather derives its power from the consensus it seeks to 
establish between the two governments. As negotiator Gerard Smith described it: “Its 
general purpose is to make the agreements more viable, by clearing up ambiguities 
which were expected to crop up as the agreements are implemented – and so it 
has.”94 SCC business is conducted in private, encouraging “serious negotiation and 
the resolution of disputes by allowing sensitive issues and ideas to be realized in the 
absence of public pressures”,95 and until autumn 1992, all proceedings and 
documents remained classified.96 
                                                 
91 G.C. Smith, op. cit., 1996, pp 174-175, see also S. Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT 
II, New York 1980. 
92 See S. Talbott, Scrambling and Spying in SALT II, in: International Security (Fall 1979). 
93 The SCC is described by Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, Article VI of the Interim Agreement, 
as well as Article XVii of SALT II. The Accidents Agreement of 1971 was also placed within 
its scope. 
94 G. Smith, Doubletalk, New York 1988, p. 99. 
95 J. Boulde, Bilateral Nuclear Agreements: The Standing Consultative Commission and the 
Special Verification Commission, in: E. Morris (ed.), International Verification Organizations, 
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York 1991, p. 205. 
96 Paragraph 8 of the SCC regulations maintained the confidentiality of SCC proceedings and 
documents to protect sensitive information. For example, the Soviets were particularly 
concerned that the dismantlement guidelines could reveal sensitive information relating to the 
design of Soviet ballistic missiles. This became a great issue of contention under the Reagan 
Administration when compliance issues were made public. The SCC session in autumn 1992 
reinterpreted Paragraph 8 intention as protection of discussions related to sensitive issues, but 




The achievements of the SCC however are mixed. While thought to have played a 
valuable role during the 1970's, it encountered difficulties after 1979. Between 1973 
and 1978, the SCC was successful in outlining procedures for dismantling systems 
and mediating several compliance disputes; the minor nature of these disputes is 
perhaps a credit to the crisis-mediation of the organization. The SALT II agreement 
actually expanded the role of the SCC, by making it responsible for an agreed 
database on numbers of strategic offensive arms.  
The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States on a platform 
attacking the “fatal flaws” of SALT II marks the degeneration of SCC consultation. 
Although the role of the ABM Treaty and role of the SCC were upheld at the 2nd 
review conference in 1982, a US 1984 law began mandating an annual report to 
Congress on possible cases of Soviet non-compliance. Making Soviet compliance a 
high-priority, high-publicity issue, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger described 
the SCC as “a diplomatic carpet under which Soviet violations have been 
continuously swept, an Orwellian memory hole into which our concerns have been 
dumped like yesterday's trash.”97  
Finally on May 27, 1986, Reagan announced withdrawal from SALT I and II 
commitments.98 “The new atmosphere of public accusation coupled with official 
unwillingness to use the SCC effectively led the forum into a period where it was 
viewed negatively from without and was deadlocked from within.”99 While the SCC 
remained officially responsible for the ABM Treaty, the US refused to discuss 
interpretation issues there, plagued as these were by the recent US announcement of 
the “Star Wars” research on a space-based missile defense system and the now-
admitted Soviet violation at Krasnoyarsk. These issues have since been taken up in 
relation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.  
The evident conclusion from the SALT experience is that while verification 
technology, carefully constructed treaty provisions, and mechanisms of mediation all 
contribute to a competent regime, the bilateral verification regime is only as strong as 
each party's political will.  
The SCC and verification rules went a long way to maintain a stable regime, but the 
unresolved issues and ambiguous activities that remained were easily exploited by all 
those uninterested in controlling arms. The SCC has been criticized for not taking 
full advantage of its mandate to monitor events and future trends. Nevertheless, the 
technological capabilities and joint body only function with the backing of the two 
parties and can be distorted to fit the political will of one or the other. As one 
                                                                                                                                          
Graybeal and P.A. McFate, More Light on the ABM Treaty, in: Arms Control Today (March 
1993), p. 15. 
97 Cited in M.Krepon, Even Before Iceland, the compliance Machinery was Under Siege, in: 
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 27. October 1986. 
98 S. Schwartz et al, Atomic Audit: the Cost and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 
1940, Washington, D.C. 1998, Table A-2; R.E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United 
States and the Nuclear Arms Race 1981-1999, New York 2000. 
99 Boulden, op. cit., p. 210. 
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Pentagon advisor has noted, “American monitoring capabilities are so good, we're 
finding violations the Russians haven't even committed.”100 
1.3. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
The verification regime set up in the context of the INF Treaty (also called the 
Washington Treaty) eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles, is a 
landmark in the development of intrusive verification measures. Paradoxically, the 
Reagan administration hard line against compliance issues that had driven SALT into 
the ground was the primary impetus to the furthest-reaching, most comprehensive 
verification system to date.  
The INF Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988. By May 1991, implementation of 
the Treaty had resulted in the elimination of 846 intermediate and shorter-range U.S. 
missile systems, including the modernized Pershing II, and 1,846 Soviet missile 
systems, including the SS-20. The last declared INF missile (a Soviet SS-20) and its 
transfer vehicle were destroyed on May 28, 1991. However, the ban on the 
possession, production, or flight-testing of INF missiles remains in force, as the 
treaty is of unlimited duration. On May 31, 2001, all inspections and monitoring 
under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ceased. 
In a political manoeuvre to block the USSR from establishing an overwhelming 
superiority of offensive forces in the European theatre by maintaining deployment of 
SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), Reagan proposed the “zero 
option”, or complete elimination of INF missiles in the region. When Gorbachev, as 
part of his “new political thinking” and ambition to stabilize relations with the West, 
surprised the Administration by accepting not only the “zero-option”, but the 
inclusion of shorter-range INF (SRINF) forces, the verification issue became the 
keystone of American negotiating policy and the primary means to control the speed 
and depth of an arms control agreements whose strategic implications had only 
begun to be realized.101  
The Administration's early support for “iron clad” verification capable of detecting 
any violation was a certain way of halting any arms control, as Soviets had long 
shied from the discussion of intrusive verification measures and as “iron clad” would 
involve an unacceptable level of intrusion and cost while still being subject to 
imperfect data and interpretation. But with Soviet acceptance of the set of 
verification principles set forward by Reagan at the Rejkjavik summit and eventual 
endorsement of an “anytime, anywhere” inspection regime102, this obstacle was 
removed, and almost by accident one might say, the two superpowers established the 
basis for “the most stringent verification regime in history”.103 
                                                 
100 Cited in: D. Aaron, Verification: Will it work?, in: New York Times Magazine (11 October 
1987), p. 123. 
101 C. Cerniello, SCC Parties Sign Agreements On Multilateralization, TMD Systems, in: Arms 
Control Today, 27/6 (September 1997). 
102 See interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov, in: Karpov Izvestia, FBIS 
– Soviet Union (23 March 1987). 
103 The words of President Reagan at the treaty signature. See Soviet Union – United States 
Summit in Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents 23 (December 14, 1987), p. 1458. 
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1.3.1 Characteristics of the INF Verification Regime 
A basic, yet critical, aspect of the INF Regime is that like the Treaty, it is bilateral. 
While the choice of the bilateral negotiating framework may not be surprising given 
the precedent of the SALT Talks, it is remarkable when one considers that the 
weapons and facilities being eliminated by this Treaty were not all located on 
national territory. Thus, both signatories, in agreeing to arms cuts and establishing a 
verification regime, were greatly affecting the military status of their allies and 
placing obligations on them that included intrusion on sovereign territory and allied 
military facilities, without involving them in either the negotiation framework or the 
resulting verification regime. In the Protocol concerning inspections, each Party took 
responsibilities for the assurances of the “basing” countries to accept inspections on 
their territory. Separate intra-alliance “basing country agreements”104 concluded in 
the week after the Washington Treaty, confirmed these countries' consent. 
By far, the greatest innovation of the INF verification regime is the layering of a 
combination of permitted methods.105 This layering offers the signatories not only 
more possibilities of noticing a violation, but also more sources of information to 
avoid making false accusations.  
First, national technical means remain a primary monitoring tool and, like in the 
SALT Agreements, the Treaty established cooperative measures for enhancing NTM 
capabilities with respect to certain systems. For instance, to manage the specific 
problem of similarity between the prohibited SS-20 and permitted SS-25 missiles, 
the Soviet Union was periodically required to open the sliding roofs of SS-25 shelters 
in order that they could be examined through satellite observation.  
Second, also along the lines of the SALT example, the Treaty requires an initial 
exchange of baseline information and continuous data exchanges on the technical 
details of missiles, launchers and supporting equipment and diagrams of designated 
sites. These exchanges are managed through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
(described below) and maintained in a common database. The innovative aspect of 
this information exchange, and likewise the most remarkable novelty of the INF 
inspection regime is the use of on-site inspections to verify. 
On-site inspections (OSI), long rejected by Soviet leaders who held to the protection 
of military secrecy and hotly debated within the American government, are the third 
component of INF verification and the most intrusive method ever implemented. 
Justifying this method in light of the highly publicized American debate over the 
Soviet treaty compliance record, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated that it 
was “absolutely essential that we have something better in the way of verification 
than we have ever had before ... the ability to go on each others soil and ... look in 
factories and look at gun sites. You have to have the ability to do what bank 
examiners do, if we want to be sure.”106 Meanwhile the Soviets, much to the 
                                                 
104 The Brussels accord was signed between the US, Belgium, the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom on 11 December 1987; a parallel Berlin Accord was signed by the USSR, 
the GDR, and Czechoslavakia. 
105 The permitted methods are detailed in Articles IX, XI and XII of the Treaty.  
106 Caspar Weinberger on Meet the Press in September of 1986. Cited in: J. Mendelsohn, INF 
Verification: A Guide for the Perplexed, in: Arms Control Today (September 1987), pp. 25-26. 
See also: J. Dean, The INF Treaty Negotiations, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1988, pp. 375-394; R.L. 
Garthoff, The Soviet SS-20 Decision, in: Survival 25/3 (May/June: 1983); J. Haslam, The 
Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe 1969-87, Ithaca 1990; H. 
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Americans initial surprise, “aggressively advertised enthusiasm for on-site 
inspection.”107 The Soviets invited a group of Congressmen and journalists to inspect 
the Krasnoyarsk radar site, long suspected as an ABM violation, and participated in a 
joint seismic monitoring event with the Natural Resources Defence Council – two 
actions that went far in increasing US confidence that this level of cooperation was 
possible. 
OSI is crucial to the verification of INF compliance because the objects of 
verification include missiles and canisters less than ten meters long. On-site 
inspections can provide detailed information from a close-up, literally hands-on 
analysis. In the end, five different types of inspection were included in the Treaty:108 
Baseline inspection were agreed as a means to verify the accuracy of the numbers 
given during initial information exchanges.109 They verified every detail contained in 
the Memorandum of understanding (MOU) and resulted in further clarifications.110 
Elimination inspections were out for any scheduled TLI (Treaty-Limited Item) 
destruction, all of which were completed in 1990. 
Close-out inspections, to be carried out within 60 days of the notified scheduled 
elimination of INF missile operating bases and support facilities, verified that the 
dismantling of bases, storage, and support facilities had been conducted in such a 
way as to end their ability to support INF systems. 
Short-notice inspections permit the signatories to examine declared and former 
missile facilities (except production facilities) for up to thirteen years after the Treaty 
entered into force to ensure that no sites have been reactivated, no remaining sites are 
concealing TLIs, and no testing sites or training facilities are being used for 
evasion.111 These inspections, still retaining a degree of “challenge” are not as 
intrusive as the original “anytime, anywhere” proposals. NTM have been left to 
ensure against undeclared sites and covert production. Inspection teams may bring 
linear measurement devices, scales, radiation detectors, and cameras,112 all of which 
are subject to inspection at the point of entry. At the end of the visit, a report is filed 
and signed jointly by the inspecting and escorting parties. 
                                                                                                                                          
Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective, New York 1989; S. Talbot, Deadly 
Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control, New York 
1985; U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact 
Statements, Washington, DC 1980, pp., 250-251. 
107 D. Aaron, Verification: Will it work?, in: New York Times Magazine (11 October 1987), p. 39. 
See also J.P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty. A History of the On-Site 
Inspections Agency and INF Implementation, 1988-1991, Collingdale 1994. 
108 The provisions for these inspections are outlined in Article XI of the Treaty. 
109 These were carried out between July 1 and Aug 29, 1988. The US inspected 129 facilities in 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, and the USSR inspected 18 facilities in the US and 13 in Italy, 
Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany. 
110 Lajoie, Insights of an On-Site Inspection, in: Arms Control Today (November 1988), p. 3. 
111 Up to twenty such inspections were permitted during the first three years, fifteen per year for 
the next five years, and ten per year for the last five years of inspection regime. 
112 Cameras may only be used with permission, in which case two case photos must be taken and 
signed by both the inspecting team leader and escort. 
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Continuous inspections or portal monitoring was permitted by each signatory at one 
production site for at least three and up to thirteen years, and includes the right to 
measure all vehicles existing in the facility and inspect the interior of those large 
enough to contain a banned missile.113 
This impressive and unprecedented array of monitoring and inspection capabilities, is 
however, only one factor in the success of the verification regime. Two other 
provisions are equally significant: the agreement to eliminate a whole category of 
weapons (as opposed to limiting or reducing them) and the added ban on all future 
flight testing.114  
First, by banning the production, storage, and deployment of all INF and SRINF, the 
Treaty made verification simpler115 by reducing the uncertainty involved, for 
example, in distinguishing the 101st missile when only 100 are permitted. In fact, the 
initial Rejkjavik agreement would have permitted the Soviet Union to maintain 100 
INF in its Asian territory, but this provision was modified in order to facilitate more 
effective verification. After agreeing to a global “zero-zero” option as the new 
agreement was called, some arms control experts acknowledged that continuous OSI 
was no longer necessary, but policymakers in both countries continued to insist on it.  
Second, by prohibiting testing, the Treaty raised the costs (both financial and to 
missile reliability) of covertly producing or maintaining the banned missiles, and 
thus increased the deterrence effect on illegal actions. 
The various institutions established within the context of INF implementation 
provide further insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the regime. The Special 
Verification Commission was set up as a forum for discussion to be convened at the 
request of either signatory to resolve compliance issues and to agree upon measures 
necessary “to improve the viability and effectiveness” of the Treaty. Since its 
creation, the role of the SVC has been questioned. It has an advantage over the SALT 
SCC because it is not linked to the controversial issue of ABM interpretation and its 
ad hoc schedule and composition offer greater flexibility. As Paul Nitze indicated, 
“In light of what we conceive as being the faster reaction time necessary under this 
treaty, we wanted a commission which could be called on a moment's notice and 
where you could really discuss such things as immediate, short-notice, on-site 
inspection ... and where the limitation on their composition and the level, et cetera, 
would be flexible.”116 The complete elimination of all INF left less need for 
negotiated interpretations. Yet, the SVC has been criticized as being powerless, 
                                                 
113 The US began portal monitoring inspections at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plan in Magna, 
Utah (a former Pershing II facility). See S.I. Griffiths, The Implementation of the INF Treaty, 
in: SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford 1990., p. 447.  
114 M.M. Lowenthal, The Politics of Verification: What's Not, in: The Washington Quarterly 
(Winter 1991), pp. 23 f. 
115 Max M. Kampelman, INF and Verification: Beyond Politics, in: International Review 
(August/September 1988), p. 12. 
116 Cited in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The INF Treaty, Report 14, April 
1988, p. 92.  
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nothing more than a formal name for a bilateral meeting that does not strengthen the 
cooperative principles.117 
In addition to the SVC, each signatory had to establish a national inspection agency. 
The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), a field-operating agency of the Department 
of Defence in the USA, was established to manage American verification measures, 
including a contract awarded to the Hughes Technical Services Company to operate 
the portal monitoring facility in Votkinsk. As discussed later, the OSIA has since 
assumed the same function under other verification regimes. In the USSR, a similar 
agency has been established under the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In 
addition, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, established by a bilateral agreement 
predating the INF Treaty, were delegated responsibility for Treaty-related 
communications and the maintenance of the common database. 
1.3.2 Evaluation of INF Verification Regime 
The INF verification regime, above all, demonstrated the value of a layered 
verification regime. NTM continue to play the lead role in providing information118 
using the initial exchanges as a basis of comparison, OSI collects information that 
can increase the detail and confidence in that information, and the JVC consultation 
forum provides for the low-key mediation of any suspected violations. Even through, 
States-parties' rights to conduct on-site inspections under the treaty ended on May 
31, 2001, the use of surveillance satellites for data collection continues. The INF 
Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) to act as an 
implementing body for the treaty, resolving questions of compliance and agreeing on 
measures to “improve [the treaty's] viability and effectiveness.”119 
In addition, the existence of more than one source of information provides political 
leaders with more leeway to publicize compliance judgements, something that is 
otherwise limited “because they might not want to reveal the source of the 
information or the method used to collect it, and because the information collected 
by NTM usually cannot provide direct evidence without further translation and 
interpretation.”120 
The success of this progressive arms control regime can also be attributed to the 
cooperation encouraged by the verification regime. On-site inspections are 
particularly valuable as a confidence-building symbol of improved cooperation, 
helping to reduce mutual suspicions and tension.121 Those involved with OSI suggest 
                                                 
117 See S. Sur, Problems of the Washington Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range 
Missiles, Research Paper 2, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, October 1988, 
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that the “human factor” – the contact of visiting inspectors with their counterparts – 
is as important as the verification factor of such visits in building confidence in treaty 
compliance. The motivation for cooperation is even greater due to the bilateral 
format of the regime in which the principle of reciprocity governs parties' interests. 
For example, the Treaty does not limit the size of the escorting team that 
accompanies on-site inspectors. So foreseeably a state concerned about protecting 
military secrecy or even a violation could reduce the effectiveness of OSI by 
surrounding the inspectors with numerous vigilant (and thus inhibiting) escorts. But 
that state would then have to expect a reciprocal lack of cooperation and possibilities 
of concealment when it inspects the other party. 
It is fair to conclude, then, that within INF “verification seems more adequate than 
effective.”122 It meets the interests of the parties in balancing the more secure 
confirmation of treaty compliance that is provided by a more intrusive regime, with 
the maintenance of control over sensitive information, which can only be guaranteed 
under less rigorous procedures. Because “iron clad” (or 100% “effective”) 
verification can never be achieved and the two parties are satisfied with the degree of 
confidence obtained in the regime described, one could also conclude however, that 
the INF regime is a remarkable success for bringing the definition of “adequate” 
verification so close to “effective”.123 As a result of the INF Treaty, the United States 
and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-
range missiles by the treaty's implementation deadline of June 1, 1991. Neither 
Washington nor Moscow now deploys such systems.124 These events brought to an 
end a remarkable chapter in arms control verification. During these 13 years a total 
of 851 inspections were conducted. US inspectors carried out approximately 60 
percent of them at 130 sites in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. Around 40 
percent were conducted by the other parties at 31 sites in the US and in the five 
Western European INF basing countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the UK).125 
Compliance verification was realized through a combination of national technical 
means, on-site inspections, and continuous portal monitoring. In addition to being the 
first nuclear agreement to reduce arms delivery vehicles, the INF Treaty was also the 
first major arms control agreement to establish a verification regime including on-site 
inspections. In all, the United States conducted 540 inspections and Russia (prior to 
December 25, 1991-the Soviet Union) conducted 311 inspections as detailed in the 
table below. 
Table 3: Inspection conducted under the INF Treaty. 
 United States S.U. / Russia 
Eliminations: 137 109 
                                                 
122 S. Sur, op. cit., 1988, p. 12. 
123 J.R. Blackwell, Contributions and Limitations of On-Site Inspections in INF and START, in: 
L.A. Dunn and A.E. Gordon (eds.), Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site 
Inspection, Lexington 1990, pp. 95-120. 
124 Arms Control, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance, Fact Sheets, 
February 2003. 
125 Office of Public Affairs, Defence Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, DC 2004. 
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Quotas: 185 141 
Closeouts: 101126 27 
Baseline: 117 34 
Totals: 540 311 
It has been said that the minimal military significance of the INF did not warrant the 
costly and elaborate verification schemes adopted, but if one looks at the effects that 
the INF example has had on subsequent bilateral and multilateral arms control 
agreements, the significance of this regime is far-reaching. 
1.4. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
The verification regime for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) can be 
seen both as the last step to a pattern of increasing rigor and intrusiveness in bilateral 
agreements, and the turning point for the superpower approach to arms control. The 
START talks began in the midst of the Cold War and had already achieved many 
valuable points of consensus by the end of 1989 when events in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe began to dramatically shake the strategic background for negotiations 
and the relationship between the two parties. “Thus, when the cold war ended, 
START had an established negotiating format. Negotiations were taking place within 
that specific format and only secondarily within an evolving political 
environment.”127 It was estimated that any shift in negotiation objectives risked the 
loss of what had already been agreed. Thus, the bilateral framework was maintained 
and in July 1991 Presidents Gorbachev and Bush signed the START I Treaty limiting 
strategic ballistic missiles, their platforms, and the weapons they carry.128 The Treaty 
reductions are to be implemented over a period of seven years after it enters into 
force, this time being divided into three phases to create a structured, verifiable 
process. 
                                                 
126 Includes the closeout inspection conducted at Saryozek, which the Special Verification 
Commission determined to be invalid; and does not include closeout inspections due to MOU 
omission (17) and collocated sites (12). Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). On-Site 
Inspection Operations, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, INF: The Beginning 
and End of an Era, available at www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/osi/Programs/ 
ops/inf/index.cfm. 
127 C.K. Regina, The START Treaty and the future of strategic nuclear arms control, in: SIPRI 
Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford 1992, p. 16. 
128 The START I Treaty consists of the Treaty text, 2 annexes, 6 protocols, one MOU and 12 
“associated documents”. Each side is allowed to keep 1600 SNDVs each on ICBMs, SLBMs, 
and heavy bombers, and no more than 6000 “accountable” warheads with sublimits of 4900 on 
ballistic missiles, 11OO on mobile ICBMs an 1540 on heavy ICBMs. “Accountable” warheads 
are determined by the counting rules in Article III.  
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Table 4: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements  
 
 
START I START II START III SORT 
Deployed 
Warhead Limit 
6,000 3,000-3,500 2,000-2,500 1,700-2,200 
Deployed Delivery 
Vehicle Limit 
1,600 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Status In Force Never Entered Into 
Force 
Never Negotiated Signed, Awaits 
Ratification 
Date Signed July 31, 1991 January 3, 1993 Not Applicable May 24, 2002 
Date Entered Into 
Force 
December 5, 1994 Not Applicable Not Applicable ? 
Implementation 
Deadline 
December 5, 2001 December 31, 2007 December 31, 2007 December 31, 2012 
Expiration Date December 5, 2009 December 5, 2009 Not Applicable December 31, 2012 
A multilateral protocol, the Lisbon Protocol of 23 May 1992 has been attached to the 
START I Treaty to include the successor states to the Soviet Union, with whom the 
Treaty had been negotiated, in the implementation and verification framework. The 
four successor states possessing strategic weapons on their soil – Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine – are identified as “the bilateral US treaty partner”.129 It 
is interesting to note that while this document commits the parties to “work out” a 
system of implementation for START I and its verification provisions, no 
verification measures whatsoever are mentioned for the mandated transfer of tactical 
weapons to Russian soil.130 In essence, the negotiations were bilateral but the 
START I Treaty is multilateral. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus have all ratified the 
Treaty,131 but Kiev has made parliamentary action conditional on security 
guarantees, financial compensation for dismantlement, and an acceptable conclusion 
to the issue of weapon control.132  
On 5 December 2001, the US and Russia reported that they had completed 
reductions mandated by the treaty133. The reductions were accomplished in three 
phases within the seven years prescribed by the treaty. Each side has reduced to less 
than 1,600 deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, 6,000 warheads on those 
missiles and bombers, and no more than 4,900 warheads on the ballistic missiles. 
Launchers associated with those missiles were also eliminated. Belarus and 
Kazakhstan now have no strategic nuclear arms, and Ukraine is in the process of 
                                                 
129 Amy Smithson, START II: Evolution or Revolution?, in: S. Sur (ed.) Verification of 
Disarmament or Limitation of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, Proposals, UNIDR, 
Geneva 1992, p. 60.  
130 See C. Paine and T.B. Cochran, Kiev Conference: Verified Warhead Controls, in: Arms 
Control Today (January/February 1992). 
131 In July 1992, November 1992, and February 1993 respectively. 
132 The Ukrainian hesitation was overcome by the extension of security guarantees from the 
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actively eliminating their remaining missiles and launchers. The strategic arsenals of 
the United States and former Soviet Union have been reduced by 30-40 percent.134  
1.4.1 Characteristics of the Regime 
The verification regime established under START I is in many ways the descendent 
of the INF regime, but is even more rigorous in light of the ambitious, yet more 
complex, technical and quantitative limits set by the treaty. It combines the 
verification provisions of its predecessors (SALT I and II, and INF), but expands 
them through even more intense and penetrating cooperation.  
First, NTM remains the cornerstone of verification procedures under the START 
regime. Although available NTM are capable of “seeing” the delivery systems 
limited by START,135 by themselves they could not reliably track mobile items, 
particularly if these were concealed, and are by no means capable of counting the 
numbers of warheads on each missile. Thus, along the lines of SALT and INF 
provisions, START established a comprehensive list of cooperative measures aiming 
to facilitate the use of NTM and increase the information available to each country. 
First, the restricted deployment approach to verifying mobile missile numbers limits 
the location, the size, and the number of missiles present at deployment sites and 
non-deployed storage sites for both road-mobile and rail-mobile missiles so that they 
can be readily observed by NTM and any confirmed irregularity can be considered a 
violation.  
Second, START I ensures full access to telemetric information from missile flight 
tests by banning concealment measures and mandating that each side record and 
exchange information obtained during those tests. Importantly, this access to 
telemetry under START applies to nearly all ICBM and SLBM flight tests, not just 
those that might be considered a violation of the Treaty.136 Finally, START I also 
introduced three categories of “exhibitions” ("technical characteristics”, 
“distinguishability”, and “heavy bomber baseline”). These exhibitions are designed 
to increase each state's knowledge of the others Treaty limited items (TLI), so that 
they and their functions may be more easily distinguished.  
Counting rules, or attribution rules, established under Article III, represent another 
cooperative measure that permits START to verify technical characteristic 
limitations and numerical reductions. These agreed rules detail what counts as a 
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) or warhead under the Treaty limits and 
how warheads on new types of missiles are to be counted.137 The principle of 
“downloading” permits each side to reduce the number of nuclear warheads on a 
MIRVed missile, so that only the remaining mounted warheads count against the 
sublimity of 4900 permitted under the treaty. Because the Treaty does not mandate 
                                                 
134 Defence Threat Reduction Agency, “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)”, DTRA 
Factsheet; available at www.dtra.mil/news/fact/nw_start.html, current as of may 2004. 
135 Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Verification Technologies. 
Measures for Monitoring Compliance with the START Treaty-Summary, December 1990.  
136 Under SALT II, the long debate regarding the encryption of telemetry signals resulted only in 
compromise provisions that forbid encryption “when it would implede the verification of the 
Treaty”. Limited exeptions under START I include some older missiles (Minuteman II, SS-11 
and SS-13) which do not broadcast telemetry, as well as research rockets. 
137 Each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber count as one SNDV; each RV counts as one warhead 
and certain numbers of warheads are counted for each bomber. 
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the destruction of warheads, US negotiators were particularly concerned that the 
warheads could be quickly “uploaded” to “breakthrough” the Treaty limitations. The 
issue was settled by agreeing on not only a total quota of downloaded warheads, but 
exactly how each MIRVed missile would count towards this quota and how many 
may be downloaded from each.138 Although counting rules made possible the 
verification of the complex Treaty requirements, they also came under heavy 
scrutiny as the weak point of the regime by theoretically leaving room for much 
higher numbers of nuclear charges than stipulated under the treaty.139 
Another category of cooperative measures provides for the exchange of information 
through baseline data exchanges, baseline inspections and data update 
inspections140. In a Memorandum of Understanding the two sides agree to exchange 
detailed information on TLIs and future developments, and to notify one another of 
any changes. The foundation for this exchange of information is a provision for a 
common database (Article VIII), which will maintain detailed records on the location 
and technical characteristics of all Treaty-related equipment. 
On-site inspections, founded on the intrusive measures agreed to in the INF Treaty, 
are even more extensive and intrusive under the START regime, covering every 
major phase of weapons life cycles. Twelve different types of OSI and exhibition are 
described for: baseline data, data updates, new facilities, suspect sites, re-entry 
vehicles, post-exercise dispersal, conversion or elimination, close-outs, formerly 
declared facilities, technical characteristics, distinguishability, and heavy bomber 
categorization. In addition, continuous perimeter and portal monitoring activities are 
permitted at production facilities for mobile ICBM launchers.141 Suspect site 
inspections (as they are called in START, but also known as challenge inspections) 
are a new step in intrusive verification, but as Alan Krass has pointed out “their 
application has been carefully circumscribed to deal only with mobile ICBMs. They 
are in no sense the 'anytime, anywhere' inspections that were often discussed in the 
1980s.” With the exception of three designated sites in each country,142 countries 
always maintain the right to refuse challenge inspections and attempt to answer the 
other parties concerns by other means.  
The last major characteristic of the regime is the creation of the Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission. Any of the five parties may request a meeting of the 
JCIC to clarify Treaty requirements or address implementation issues and all 
agreements reached are binding on all five parties. The START Treaty requires that 
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the JCIC begin functions before the Treaty actually enters into force and in this 
capacity it has already overseen such activities as technical exhibitions created a 
forum for making minor corrections to certain Treaty documents, and concluded 
several supplementary provisions.143 The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres continue 
to serve as the communication link between the parties and maintain the new 
database.144 
1.4.2 Evaluation 
Evidently the various measures foreseen, principles of cooperation and openness are 
the keys in creating a network of verification sources. Consider that under the first 
strategic arms limitations (SALT I and II) verification was conducted only from 
remote sensing and limited exchange of information, yet START's provisions permit 
inspectors to open up the most threatening weapons in one another's arsenals, count 
the number of warheads inside, and accurately calculate their payloads. The 
combination of such intrusive inspections, a highly detailed exchange of technical 
information, and the increasingly effective possibilities of NTM creates a synergistic 
multiplicity of sources that can only increase the parties' confidence of assuring 
compliance.  
Nevertheless, the regime's dependence on cooperative measures means that the 
evaluation of its success is always dependent on political will. The large arsenals that 
remain even after Treaty reductions guarantee that a state would have to deploy 
thousands of concealed weapons before any significant military advantage would be 
obtained, yet even small violations can be politically significant, particularly in 
fostering continued public and congressional support for arms control.145  
The unprecedented comprehensiveness of the regime raises another issue that is 
particularly relevant as the United States and Russia argue the value of the “peace 
dividend” created by strategic arms control. This is, of course, the cost of such 
extensive verification efforts. Already the JCIC has dealt with complaints by Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine regarding the costs that must be born by the inspected 
party.146 The negotiators went to great lengths to reduce, both the cost of reduction 
tasks – by permitting the re-use of warheads and the conversion, as opposed to the 
elimination, of bombers and missiles – and of verification tasks – by eliminating 
some high-tech options such as “tagging”. Yet, a Congressional Budget Office 
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study147 estimated that the cost of START verification would range from $150 
million to $740 million over the lifetime of the Treaty, several times larger than the 
On-Site Inspection Agency's 1990 budget of $38 million. Nevertheless, given that 
the treaties are likely pre-requisites to substantial reductions, the expenditures on a 
verification regime are minimal compared to the predicted savings.148  
One of the most valuable aspects of the START I regime, has already been proven. 
This is its utility for subsequent agreements. While the various bilateral agreements 
discussed above have built on the principles and rules established in one another, the 
regimes for the SALT and ABM agreements, the INF Treaty, and the START I treaty 
have remained almost entirely separate. Provisions of START I, however, are easily 
expandable to encompass further reductions without compromising the principles 
already agreed. It is precisely this which has been done in START II.  
1.5. START II 
Signed by Russia and the United States149 in January of 1993, START II applies to 
the same forces as its predecessor, but provides for 60% further reductions beneath 
the levels agreed in START I.150 The U.S. Senate approved ratification of the 
START II Treaty in January 1996 and the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in April 
2000, after the U.S. President George W. Bush issued a six-month notice to withdraw 
from the ABM Treaty, on 13 June 2002. The next day, June 14, 2002 the Russian 
President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia is no longer bound by its signature of 
START II, thus ending his country's efforts to bring the treaty into force.  
The most remarkable feature of its verification regime, and the reason it will be 
treated only briefly here, is that it is merely an extension of the regime installed 
under its predecessor. It does, however, provide for additional types of on-site 
inspection. 
START II is, as Spurgeon M. Keeney has remarked “in a sense ... a numerical 
amendment to START I. Without a START I treaty there cannot be a START II 
treaty.”151 The same principles of monitoring, inspection, and consultation will be 
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applied to the successor Treaty. The Bilateral Inspection Commission set up to 
oversee START II implementation is a direct application of the JCIC model and in 
fact because the verification procedures are so similar for the two regimes, JCIC will 
in great part handle the detailed implementation discussions for both treaties.152 In 
some cases, the principles applied to certain systems under START I are merely 
projected to other issues. For instance, START II applies the “restricted deployment 
approach”, devised for mobile ICBMs under START I, to the issue of distinguishing 
conventional bombers from nuclear bombers.153 In yet other instances, START II is 
actually written to make verification under the existing regime more effective, for 
example by simplifying the counting rules so that each weapon or platform is 
counted according to exactly the number of warheads for which it is actually 
equipped.  
Nevertheless, in cases where START II limitations have no exact START I 
counterparts, the verification regime has been extended to include new procedures 
for observing elimination or confirming weapons functions. One example of these 
innovations is the limited access to the weapons bay of the B-2 bomber (not subject 
to inspection under START I), which will now be permitted during a one-time 
exhibition as well as during routine START I inspections.154  
Perhaps most important are the new procedures for temporarily placing nuclear-
capable systems in the conventional category. In light of the fragile Russian 
economic situation and its continuing concerns to maintain modern security forces, 
START II, like its predecessor, allows many reductions to be accomplished by 
converting TLIs for permitted uses. In this vein, strategic nuclear forces can be 
converted to conventional functions, but START II also permits the redesignation of 
these to their former functions, as long as the agreed levels are never exceeded.155 In 
order to avoid Russian concerns that this process would become a “revolving door”, 
difficult to verify, START II established a new principle limiting each item to one 
conversion process, subject to both notification and inspection, in its lifetime.156 
From the prolonged and detailed negotiations on these two treaties and their mutual 
regime, one can at present only draw some general conclusions. The first is that the 
far-reaching possibilities of this verification regime, are equally as important as the 
force reductions in contributing to strategic stability. The second is that the line 
between cooperative measures or CSBMs is becoming finer and finer as acceptable 
levels of verification become more dependent on such harmonious interaction. 
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Finally, the delays encountered due to Ukraine's hesitation and increasing tension 
between the Russian and Ukrainian governments show the fragility of this 
extraordinary progress in arms control in the face of political instability.157 
1.6. START III 
At the Helsinki summit in 1997, former US and Russian Presidents Bill Clinton and 
Boris Yeltsin agreed an ambitious framework for a possible START III Treaty. It 
included an understanding on the establishment, by 31 December 2007, of lower 
aggregate levels of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side, to between 
2,000 and 2,500.158  
It establish, that by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2000-2500 
strategic nuclear warheads for each side.  
The framework also called for measures relating to the transparency of strategic 
nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads to 
promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.  
Deactivation by December 31, 2003, of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be 
eliminated under START II.  
Extending the START II deadline for elimination of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles to December 31, 2007.  
Bilateral talks on START III and the ABM Treaty took place in June 1999 without 
any significant progress. The United States argued in favour of a tradeoff between 
cutbacks under START III, which Russia desired for financial reasons, and 
modifications of the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited national 
missile defense system. Russia continued to disagree to such a policy tradeoff. Due 
to continuing disputes about the conflict between the ABM Treaty and the planned 
NMD system, the Pentagon began considering START III options that would permit 
limited deployments of the new Russian Topol-M ICBM with a MIRVed three-
warhead configuration.159  
Nearly after a decade of efforts to bring START II into force ended in June 2002, a 
month after, the United States and Russia concluded negotiations on the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which stipulates a 1,700-2,200 deployed 
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strategic warhead ceiling for each of the two countries' nuclear arsenals. The SORT 
limit effectively supersedes START II's cap of 3,000-3,500 warheads for each side. 
On November 13, 2000, the Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the earlier 
offer to reduce to 1500 strategic warheads was not a lower limit.160  
Realistically, there is a strong possibility that START III will be even more 
unbalanced compared to START II. The “breakout potential” problem is unlikely to 
be solved. However, it may be softened, if non-deployed nuclear warheads are to be 
eliminated. Nevertheless, such a decision will take just a temporary effect, unless 
production of new warheads is covered by transparent measures. An unbalanced 
START III may have a strong negative impact on further nuclear disarmament. 
Deeper reductions may become impossible for a long period of time. START III 
implementation will be a hostage both for of U.S. NMD deployment plans, and the 
Russian Federal Assembly.161 
The simplicity of “START III” results from the absence of the most complex 
elements: transparency and verification. When (and if) the two sides agree on a 
transparency and verification package for “START III”, the new document will no 
longer be “simple” and will be as good a “snooze” as START I. In the meantime, the 
verification mechanism of START I will be used to keep track of “START III” 
developments.162 The United States and Russia will continue negotiations on 
transparency and verification issues.163 Mainly for that reason, representatives of 
both sides have emphasized lately that the new document will be “simple”, unlike 
START I (signed by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991), 
which Assistant Secretary of Defence J.D. Crouch described as “a good snooze”.164 
Negotiations will continue, however, and hopefully a more robust agreement will be 
signed when the two countries are ready for it. Even more important, the signing of 
“START III” will reduce political pressures on negotiators, increasing the chances 
for success. The decision to postpone controversial issues was explained away by the 
Russian side with a reference to the fact that both START I and the ABM Treaty 
“continued to develop” after they entered into force. The difference is, of course, that 
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by the time of signing, both treaties were complete documents, while the future 
“START III” looks more like a framework agreement.165  
1.7. Bilateral Framework with Multilateral Verification Procedure: Nuclear 
Test Bans 
The issue of nuclear test ban offers a vivid example of the differences that have 
existed between what was considered possible in a bilateral framework and what 
verification measures were acceptable in a global framework.166 The intrusiveness of 
the bilateral agreements serve as a theatrical foil to the, as yet, slim achievements at 
the global level. 
Negotiations on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion Treaty (PNET), originally concluded in the mid-1970's and respected 
despite their unratified status, were revived in 1982 in order to resolve concerns 
about the reliability of their intended verification systems,167 and, by 1990, forged 
verification provisions and a political consensus that would finally permit 
ratification. At the Bush-Gorbachev summit of June 1990, two verification protocols 
were signed and submitted along with the treaties for ratification. This achievement 
owes its success to the progress made within the bilateral verification framework 
and, to some extent, to international pressure, primarily within the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, for progress towards a comprehensive test ban. 
Public interest in ending nuclear test explosions arose early in the 1950's as more 
information became available on the effects of radioactivity on people and the 
environment, and concern heightened after several test accidents were made public. 
Both the US and USSR recognized the political value of being the first to declare a 
halt to testing, but US military advisors and the nuclear laboratories cautioned 
strongly against the suspension of testing, warning that tests were important to 
reaffirming the reliability and safety of the nuclear deterrent arsenal. A short 
moratorium on testing implemented by both sides, although accompanied by a rush 
of last minute testing, which demonstrated the hesitation towards such a 
commitment, provided the basis for negotiations on the issue of a test ban agreement. 
Yet, from the very beginning, the sticky point in negotiations was the issue of 
verification of underground testing, by the proposed emplacement of monitoring 
stations and on-site inspections. The French nuclear test of February 1960 and the U-
2 incident of May 1960 led to the breakdown of bilateral talks and the sacrifice of the 
test ban issue to what was achievable in a multilateral forum.  
1.7.1 The PTBT – a multilateral precedent 
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water (also known as the Limited or Partial Test Ban Treaty, LTBT or PTBT) 
entered into force in October of 1963, after several years of failed negotiations 
among the nuclear powers towards a verifiable complete ban on nuclear weapon 
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testing.168 Although the preamble asserts the wish to “achieve the discontinuance of 
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”, the content of the Treaty is far 
less ambitious, bypassing the verification issue in order to establish at least a 
minimum consensus on limiting nuclear tests. It requires only that the parties refrain 
from nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, under water – where verification 
is much easier.  
Although the PTBT represented “the first global agreement to protect the 
environment”,169 it had only limited arms control value. This criticism was not 
unusual as legal possibilities afforded by the treaty, in particular in underground 
testing,170 were used to test new generations of missiles.171 Despite the commitment 
to pursue a comprehensive test ban, no such negotiations followed for over a decade. 
Although the multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty makes no mention of verification 
and relies only on national technical means to monitor its ban, its merit lies in the 
fact that it created a test ban precedent from which to work and galvanized research 
on seismological verification techniques. A decade after its signature, the issue was 
taken up once again in the bilateral framework. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
(TTBT) was concluded at the Moscow summit of June 1974, and an associated 
agreement on the peaceful nuclear explosions, the PNET, was settled in 1976.172 
1.7.2 The Bilateral Test Ban Treaties 
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty limited underground nuclear weapons tests to a 
maximum yield of 150 kilotons with verification to be carried out by the national 
technical means (NTM) of the two parties. Unlike the PTBT where there was only 
implicit agreement to NTM monitoring, here the reference is explicit and is to be 
carried out by each state with its own seismic network. The Treaty as it was signed in 
1974 provided additional cooperative measures to facilitate NTM, but although there 
is no evidence that the Treaty has ever been violated, it was not ratified until after the 
addition of two verification protocols in 1990, and the envisioned cooperative 
measures were never carried out.173  
The PNET accompanied the TTBT signature, allowing the USSR to continue 
conducting peaceful nuclear explosions as long as they were below the ceiling of 150 
kilotons and the United States was permitted to verify them and preventing any 
circumvention of the TTBT under the guise of non-military functions. The detailed 
procedures negotiated for observance of these tests and measurement of yields 
produced a Verification Protocol that is considerably longer than the Treaty itself. 
The PNET, as signed in 1976, contained several advances in cooperative measures, 
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including the presence of “designated personnel” (inspectors) to observe and monitor 
explosions at the site using double sets of equipment to record data174 and an SCC-
like consultative commission. Yet these advances were never achieved in practice, 
and the verification measures of the PNET, like those of the TTBT, were modified 
and expanded in the 1990 protocols, which finally led to its ratification by the US 
Senate.175 
1.7.2.1 Characteristics of the regime 
The 1990 protocols provide the substance of both Treaties' verification system, 
significantly elaborating the ways in which seismic monitoring can be performed as 
well as the cooperative measures that greatly improve the efficiency of these 
measurements, but national technical means remain the core of the verification 
regime. 
In addition to observation satellites, which can detect excavation and geological 
evidence of nuclear testing,176 the threshold of 150 kilotons, which applies to both 
Treaties, was judged even in the mid-1970's as capable of being “readily detected 
and identified by seismic stations throughout the world”.177 However, by themselves 
and measured at a distance from the testing site, these yield estimates were accurate 
only within a “factor of two uncertainty”, implying that a measurement of 150 
kilotons could be the result of an explosion as small as 75 kilotons or as large as 300 
kilotons. Hydrodynamic techniques of yield estimation,178 foreseen by the 1990 
protocols for explosions greater than 50 kilotons, are more accurate, but involve a 
close-in direct measurement of the explosion. 
Cooperative procedures have, thus, been designed to help reduce the margin of error 
of the results obtained from NTM. The first cooperative measures involve an 
exchange of information regarding test sites and the geological environment in which 
they are situated. The Joint Verification Experiment organized during 1988 gave the 
US and USSR a chance to exchange additional data and check the precision 
attainable in practice. NTM, including hydrodynamic testing methods,179 were set up 
during two explosions180 and the “measurements were carried out successfully, 
demonstrating a level of cooperation unheard of before glasnost.”181  
                                                 
174 It was agreed that one set of equipment would be left behind to the host state and one would be 
kept by the inspecting state so that any violation or tampering with the equipment had a one in 
two chance of being caught.  
175 See E.H. Arnett, Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban Implications for 
Modernization and Proliferation, New York 1996. See also K.C. Bailey, The Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the Debate, Fairfax, VA 2001, available at 
www.nipp.org/Adobe/CTBT%20Update.pdf. 
176 W. Leith and D.W. Simpson, Monitoring Underground Nuclear Tests, in: M. Krepon, P.D. 
Zimmerman, L.S. Spector, and M. Umberger (eds.), Commercial Observation Satellites and 
International Security, New York 1990. 
177 G.E.v.d. Vink and C.E. Pine, The Politics of Verification: Limiting the Testing of Nuclear 
Weapons, in: Science and Global Security 3 (1993), pp. 267 f. 
178 The normal US method of hydrodynamic measurement is called CORRTEX (Continuous 
Reflectometry for Radius Time Experiments). See Technology Chapter. 
179 The use of a “satellite hole” – a separate small hole adjacent to that where the explosive is 
placed – was allowed to test the effect of hydrodynamic measurements.  
180 One conducted in Nevada on August 17, 1988 at very near 150 kilotons and one at the Shagan 
River test site in the USSR on September 14, 1988 at a lower yield. 
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The IRIS Consortium of seismic monitoring systems takes this cooperation even 
further. Established in 1988 by a U.S. university research organization, the U.S. 
Geological Survey and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, this project was expected to 
install a total of 13 stations to monitor data and send it back to the respective states. 
“Ultimately, a larger seismic network coupled with restrictions on chemical 
explosions could probably monitor nuclear tests down to one or two kilotons, even if 
another country attempted to hide them,” said the project's planning director.182 
The protocols provide for additional exchanges to take place through on-site 
inspections, during which scientists may collect geological data, rock samples, and 
the like. The OSI provisions were made possible by the INF precedent. A chief U.S. 
negotiator at the Nuclear Testing Talks, which speaking of the importance of this 
possibility, has said that “being able to correlate the reading from your seismometer 
with an on-site measurement is a real key to improving NTM.”183 First, the protocols 
establish the right of each side to perform on-site observations and hydrodynamic 
measurements at two tests per year for the first five years (one each year after that), 
regardless of the yield size of the test. Moreover, the same rights apply to two tests 
per year at any new test sites opened after the initial data exchange.  
In addition, OSI is permitted for all explosions whose planned yield exceeds 35 
kilotons. Inspectors will be able to take soil samples and make geological 
measurements to establish a baseline for yield estimation and ensure that “de-
coupling”184 techniques are not used to conceal an illegal explosion. If the intended 
yield exceeds 50 kilotons, on-site hydrodynamic measurements of the test will also 
be permitted, as will close-in direct measurement of the yield from three seismic 
stations offered by the host state and chosen to provide surface wave registrations 
that NTM do not record.185 
Further cooperative measures include a non-interference clause committing the 
parties not to impede verification as long as they operate within the principles of 
international law and Article 2.3, which provides for consultations and enquiries 
between both parties to promote the objectives and implementation of the treaty. 
Similar provisions inserted in the SALT and ABM Treaties of 1972 had amounted to 
Soviet acceptance of NTMs once regarded as a form of espionage. The inclusion of 
this provision in the TTBT is a sign that both parties were reasonably satisfied with 
the system that had been set up. 
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The “whoops” clause is a much-debated innovation of the TTBT. This provision of 
the original TTBT allowed for one or two slight unintentional breaches per year, 
which when noted by the other party would be termed a “cause for concern” but not 
serious enough to warrant withdrawing from the treaty. The clause subsequently 
proved to be “political dynamite” prompting one US Treaty negotiator to label it “the 
mistake's mistake”.186 However, it is still included as a bilateral side agreement in the 
version signed in 1990.  
Lastly, the 1990 protocols offer an unprecedented provision that is basically equal to 
a veto power against tests that it considers unverifiable. If a state cannot announce a 
test in a cavity larger than 20,000 cubic meters (a scenario that would make accurate 
yield measurement very difficult), without arranging a new verification agreement 
with the verifying party. 
1.7.2.2 Evaluation 
Any evaluation of the TTBT and the PNET must take into account the highly 
politicized nature of the test ban issue and the role that verification has played in this 
debate. Many arms controllers opposed the treaties, saying a verified 150-kiloton 
ceiling is too high and would permit destabilizing testing and development. President 
Carter, for example, avoided ratification of the Treaties because he felt that they were 
an intermediary step that would limit the ability to conclude a more far-reaching or 
comprehensive test ban. Opponents of nuclear test ban, on the other hand, argue that 
although both states claim to have stayed within the Treaties' limits throughout the 
1980's, there is ample evidence that both sides violated the agreement.187 They 
consequently fear the precedent that these Treaties set towards agreement on a total 
test ban. Thus, “in reviewing the verification debate of the last decade, it appears that 
the strategy for delaying progress toward a test ban worked, ultimately entangling 
both the US and the Soviet Union in a largely spurious debate over threshold 
verification at high yields.”188 
Yet, technically there is little reason to doubt that the combination of NTM and 
cooperative measures described in the 1990 verification protocols would not detect 
any explosions over the agreed yield levels.189 The verification provisions are 
extremely detailed, a factor that has spawned criticism for entailing higher costs and 
providing too much room for argument over implementation.190 However, this detail 
is designed to support the precision required to verify nuclear tests, which take place 
in fractions of a second of time and whose various environments can dramatically 
affect the necessary methods of measurement and calculation. 
Most importantly, the recent ratification of the TTBT, the PNET, and their 
verification protocols is an optimistic precedent for a multilateral comprehensive test 
ban. Whereas the Treaties' high ceilings and minimal verification may have stood “as 
                                                 
186 W. Potter, IGCC and Ploughshares, Kingston 1988, p. 158. 
187 William R.v. Cleave and S.T.Cohen, Nuclear weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue, 
Westport 1987, pp. 81-86. 
188 G.v.d. Vink and Paine, op. cit., p. 282. 
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symbols of the shallowness of detente”191 at their signature in the 1970's, the 
confidence in technological and cooperative means of verification expressed in the 
1990 protocols reflects the defeat of a long-standing obstacle to progress on this 
issue.  
1.7.3 From bilateral to multilateral again – the CTBT debate 
Changing political attitudes towards the acceptability of available technology for the 
verification of nuclear test bans has given new spirit to the debate over a 
comprehensive test ban – an idea that has been discussed since the mid-1950's.192 
Pressure from non-nuclear weapon states within the Non-Proliferation Treaty to 
control “vertical proliferation”,193 has given the nuclear weapons states a certain 
incentive to reconsider their customary opposition. Since 1985, the Soviet Union has 
announced its willingness to execute a permanent moratorium on nuclear testing, and 
the US, Russia, and France have all implemented temporary halts to testing, as signs 
of their willingness to consider the issue. Yet, a 1991 PTBT Amendment Conference 
failed to garner support for an amendment that would convert the PTBT into a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).194  
President George H. W. Bush signed into law the unilateral declaration to forego 
full-scale nuclear weapons testing on October 2, 1992. The United States signed the 
CTBT on September 24, 1996, the day it opened for signature, but the Senate dealt a 
severe blow to the near-term prospects for U.S. participation when it refused to 
provide its advice and consent on October 13, 1999. The current Bush administration 
has refused to ask the Senate to reconsider the treaty but has said it will observe the 
moratorium.195 
The recent seeds for this change of context for the debate have already been sown by 
the imminent release of several studies. These include General Shalikashvili's 
January 2001 report to the President with “Findings and Recommendations 
Concerning the CTBT”;196 a November 2000 Lawyers Alliance for World Security 
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(LAWS) “White Paper on the CTBT” with chapters by a number of scientific and 
arms control experts; and a National Academy contain serious responses to the 
technical, economic and political criticisms that arose during the US ratification 
debate, addressed President Bush's specific concerns about proliferation value, 
verifiability, enforceability, and confidence in the stockpile, and made 
recommendations to improve the likelihood of treaty ratification.197 
Verification questions continue to enter the debate, however, particularly in the 
decision as to whether a Comprehensive Test Ban or a Very Limited Threshold Test 
Ban is more appropriate. Those who argue in favor of a very low threshold (likely to 
be 1 kiloton yield), maintain that significant weapons testing requires a yield of 5-10 
KT minimum level, which can be detected and therefore controlled. Explosion for 
industrial purposes such as construction and excavation – generally under 1 KT – 
could thus be carried out without need for verification as they were not for military 
purposes, and those above the limit could be monitored by a seismic network and be 
identified.198 A low threshold would also remove the chance of controversies over 
whether various activities in nuclear research laboratories constitute a nuclear test 
explosion.199 To reduce possible technical disputes, proponents recommend that low-
yield tests be restricted to one site and that “muffling” techniques such as de-
coupling be prohibited. Placement of the treaty threshold too far below that required 
for security purposes would only lead to endless confrontation over irrelevancies.200 
The CTBT provides for the establishment of a unique global verification regime that 
consists of an International Monitoring System (IMS), a consultation and 
clarification process, on-site inspections (OSIs) and confidence building measures 
(CBMs). Data from IMS stations are processed and analysed by the International 
Data Centre (IDC). The IMS is to consist of a global network of 337 facilities: 170 
seismic, 11 hydroacoustic, 60 infrasound and 80 radionuclide stations together with 
16 radionuclide laboratories. The facilities, to be established or upgraded in some 90 
countries around the world, will be capable of registering vibrations underground, in 
the sea and in the air, as well as detecting traces of radionuclides released into the 
atmosphere from a nuclear explosion. 201 
The argument in favour of an outright test ban is that it would eliminate disputes over 
the exact yields of tests made near the threshold and all uncertainties would work 
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against the potential evader. A total test ban would also reinforce the inherent 
difference between nuclear and conventional weapons.  
The decision, however, is not to be made on the basis of technological capabilities 
alone – the decision will be a political one: judging the acceptable level of certainty 
in any verification system and the acceptable of level of sacrifice within nuclear 
testing programs.  
For this reason, the debate over the CTBT202 has strayed from the issue of 
verification and currently centers more on the desirability of such a treaty. For 
example, arguments are there against those ranging from simplistic “we just can't 
trust the others” statements to concerns for the dependability and safety of an 
untested nuclear stockpile.203 Proposals now focus less on verifiable limits and more 
on limits that allow for continued research and maintenance of the arsenal, for 
instance the idea of a low threshold ban that still allows one or two tests above the 
threshold each year.204  
Even though, in 1996, CTBT had widespread international support and it has been 
signed by 171 states and ratified by 113, including three of the five nuclear weapon 
states and all but one member of NATO. However, the failure of the Senate to give 
its advice and consent for ratification in 1999, the current administration's opposition 
to the treaty, and the reluctance of 12 other key states to approve the treaty means 
that the formal entry into force of the treaty is still years away.205 
Whatever the outcome, the CTBT debate is symbolic of the transition between 
bilateral negotiations and agreement on mutual acceptance of intrusive procedures to 
the acceptance of these same principles in a multilateral negotiating framework. 
Earlier test ban treaties were bilateral and the debate, if not limited to only two 
parties, centers around the very few states with independent means of nuclear 
testing.206 But the resulting treaty will doubtlessly reflect the influence and the 
format of a more globalised negotiation process.207 
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2. Multilateral Verification 
2.1. Arrangements concerning uninhabited regions and environment 
The first multilateral verification agreements pre-date the bilateral arms control 
agreements discussed in the previous section. The Antarctica Treaty (1959), the 
Outer Space Agreement (1967), and the Seabed Agreement (1971), attempted to 
subdue an unbridled arms race by demilitarizing certain parts of the earth and their 
environment and providing verification regimes to increase parties confidence that 
their national interest would not be jeopardized by their commitments.  
As sovereign states have always been reluctant to relinquish any control over their 
territory, it is evident that it is less difficult to implement these projects in areas that 
are of relatively low military significance and not under any state's control.  
One can then understand why it was that the first agreements on Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zones, the peaceful use of certain areas, and multilateral inspection regimes 
covered only uninhabited regions such as Antarctica, the Seabed, Outer space and 
somewhat militarily insignificant issues such as environmental modification 
techniques. 
2.2. The Antarctic Treaty  
The Antarctic Treaty, signed in December 1, 1959; entered into effect on June 23, 
1961 and set a significant precedent as a multilateral verification regime based on 
international cooperation and openness. The twelve original signatories208 agreed 
that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only, prohibiting all military 
measures (including bases, manoeuvres, and weapons testing), outlawing nuclear 
explosions and waste disposal, and encouraging scientific research and international 
cooperation. The Treaty also suspends all territorial sovereignty claims during its 
lifetime.  
To verify its implementation, a system of control was set up which, for the first time, 
was based on national verification by inspection. The fact that the area controlled 
was of relatively low military significance and that no weapons system had to be 
counted or controlled was a factor, which must have assisted agreement on this 
format. Nonetheless, the Treaty provided a precedent in international cooperation 
and verification; the key elements of open access to all stations and equal opportunity 
of all interested parties to verify, have been developed and expanded in subsequent 
agreements of a similar nature, such as the Outer Space, Seabed and Environmental 
Modification (Enmod) accords.  
The regime operates according to the principle of reciprocity. Only the Consultative 
Parties to the Treaty – those states, which demonstrate interest in the area by 
establishing a scientific station or dispatching a scientific expedition to Antarctica – 
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are allowed to designate observers. There are now 26 Consultative Parties including 
the original signatories and 14 other states, which have achieved this status by 
conducting “substantial scientific research activity” in the region.209  
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty provides a verification regime that covers all areas 
of Antarctica, including all stations, installations, and equipment within those areas, 
and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargos or personnel in 
Antarctica are open at all times to inspection by observers designated by the 
Contracting Parties.  
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty establishes the right of free access for observation 
and inspection by the Contracting Parties. Observers designed under Article VII (1) 
“shall have complete freedom of access”, including the conducting of aerial 
observations, “at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.” The facilities that may 
be inspected include “all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and 
all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in 
Antarctica.”  
Article 14 of the Protocol establishes that Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties “shall 
arrange, individually or collectively, for inspections by observers to be made in 
accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty.” During inspections, observers 
should be given access to “all parts of stations, installations, equipment, ships and 
aircraft open to inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, and to all 
records” that are maintained at those facilities in accordance to Protocol 
requirements.  
The Verification regime is based on two measures: inspection and information 
exchange.  
First, observers, remaining under the control and protection of their national 
governments, are entitled to complete freedom of access at all times, to all areas of 
the Antarctic,210 in order to carry out inspections.  
The observers are also empowered under Article VII, to carry out aerial observation 
of the entire area. Inspections may provide information on: 
the relationship of logistic support and principal activities observed at the station to 
the information in the annual exchanges 
Treaty-prohibited activities, such as military activities, nuclear explosions or disposal 
of radioactive waste 
the quantity of arms present 
environmental protection measures 
observance of measures adopted at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
scientific research and equipment 
construction activities 
any new or unusual activities211 
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Over 100 inspections have taken place between 1961 and 2002, the majority since 
1980. Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Germany, New Zealand, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States have conducted these inspections. 
Compliance: so far there is no administrative body to oversee the effective 
implementation of these measures.212  
In addition, in order to promote the freedom of scientific investigation guaranteed 
under the treaty, and to avoid duplication of efforts, the signatories agreed to a 
maximum possible exchange of information, personnel, observation, and results of 
inspections. The Treaty requires advance notice of expeditions to and within 
Antarctica, the activities of research stations, as well as the intent to introduce any 
military personnel or equipment (which must be justified for scientific purposes). In 
this way observers from other signatory states are viewed more as cooperating 
colleagues and less as potential spies. Reports are made to regular meetings of the 
Treaty parties, known as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM). 
The ATCM meet once every two years to decide measures relating to the Treaty by 
consensus. As of 1991, the Treaty may be amended with consensus at these 
meetings. The parties have so far avoided setting up a permanent secretariat, 
preferring minimal institutional arrangement, notably due to the concern by some 
parties that this might jeopardize sovereignty claims if the Treaty's system ever fell 
apart.213 However, demands for a type of general secretariat, particularly from 
Greenpeace USA assert that “While not functioning as an enforcement body per se, a 
secretariat could serve to facilitate information exchange, including inspection 
reports, updated Antarctic Treaty recommendations and general information on 
environmental protection. Better use and wider availability of such information could 
help remedy some of the current difficulties frustrating broader implementation and 
compliance.”214 
Although the Treaty does not involve any other organizations in the verification 
process, it does encourage signatories to work closely with Specialized Agencies of 
the United Nations, which have an interest in Antarctica. Against the resistance of 
the Consultative Parties, a number of non-signatories to the Treaty, who would like 
its management to be transferred under UN control, have used this article to back up 
their argument.215  
The verification regime, however remarkable it may have been at the time of its 
signature, has come under attack in recent years. No compliance issues have ever 
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been raised at an ATCM. Yet non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, 
have observed and publicized numerous violations to environmental provisions. For 
this reason, they propose an independent inspection force or mandatory collective 
inspections that would reduce the chance of states' concealing violations for political 
or diplomatic reasons. 
“The unanimity displayed by the (Antarctic) Treaty powers ... has offered an 
interesting demonstration of the cooperative possibilities of the Antarctic Treaty in 
respect to an extremely diverse range of signatories.”216 Treaty signatories have 
found themselves issuing statements in support of each other on Antarctica despite 
their differences elsewhere on other issues. Although the verification regime is not 
entirely “internationalized” – participation being limited to those countries developed 
enough to establish a scientific research station – the seed of international 
cooperation and coordination with agencies such as the UN is sown in this 
agreement. 
The treaties, which followed the Antarctic agreement show a certain development or 
evolution and according to some authors a sort of tradition.217 Like Antarctica, the 
areas covered by these multilateral Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) are 
uninhabited, but some progress can be noted. The military significance of the area 
covered also is increasing and the degree of internationalization of their verification 
provisions is more advanced.  
As of May 2000, 15 additional nations (Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Ecuador, Finland, 
Germany, India, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Peru, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Spain, 
and Uruguay) have achieved consultative status by acceding to the Treaty and by 
conducting substantial scientific research in Antarctica. Russia carries forward the 
signatory privileges and responsibilities established by the former Soviet Union.  
Another 18 nations have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty: Austria, Canada, 
Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Denmark, 
Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. These nations agree to 
abide by the treaty and may attend consultative meetings as observers. 
2.3. The Outer Space Agreement 
By some estimates, there are over 500 active satellites currently in outer space, with 
the USA building about 75% of them. It is evident that the international community, 
and especially Western states, is dependent to an ever-increasing extent on the 
peaceful uses of outer space for crucial civilian and military functions. One need 
only consider the global communications, weather, navigation and remote sensing 
functions performed by civilian satellites. Military applications include 
communication, navigation, search & rescue and surveillance, including for purposes 
of verification of arms control and disarmament commitments.218  
                                                 
216 P.J. Beck, The Antarctic Treaty System after 25 Years, in: The World Today (November 1986), 
p. 196. 
217 A. Krass, op. cit., 1985, p. 224. 
218 Paul Meyer, Director-General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada, Arms Control Options in and from Space 
Presentation to Fisher Institute-RAND International Conference, Towards Fusion of Air and 
Space: Surveying Developments and Assessing Choices for Small and Middle Powers, Tel-
Aviv, Israel, March 19-21, 2001; See also R.L. Garwin, Space Weapons: Not Yet, paper 
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The Outer Space Agreement of 1967 took place in an environment of great 
international activity and awareness of global issues. Both superpowers were 
carrying out extensive space programmes, which had captured the world's attention 
and imagination219. Space exploration was no longer a science fiction dream but a 
reality which needed to be controlled and regulated. The newly independent states of 
the 1960s had found their majority in the UN and did not want to stand by and watch 
the superpowers carve up this new territory between themselves. 
The Treaty of course reflects both these influences. Parties agree in Article I, that 
outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies are not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty. Exploration and the use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is declared to be the province of all 
mankind220 and is to be carried out for the benefit and interest of all, irrespective of 
their degree of economic or scientific development. States undertake to encourage 
and facilitate international cooperation and investigation, and guarantee free access 
to all areas of celestial bodies. In this vein, the Treaty prohibits the stationing in outer 
space of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction221 
and bans weapons testing and military installations of any type.222  
To verify compliance223, parties agree in Article 10 to consider on an equal basis any 
requests from other States Parties to the Treaty to be given an opportunity to observe 
the launch and flight of space objects. This, in effect, amounts to an on-site 
inspection of the flight by the “guest” observer. However, such “inspection” is 
subject to the consent of the launching state.  
In addition, Article 12 stipulates that all Parties are entitled to inspect, on a basis of 
reciprocity, all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles of other parties 
on the moon and other celestial bodies. States may refuse a requested inspection, but 
this is unlikely to be necessary as states can also demand “reasonable advance notice 
                                                                                                                                          
presented at Pugwash Workshop on Preserving the Non-Weaponization of Space, Castellon de 
la Plana, Spain, 22–24 May 2003, available at fas.org/rlg/030522-space.pdf. 
219 The military use of outer space is currently confined to a variety of missions in support of 
terrestrial military force application (such as early warning; communications, command and 
control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; navigation; and meteorology), confined 
not so much by the bindings of international law but by technical limitations and decisions on 
national policy. To the best knowledge of the international community, no nation has so far 
deployed space-based weapons in orbit above the Earth for extended operations. The Non-
Weaponization of Outer Space, Food for Thought Paper, 31 March 2002, available at 
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/outer3-en.asp. 
220 J. Fawcett, International law and the use of Outer Space, Manchester 1968; see also his book 
Outer Space new challenges to law & policy, Clarendon 1984. 
221 Parties may not place weapons in orbit, but weapons in transit (i.e. missiles) are not included, 
nor are satellites used for military surveillance. See M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, International 
Space Law in the Making, Gif-sur-Yvette 1993. 
222 This clause would be violated were SDI tests to take place in space. 
223 The request for consultation under Article IX can come from any party or group of parties to 
the Outer Space Treaty. It has been noted that parties to the treaty could convene and issue an 
interpretation that US testing or orbiting of space weapons was contrary to the peaceful-uses 
language of the treaty, in effect amending the treaty to preclude weaponization. G. Bunn and J. 




of a projected visit”, which is subject to negotiation and consultation to ensure that it 
does not interfere unduly with the normal operations of the facility to be observed.  
The reciprocal nature of the inspections, however, restricts it to a very limited 
number of countries who possess advanced space programs, and even under these 
circumstances inspections may be refused. For the majority of states,224 not 
possessing the technology for this type of verification, the right of inspection may be 
meaningless.225 Moreover, given the military significance of satellites orbiting the 
Earth,226 the verification provisions of the regime failed to mention bodies in Earth's 
orbit, rendering unverifiable the main provision of the Treaty – the exclusion of 
nuclear weapons from our orbit. 
Monitoring of space activities is a key element Outer space ispermeable for all parts 
of the electromagnetic spectrum and thus well suited for various kinds of monitoring 
at long distances, with systems looking from earth into space (tracking) and systems 
in space (satellites) looking towards earth. Accuracy is close to 10 cm in both 
directions. Especially, testing is often visible. 
The more capable the systems are, the more costly they become which speaks in 
favour of cost sharing. Since remote sensing sometimes can only provide an 
indication of suspected treaty violations but not absolute certainty, some form of on-
site inspections is required, largely on the ground (e.g. at production and space 
launch facilities) but also in space by use of inspection satellites.227 
Actually, almost 140 nations voted for the resolution entitled “Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space.” It recognizes “the common interest of all mankind in the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,” reaffirms the will of all 
states that the exploration and use of outer space “shall be for peaceful purposes and 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries,” and declares 
“that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for 
international peace and security.” Only two nations declined to support this bill – the 
United States and Israel. Both abstained.228 
Beyond this, there are five relevant General Assembly resolutions. They are: the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Uses of Outer Space (1963), which preceded the Outer Space Treaty and laid out 
most of its content; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration 
                                                 
224 Most developing countries have no communication satellites of their own – not only because of 
the cost but also because of the unavailability of appropriate slots in Geostationary Orbit 
(GSO). These slots were allocated to the big space faring nations by the ITU when most 
developing countries were yet to adopt a space program. It is also important to note that 90% 
of these slots are not being used, however are still unavailable to those who need them, 
particularly developing countries. G. Tleubayeva, Y. Takaya, H. Klein, N. Djanji, N. Cox and 
F. Chizea, Space Generation Summit Output 11-13 October 2002, Houston, TX 2002. See also 
K. Baslar, The Concept of Common Heritage of mankind in International Law, The Hague 
1997. R. Bender, Launching and Operation Satellites: Legal Issues, The Hague 1997. 
225 See also B. Jasani (ed.), Space Weapons, the arms control dilemma, London 1985. 
226 See P. Stares, Space and National Security, Washington 1987. 
227 J. Scheffran, Options for Rules in Outer Space, paper, May 2-3, 2002. This paper summarizes 
the main conclusions of the author presented at: Reconsidering the Rules of Space: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Project Planning Meeting and Workshop on Chinese 
Perceptions of US Space Plans, May 2-3, 2002, Cambridge, MA 2002. 
228 K. Grossmann, Master of Space, in: Progressive Magazine (January 2000). 
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and Use of Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the Interest of All States 
(1996); and resolutions on Direct Television Broadcasting, Remote Sensing of the 
Earth from Outer Space (which seeks to ensure affordable access by developing 
countries to non-military satellite imaging), and the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer 
Space (which deals with limiting exposure in the crash landing of nuclear-powered 
satellites and the liability for such accidents).229 
2.4. The Seabed Treaty 
The Seabed Treaty of 1972, which commits parties not to emplace or emplant any 
weapons of mass destruction or associated facilities in the seabed zone, marks 
another development in international cooperation towards verification.  
First it drops the principle of reciprocity. Rather Article III gives any State Party the 
right to verify through observation using its own means or by seeking full or partial 
assistance of another party.  
In addition, further encouraging international cooperation in the verification process, 
the Seabed Treaty foresees consultation among the parties in the verification process 
as well as the possibility of involving the UN Security Council “if consultation and 
cooperation ... have not removed the doubts” of a State.230 While not formally 
institutionalizing these ideas, the Seabed Treaty sets the precedent for multilateral 
versions of the Consultative Committee that was negotiated in the bilateral SALT 
talks that same year. 
Article VII included a provision for a review conference to be held in five years. The 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty Review Conference was held in Geneva June 20 – July 
1, 1977. The Conference concluded that the first five years in the life of the Treaty 
had demonstrated its effectiveness. The Second Review Conference, held in Geneva 
in September 1983, concluded that the Treaty continued to be an important and 
effective arms control measure. The Third Review Conference was held in Geneva in 
September 1989 and confirmed results of previous meetings. It was agreed that the 
next review conference would be convened in Geneva not earlier than 1996. In 1992, 
the Conference on Disarmament informally considered further measures and saw no 
need for a fourth review conference. 
2.5. The Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) 
The term for environmental modification by humans (ENMOD) refers to altering 
ocean currents, depletion of the ozone layer or production of greenhouse gases. Since 
1946 ENMOD has included weather modification, primarily via cloud seeding in 
attempts to remove fog from airports, make it rain and augment snow packs.  
In the 1950s, ENMOD held a convention to prohibit nations from using weather 
modification as a weapon. Since the 1960s governments have tried to alter the upper 
                                                 
229 The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Uses of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963); The 
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct 
Television Broadcasting (resolution 37/92 of 10 December 1982); The Principles Relating to 
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (resolution 41/65 of 3 December 1986); The 
Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (resolution 47/68 of 
14 December 1992); The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account 
the Needs of Developing Countries (resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996). 
230 See Treaty text Art III. 
 
 67 
atmosphere by dumping copper needles into the ionosphere and trying to create an 
artificial ionospheric to enhance the reliability of radio communications. They also 
tried launching chemicals and suggested bacteria as well for communications 
enhancements. In the 50s and 60s, 300 megatons of nuclear bombs were exploded in 
the atmospheres which released large amounts of charged and radioactive particles as 
well as over 40,0000 electromagnetic pulses. Between 1962 and 1983 hurricane 
modification experiments tried seeding with silver iodide which seemed to reduce 
peripheral winds by 10%.231  
The Enmod Convention of 1977 is not so well known, but is responsible for a 
landmark development in multilateral verification regimes. In prohibiting the 
military or hostile use of any environmental modification techniques, the parties 
agreed to consult and cooperate with one another to resove any problems which may 
arise and recognized the UN framework as a suitable setting.  
More important, however, Article V envisions the creation of a Consultative 
Committee of Experts to meet on an ad hoc basis to investigate complaints. The 
scope assigned to this Consultative Committee has been restricted to fact finding and 
expert views, in order to prevent any politicization and bias that might arise from the 
power to make judgements. There was talk of making the committee a permanent 
institution and expanding its duties to encourage more information exchange and 
research cooperation, but this idea received no support in light of the marginal 
significance of the issue of environmental modification.232 
ENMOD does not include verification mechanisms for identifying attempts by 
Parties to develop environmental modification techniques. These omissions were not 
accidental; at the time of ENMOD's negotiation, the USSR and the US agreed that 
environmental techniques could be used for peaceful purposes.233 Having noted the 
progress made in the conclusion of each verification regime, one must also note that 
this progress can be deceptive. The coming years present common challenges to all 
of these treaties. 234  
                                                 
231 Today radio frequency technology is attempting to use ionospheric heating to change 
temperature and alter weather. Heating the ionosphere (35 miles above the surface) can have 
the effect of reducing the air density in the region beneath the heating (as the column of air 
rises). Radio waves used to heat the ionosphere would interact with the charged particles found 
at that altitude. This would create a magnetic phenomena known as a mirror force which would 
push that section of air upward and outward. The radio waves could change the atmosphere to 
act as a lense for focusing sunlight and heat a specific part of the earth or manipulate local 
wind patterns. It could alter jetstream patterns to increase rain in drought areas and even reduce 
devastating hurricanes. See more information in Intelligence Newsletter, December 16, 1999 
and Air University of the US Air Force, AF 2025 Final Report, available at 
www.au.af.mil/au/2025/ (emphasis added). 
232 A.S. Krass, The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977: the question of verification, 
in: A.H. Westing (Ed), Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal, and Policy Appraisal, 
Taylor and Francis, 1984, p. 74, footnote 159. 
233 A. Anastassov, The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, in: UN Institute for Disarmament Research (ed.), 
Verification of Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreement, Geneva 1991, p. 272 f. 
234 S. Pimiento Chamorro and E. Hammond, Addressing Environmental Modification in Post-Cold 
War Conflict. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and Related Agreements, an occasional 
paper of The Edmonds Institute, 2001. 
 
 68 
First, having been written in a different era, however forward-looking they may be, 
these Treaties are liable to encounter difficult interpretation issues. For example, the 
Outer Space Agreement does not define whether or not peaceful purposes excludes 
“passive” or “non-aggressive” military installations. This will inevitably be an issue 
if the US decides to test or deploy the Brilliant Pebbles program (the successor to 
SDI) as a cooperative defense system. Likewise, the Seabed treaty prohibits the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the Seabed, but not their movement over the 
seabed in submarines. The Enmod convention prohibits the “hostile use” of 
environmental modification techniques with widespread, long lasting, or severe 
effects – thus qualifying its application in four major ways.  
Second, despite the evolution of cooperative efforts towards verification, the divide 
between the “haves” and “have nots” is an ever present challenge to the legitimacy of 
such a verification regime. “Have nots” are inherently dependent on those countries 
with the technological capability to verify compliance at the bottom of the sea or in 
outer space.235 These few countries thus form a small club that only verify one 
another. The Antarctic Treaty provides the clearest example of the issues bound to 
arise within these agreements as more and more states perceive the possibility of 
exploring these distant regions and assert their right to an equal voice and possibility 
in monitoring the implementation of the agreements.236 
2.6. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation regime 
The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime represents the most significant multilateral 
verification effort to date. 237  
The original idea of such international cooperation to control the use of nuclear 
materials and verify through inspection can be traced back to the Baruch Plan of 
1946, which proposed to place all the world’s nuclear resources under the control of 
an independent international authority with the power to verify, by inspections. This 
proposal was, however, rejected by the USSR who proposed that the US first destroy 
all existing nuclear weapons, insisted on the maintenance of Security Council veto 
powers on the control of materials use and refused the concept of inspection, 
suspecting an unfavourable ideological bias within an international organization. 
                                                 
235 The south regions concerns are mainly reflected in their initiatives to impose limits on 
environmental damage from war making, including the Central American Water Tribunal, 
which imposes moral sanctions in cases of severe pollution and the Lusaka Agreement on 
Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 
(“African Interpol”), established by six African countries in 1999 to fight wildlife crime. See 
M. Drumbl, International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Environmental 
Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?, in: ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 6/2 (Spring 2000), avaible at 
www.nsulaw.nova.edu/student/organizations/ILSAJournal/6-2/Drumbl%206-2.htm. The 
European Union established criminal responsibility for ecocide in 1988 with its Convention on 
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. See S. Pimiento and E. Hammond, 
Umweltaspekte in Konflikten in der Ära nach dem Kalten Krieg, Die ENMOD-Konvention, 
The Sunshine Project, Hintergrundpapier Nr. 6, April 2001. 
236 See Sohr’s intervention during the London Conference, in G. Plant, 1992, p. 115. 
237 P.d. Klerk, The Role of the IAEA in Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear 
Disarmament, available at cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/ionp/klerk.htm, See also D.A. Fischer, 
History of the IAEA: The First 40 Years, New York 1997. 
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The principles of multilateral verification for the peaceful uses of atomic energy 
were revived in President Eisenhower's 1953 “Atoms for Peace” proposal to the UN 
General Assembly238 and started to be put into practice in 1961239 by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was established in 1957. In 
combination with efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the IAEA 
Statute aims to ensure that this technology is not diverted to military functions. 
Articles II, XI and XII lay out a system of safeguards, whereby the Agency can 
verify the peaceful use of any agreed upon nuclear materials or technology.240 The 
principle of inspection on which this verification rests is remarkable as one of the 
first departures from the diplomatic practice of accepting agreements on only the 
“good faith” of contracting parties. It was for years seen, by East, West and South, as 
a major encroachment on the state sovereignty of nuclear exporters and importers, 
yet such intrusiveness on the part of an impartial international organization was still 
more appealing than inspection by the vendor state. The IAEA safeguards system, 
revised and extended, is still used to govern agreements with certain countries on 
certain facilities, but has been superseded by a wider instrument for the management 
of more complete verification agreements – the NPT.241 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged from negotiations between the US, 
USSR, and UK in part due to the realization that the successful IAEA safeguards 
system needed to be expanded and universalized if it was going to maintain the 
confidence of participating states. Concluded within the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee of the UN, the NPT represents an unprecedented degree of 
international cooperation for intrusive verification. Article III(1) of the NPT calls for 
compulsory and comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material produced, 
processed, or used on national territory and on all nuclear material and equipment 
transferred to any other State. International Safeguards thus took on the objective of 
verifying legal commitments to non-proliferation, by “the timely detection of the 
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities 
                                                 
238 UNGAOR, 8th session, 470th meeting, paras. 79-126.  
239 In 1961, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted INFIRC/26, the first safeguards system. It was 
subsequently revised and extended to cover not only reactors, but conversion and fuel 
fabrication facilities. The current agreement, known as INFIRC/66 Rev. 2, is applied to non-
NPT parties who negotiate for IAEA safeguards, primarily as part of export/import 
transactions. 
240 Safeguards can be implemented under three types of agreements:1) Agency projects, 2) 
“unilateral submission agreements” which generally cover material or equipment supplied by 
another State under a co-operation agreement or 3) trilateral safeguards agreements including 
the Agency, a supplier State and a State receiving nuclear material or equipment. 
241 The United States signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement in 1998, but 
has not yet ratified it. President George W. Bush transmitted the protocol to the Senate for its 
advice and consent on 9 May 2002. In his transmittal letter, Bush wrote that U.S. ratification of 
an Additional Protocol will “greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption” of 
Additional Protocols, which “will contribute significantly to our nonproliferation objectives.” 
The United States is currently encouraging Iran to ratify its Additional Protocol after Tehran 
signed it in December 2003. The IAEA had reported a month before that Iran had repeatedly 
violated its earlier safeguards. Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets, The 1997 IAEA 
Additional Protocol At a Glance. 
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to the manufacture of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and 
the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”242 
2.6.1.1 Characteristics of the Regime 
The NPT has created a unique international verification system in which sovereign 
states invite an impartial institution to inspect sensitive installations and their use of 
nuclear technology.243  
NPT safeguards244 rely on two layers working as checks and balances. The first layer 
is composed of three procedures – materials accountancy, containment, and 
surveillance – and is regulated by the second layer – IAEA on-site inspections.  
First, materials accountancy is a form of information exchange practiced by all 
parties to the NPT. Upon accession to the Treaty each party must make an inventory 
of materials, declare the quantities and location, of nuclear materials and installations 
present on the territory and submit design information for any related facilities. From 
this data, the IAEA is able to locate material storage sites and “key measurement 
points” (KMP) in the fuel cycle. The state is required to create its own national 
system of accounting and keep records of material flows and transport through 
KMPs; these are compared with results obtained through periodic on-site 
measurements by IAEA inspections.245  
Second, containment procedures, such as the application of locks, seals and other 
devices, further impede the diversion of declared materials and alert officials in case 
of any tampering.  
Third, surveillance techniques include the use of video cameras, closed circuit 
television monitors and on-site inspectors to detect any undeclared activity or 
tampering with safeguarded material and equipment.  
Inspections provide the second layer to this system of verification. Agency 
inspectors, nominated by the IAEA Board of Governors and approved by the 
inspected states, may visit declared sites to examine records, make independent 
measurements, check control and measuring equipment, and take samples for 
Agency analysis. To minimize the intrusiveness of this system and protect the “safe 
and normal operation” of these institutions, inspectors' rights of access are, however, 
limited to pre-designated sites agreed by both the Agency and the state.246 Any 
significant discrepancies between the “book inventory” derived from national 
                                                 
242 At this time, the system depended on Agency involvement in projects or the forthcoming 
request by a State to apply safeguards. See International Safeguards and the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency, April 1985. From the Safeguards 
Agreement for NPT – INFIRC/153, paragraph 28. 
243 L. Scheinman, Assuring the Nuclear Nonproliferation Safeguards System, The Atlantic 
Council of the US, October 1992.  
244 There are two range of safeguards agreement that the Agency has concluded: a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol (AP) in force. See J.N. Cooley, 
Integrated safeguards: current status of development and plans for implementation, 
Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 
(INMN), July 2001; and J.N. Cooley, The conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, 
Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the INMN, June 2002. 
245 All of the information reported to the IAEA or collected during inspections is maintained in a 
computer-based information system named ISIS. 
246 As will be discussed below, this notion is being challenged. 
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accounting records and the “physical inventory” measured by the IAEA are 
considered “anomalies”247 or “materials unaccounted for” (MUF), the latter being 
more serious,248 must be satisfactorily explained by further investigation. In this way, 
the IAEA inspections verify the functioning of state systems of accounting and 
control of nuclear materials, but are not allowed to verify that all such material is 
declared.  
Safeguards249 make up the most significant aspect of the NPT verification regime, 
but a complete picture must also mention the confidence-building effect of other 
NPT provisions. Safeguards are not “police measures” and cannot by themselves 
physically stop non-compliance, but rather they are a part of a larger set of legal, 
political and commercial barriers to Treaty violation. Articles IV and V provide a 
political incentive not to violate the Treaty, by rewarding compliance with technical 
assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Positive and negative security 
guarantees were provided at the time of signature in UN Security Council Resolution 
255 and various unilateral declarations. Article VI, by committing Nuclear Weapons 
States (NWS) to halt the arms race and vertical proliferation, aims to build 
confidence in a mutual dedication to the ideal of a nuclear-weapon free world.  
In June 1995, the IAEA Secretariat submitted to the Board of Governors a set of 
proposals on the implementation of Programme 93+2. The proposals were 
considered in two parts: activities with which the Secretariat believed it had the 
authority to proceed with (Part I), and those for which it considered. The need for 
additional authority (Part II). Part I activities included: 
the collection of environmental samples at sites where the IAEA already had the 
right of access;  
the acquisition of information for which it had not previously asked, including data 
on parts of the fuel cycle that precede the introduction of safeguarded material into a 
reactor or enrichment facility, such as mining, processing and conversion plants; and  
information on past operations. 
2.6.1.2 Evaluation of the Regime 
According to Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) each non-nuclear-
weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an 
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in accordance with its statute and safeguards system. The purpose of 
such safeguards is to verify the fulfillment of the state party's obligations under the 
NPT – to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices.250 
                                                 
247 Anomalies are fairly normal. The Agency discovers about 400 of them each year for which 
logical explanations are usually found rather quickly. 
248 The discovery of MUFs are not necessarily grounds for judgements of non-compliance. 
249 Safeguards are measures to verify that states comply with their international (ie Treaty) 
obligations not to use in the case of Nuclear Safgeguards nuclear material for explosives 
purposes. the need for such verification is reflected in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  
250 Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty entered into 
force on March 5, 1970. According to Article III, procedures for the required safeguards “shall 
be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
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The limitations of the NPT safeguards regime have been the subject of analysis for 
years,251 but the debate has taken on even greater significance in the shadow of the 
Gulf War and the discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear weapon program – the 
first discovery of intentional NPT non-compliance – and in view of the preparation 
for the 1995 Extension Conference.252 The general consensus is that safeguards did 
not fail in Iraq, but that given their authority to monitor only declared facilities and 
activities, they were unable to detect, much less prevent, non-compliance.253 This is 
the result of several weaknesses.  
 First, the IAEA possesses very limited authority. Safeguards are designed to confirm 
state declarations, and not to verify compliance in its entirety. This is reflective of the 
IAEA's intergovernmental status; it operates between and not above sovereign 
member states. The Agency accepts baseline data from each state at its accession to 
the Treaty, and it is this “official” data, which is verified at the declared facilities254. 
The inspectors have the right to only limited access in the facilities they visit. They 
may not search for undeclared sites and must give advance notice of their inspection. 
Agency inspectors must be approved by the states to which they are sent, a process 
which often results in delays and difficulties in obtaining necessary visas.255 These 
                                                                                                                                          
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The 
safeguards required shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful 
nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 
control anywhere”. For the full text of the treaty, see the United Nations, available at 
disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html. 
251 R.G. Johnston and M. Bremer Maerli, International vs. Domestic Nuclear Safeguards: The 
Need for Clarity in the Debate over Effectiveness, Issue No. 69, February – March 2003; T. 
Nottberg and O. Prygoda, Countdown to the IAEA Report on Bushehr, 2003, available at 
www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/CountdowntoBushehr.htm (The Eisenhower Institute); J. 
Carlson, Nuclear safeguards: developments and challenges, in: Verification Yearbook 2001, 
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London 2001, pp. 61-78; 
P. Leventhal, IAEA's Safeguards Shortcomings: A Critique, Washington, DC 1994; D.A.V. 
Fisher and P. Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, Stockholm 1985; A.S. 
Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough, SIPRI, Stockholm 1985.  
252 At this conference, the parties must decide whether to extend the Treaty provisionally or 
indefinitely, as is or with revisions. For more information see, inter alia, G. Bunn and C.v. 
Doren, Two Options for the 1995 Extension Conference Revisited, LAWS, 1992; G. Quester, 
The Multilateral Management of International Security: The Nuclear Proliferation Model, 
CISSM Project on Rethinking Arms Control, March 1993; Washington Council on 
Nonproliferation Consensus Report, Towards 1995, July 1993.  
253 Traditionally, IAEA safeguards have been primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities 
declared by the state – that is, determining the correctness of states’ declarations. Failure to 
address adequately the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities being conducted – the issue 
of the completeness of states’ declarations has, since the 1990-91 Gulf War, been recognised as 
a serious shortcoming in the classical safeguards system. See J. Carlson, Nuclear safeguards: 
developments and challenges, in: Verification Yearbook 2001, Verification Research, Training 
and Information Centre (VERTIC), London 2001, pp. 61-78.  
254 Before the strengthened safeguards reforms were initiated, the IAEA had not been expected to 
look for undeclared nuclear activities, unless these were revealed through the agency’s 
detection of diversion. While the IAEA has the right of special inspection, which can be 
applied to undeclared as well as declared locations, this right had never been exercised. It was 
generally considered that it should not be invoked unless there was substantial evidence of a 
safeguards breach. J. Carlson, op. cit., 2001, p. 62. 
255 Some governments have, however, since 1995 accepted a voluntary recommendation that all 




delays, of course, provide ample time for a non-compliant state to conceal any 
evidence present at the facility to be inspected. 
This limited authority is, however, being challenged. Recent interpretations of 
paragraphs 73 and 77 of the inspection protocol,256 have suggested that “special 
inspections” can provide access to undeclared locations, but only with the consent of 
the concerned state. The Board of Governments has recently confirmed the Agency's 
right to inspect these undeclared locations, in keeping with their obligation that 
safeguards will be applied to all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
activities, if plausible evidence of undeclared materials or non-compliance can be 
presented.257  
A second constraint is that the NPT safeguards system is material-oriented. The 
safeguards agreement (INFIRC/153) limits itself to “source258 or special fissionable 
material”, operating under the assumption that by focusing on the flow of fissionable 
material “they should be able to detect any suspicious event or situation involving 
nuclear material in time to raise an alarm and thereby interdict its misuse.”259 Thus, a 
state need not declare data on any nuclear research installation until the presence of 
nuclear material is introduced and the Agency may not perform inspections in a 
facility that is not known to contain these materials.260 This presents another 
weakness of the regime: the Agency's access to information about possible 
violations. 
The Director-General of the IAEA has said that “the most fundamental requirement 
for successful inspection is information. ... Inspectors must have access to 
information leading them to sites and installations of possible interest”.261 NPT 
safeguards were designed primarily for open industrialized countries, with the object 
of minimizing the level of intrusiveness to protect industrial secrecy and reduce 
interference in research projects. Information is to be provided by the safeguarded 
states “as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into the facility”, but 
                                                 
256 GOV/2554. 
257 By 1995 the IAEA and member states had developed a detailed outline of strengthened 
safeguards measures. There was general acceptance that certain of the measures proposed 
(termed “Part 1” measures) could be carried out under existing safeguards agreements. The 
IAEA Board of Governors endorsed the implementation of these in March 1995, in time for the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference in April. The text of the model Additional Protocol 
(designated INFCIRC/540) was agreed by the Board of Governors in May 1997. For a detailed 
account of the development of the safeguards system and the NPT see D. Fischer, in T. Findlay 
(ed.), Verification Yearbook 2000, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre 
(VERTIC), London 2000, pp. 43-56. 
258 Source materials are those that are precursors to fissionable material (i.e. natural uranium in 
any form).  
259 B. Sanders, IAEA Safeguards: A Short Historical Background, in: Mountbatten Centre for 
International Studies, A Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, 
International Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency, PPNN Study Number 
3, September 1992.  
260 This is a characteristic of INFCIRC/153 that is not true of the original IAEA safeguards 
agreement, INFCIRC/66, Rev 2, in which safeguard procedures are extended also to facilities 
in order to ensure that nuclear supplies are not used for military purposes. For discussion, see 
B. Sanders, op. cit. 




the Agency has no recourse if the required data are not provided in time to work out 
appropriate safeguard procedures or are not provided at all. The IAEA thus has no 
independent source of information outside the declared data. In maintaining an 
impartial perspective, the Agency has not used information from national intelligence 
sources and one can also understand that national authorities are inherently hesitant 
to share sensitive data with an international organization.  
This practice, however, is also changing as the Agency realizes “it cannot possibly 
close its eyes to any credible safeguards relevant information. It is expected to be a 
watchdog, not an ostrich.”262 As is evident in the case of Agency policy towards the 
suspected North Korean violation, where US intelligence led to the IAEA request for 
“special inspections”, the Agency can now receive and act on information obtained 
by member states through national means. 
A third limitation is found in the organizational culture of the Agency's verification 
system and is not the result of its legal possibilities. The mind-set and attitudes of 
inspectors regarding their responsibilities is an important aspect of safeguard 
practice. “Patterns of conservatism and self-constraint became internalised to the 
extent that the agency occasionally gave more ground than necessary in negotiating 
subsidiary arrangements that regulate the operational side of safeguard agreements. 
Moreover the emphasis on material accountancy has led to an almost obsessive focus 
on sharpening and improving the attainment of quantitative goals.”263 This 
conservatism and disregard for non-quantitative warning signs of illegal activity 
hinder the detection of non-compliance. In making national assessments, inspectors 
have been known not to take into account widely available information made public 
in other circumstances but regarding unclear transaction of the country inspected. 
Financial limitations are a fourth restraint to the safeguards regime. Since 1983, the 
safeguards budget has been frozen at $30 million per year and Russian difficulties in 
paying their contribution, which makes up about 13% of the budget,264 further 
tighten the situation. Yet, the number of sites subject to safeguards has augmented; 
the technical complexity of safeguards has increased and political expectations of 
safeguard effectiveness continue to grow. “Expanding safeguards tasks, in the long 
run, requires expanded resources.”265  
One result of these financial constraints has been a growing pressure from 
industrialized countries to concentrate safeguards on “suspect areas”. This would 
adjust the current distribution of safeguards spending, which was designed in the late 
                                                 
262 Idem. 
263 L. Scheinman, Lessons from Post-War Iraq, in: Arms Control Today (April 1993), p. 6. 
264 About $160 million of the $385 million the IAEA budget of 2004 has been allocated to those 
safeguard programs – for the salaries of about 230 inspectors and 200 administrative personnel, 
the cost of conducting roughly 900 inspections worldwide each year, and the cost of 
purchasing safeguard equipment. See the Congressional Budget Office documented dated 
March 5, 2004 related to the costs associated with ratifying the Protocol Additional to the 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States (Treaty Document 107-7), available at 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/51xx/doc5160/IAEA.pdf. 
265 H. Muller, The Fourth Review of the NPT, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and 
Disarmament, p. 561. The IAEA's budget, which has not increased in real terms since 1985. 
The 1996 budget for safeguards, however, rose to US$86 million; in addition some US$14 
million in extra-budgetary resources was contributed by individual Member States. 
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1960s to monitor the large fuel cycles of major industrial countries and still 
concentrates 70% of its resources on three industrial democracies (Canada, Germany, 
and Japan) rather than on small declared programs such as those of Libya, Israel, 
Iran.266 A redeployment of resources, however, would entail discrimination against 
certain countries by making them the object of relatively more frequent intrusive 
inspections than others, or would have to focus on more sensitive facilities (i.e. those 
for reprocessing and enrichment) at the risk of relaxing the rigour of an already-
criticized system. Both options involve unacceptable losses of credibility for an 
impartial verification regime. 
Finally, the NPT267 regime shares a weakness common to many verification regimes 
– lack of enforcement. The Agency has only largely formal powers to declare 
sanctions. Any real enforcement action is the decision of individual states outside the 
framework of the NPT system.268 The Iraq case, where a coalition of states under the 
UN Security Council framework intervened to dismantle the non-compliant 
installations, is a special case of a state defeated in war and voluntarily accepting 
disarmament and inspections as part of a peace treaty. Yet, it is also a precedent for 
Security Council enforcement of the NPT regime. An IAEA Action Team was 
created under the authority of Security Council Resolution 687 to conduct 
inspections, make inventories, and tag dual-use items, but even with this support 
from the Security Council and political resolve, it now relies on information from 
outside intelligence and not only on the structural possibilities of the verification 
regime.269  
The IAEA's experience and expertise in the application of safeguards will be 
employed in a number of important areas in three near future.  
One area is further development of verification arrangements under regional nuclear 
weapon-free zone treaties. Joint inspection teams of IAEA inspectors and national 
inspectors from the zone, thus providing added confidence to those States that no 
undeclared activities relating to the development of nuclear weapons were being 
undertaken by other States in the region. (See section of Nuclear Free Zone); 
Second, steps are underway to establish – in the United States and Russia – an 
international verification of fissile material removed from nuclear weapon 
programmes and 
                                                 
266 An additional 8% to 10% of the safeguards budget is spent on selected plants in the NWS and 
the largest part of the remainder on countries with large civil nuclear programs, such as 
Belgium and Sweden. See D. Fisher, The London Club and the Zangger Committee: How 
Effective?, speech at the National Institute for Public Policy Conference on Proliferation and 
Export Controls, Washington, D.C., 29-30 January 1992, p. 6. 
267 As called for in the Treaty, in 1995, 25 years after its entry-into-force, a Conference was held 
to determine the fate of the NPT. States parties could agree to make the Treaty permanent 
(indefinite extension, the position supported by the United States and most Western states), 
extend it by one or more set periods, or end the Treaty entirely (an outcome no one viewed as 
remotely possible). After months a heavy diplomatic lobbying before the Conference, and 
intense negotiations during it, states parties agreed to three interlinked decisions: indefinite 
extension of the Treaty; a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament; and an enhanced review process for the Treaty. See BASIC's page on the 1995 
Review and Extension Conference for more information. 
268 See J. Howes, Nuclear Proliferation: Down to the Hard Cases, Project on Rethinking Arms 
Control, CTSSM, University of Maryland, 1993. 
269 See A. Fainberg, Lesson from Iraq: Strengthening IAEA Safeguards, CISAC, Stanford 1993. 
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Third, pursuant to a request by the United Nations General Assembly to the IAEA, 
the possibility exists of some form of future Agency involvement in verification 
arrangements for a multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning all 
further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.  
3. Global regimes for controlling chemical and biological weapons 
Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) have been on the arms control agenda for a 
long time. The first step was taken with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which 
prohibits only the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of 
bacterial methods of warfare, but lacks a verification regime.  
The verification gap has to some extent been filled by more recent United Nations 
fact-finding missions which investigate allegations of use, but these missions have 
never resulted in sanctions on the state in question, nor have they deterred states from 
violating the Geneva Protocol270. Over the years, the application of chemical and 
biological technology in civil industry has grown, and is increasingly open to misuse 
for military production. The spread of ballistic missile technology in the past few 
years has added to the threat, with chemical weapons in particular having the 
potential of becoming the 'poor mans’ nuclear bomb'.  
There has thus been a need for verifiable global agreements prohibiting not only the 
use, as was the case in the Geneva protocol, but also the possession, production or 
transfer of biological and chemical weapons. The end of the Cold War and the 
example of Iraq (representing the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction) have opened the way for successfully negotiating such agreements.  
In 1992 the Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded and possibilities for a 
verification regime to the 1972 Biological Weapon Convention are now seriously 
being examined. Even so, verification in the field of CB arms control remains an 
extremely difficult task, since most chemical and biological agents can be used for 
both civil and military purposes. Intrusive inspections are needed in order to be able 
to detect military production, and such measures touching upon national sovereignty 
require extensive negotiations in a global framework where many different 
viewpoints have to be melted into an agreement acceptable for all.  
3.1. The Chemical Weapons Convention 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was opened for signatory in January 
1993 and entered into in force April 1997. As at 21 May 2005, 168 countries are 
States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.. CWC obligates states not to 
use, develop, produce or otherwise acquire, stockpile, or transfer chemical weapons. 
It also prohibits to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under the convention, in language similar to that 
used in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The CWC is the first global arms 
control agreement, which provides for intrusive verification of banning an entire 
category of weapons.  
The convention took 25 years of negotiation in the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament. Discussions remained fruitless for long, but the process accelerated in 
the late 1980's when the Soviet Union started to accept the principle of on site 
                                                 
270 See section on United Nations role in verification. 
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inspections (OSI). As in the case of INF, this came as a surprise to the US, who had 
thought that the 1984 Bush proposal of “anytime, anywhere” inspections for 
“effective verification” of a CW treaty would never be acceptable to the USSR. The 
US government, under pressure from the defence and intelligence community, began 
to express second thoughts about intrusive inspections as it was feared that these 
might expose sensitive military projects and trade secrets.271 As a result, the US 
position moved in the direction of states like China and Pakistan, which in 
negotiations have always been eager to limit intrusiveness as much as possible.272  
The final result of negotiations (the treaty of CWC) displayed a difficult balance 
between the initial objective of effective verification and the need for the protection 
of sensitive information. This is a classic dilemma of verification that has been 
particularly evident in the case of chemical weapons; distinguishing peaceful uses of 
chemicals from military purposes requires intrusive inspections in both military and 
civil production facilities (the fact that CW are relatively quickly and cheaply 
produced makes the detection of possible cheating even more complicated). 
Although Western countries in principle support such intrusiveness for the purpose 
of detecting CW production in Third World countries, they do not like to expose 
their large chemical industries (often relying on patented technologies) to far-
reaching international inspection.  
3.1.1 Implementation 
The responsibility related to the implementation of the treaty has been entrusted to 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is 
established in The Hague, Netherlands in 1997 by the countries that have joined the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to make sure that the Convention works 
effectively and achieves its purpose. 
The OPCW is made up of three organs: The Conference of States Parties (supreme 
body), the Executive Council (rotating membership of 41 members according to UN 
standards of equal geographic distribution) and the Technical Secretariat, which will 
carry out the inspections and day-to-day activities.  
The OPCW is responsible for efficacious implementing of the verification regime by 
doing the following activities: 
assessing declarations made by its member countries on a regular basis – this 
amounts to thousands of pages of documents in six languages;  
conducting regular on-site inspections of declared military or industrial sites and/or 
facilities to check (i.e. verify) the accuracy of the declarations made;  
conducting challenge inspections; and  
investigating any report that chemical weapons have been used.  
                                                 
271 US ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar stated: “We have some very sensitive sites having to do 
with ‘black’ programs, intellegence activities, nuclear weapon design, command and control 
and so forth. As we got a little bit deeper into the implications for ourselves, the idea of 
inspections being anywhere, immediately, inlight of what could be the losses to our 
intelligence and technology lead, became very worrisome. It was then, about three years ago 
that we started to modify this slogan.”. Interview, in: Arms Control Today (October 1992), 
p. 9. 
272 For a good summary of the negotiations, see G.M. Burck, The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Negotiations, in: Verification Report, op. cit., 1992, pp. 122-130. 
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Chemicals covered by the CWC are listed in three “schedules”, corresponding to the 
risk they pose to the objectives of the treaty.  
Schedule 1 concerns supertoxic agents such as mustard and nerve gas, which have 
little use other than as chemical weapons. These chemicals must be destroyed, except 
for a small quantity.  
Schedule 2 chemicals pose a “significant risk”, being either highly toxic or used as 
direct precursors for schedule 1 chemicals.  
Schedule 3 includes a variety of other chemicals which pose a risk to the purpose of 
the convention, and are mostly produced on a large scale in the commercial industry. 
Production of such agents must only be declared if it goes beyond a certain level.  
The verification provisions are different for each schedule; the higher the number the 
less intrusive. In a first phase of CWC implementation states must give extensive 
declarations of production facilities and provide plans for the elimination of chemical 
weapon stocks and CW production capabilities. These data provide baselines for 
inspections.  
The implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention's (CWC) verification 
regime is done by means of inspections. The CWC relies on two important types of 
inspections: routine273 and challenge inspections as well as investigation of alleged 
use of chemical weapons. Routine inspections take place at declared sites only, for 
which the convention specifies a list of rights and obligations for inspection teams 
and host countries. Inspectors, for example, have the right to interview personnel, 
inspect documentation and records, take pictures and samples and obtain 
clarifications of ambiguities, which may arise. 
The provisions of the CWC, foresees several types of inspections274 that can be 
conducted, in military and industrial sites:  
Military Sites that are: 
1. At former Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPF);275 
2. At Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities (CWSF); 
3. At sites of Old Chemical Weapons (OCW);276 
                                                 
273 D. MacEachin, Routine and challenge: two pillars of verification, in: The CBW Conventions 
Bulletin 39 (March 1998), pp. 1-3, available at 
www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb55.pdf. 
274 181 inspectors from 53 countries carry out inspections for OPCW. For more information 
OPCW website, www.opcw.org. See also G.D. Rowe, Using Airborne Remote Sensing to 
Verify the CWC, in: The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Spring-Summer 1996), available at 
www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/33/rowe33.pdf. 
275 In 2002, 30 CWSFs were under systematic verification. Between entry into force and 31 
December 2002, 11 States Parties had declared 61 CWPFs. According to paragraph 30 of Part 
V of the Verification Annex and a decision of the Conference (C-I/DEC. 29, dated 16 May 
1997), States Parties were required to destroy 40% of their aggregate production capacity by 29 
April 2002, 5 years after entry into force. By that date, all States Parties with declared CWPFs 
had met this destruction deadline, and 5 – China, France, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, and 
a State Party – had destroyed 100% of their aggregate production capacity. By the end of 2002, 
28 CWPFs had been completely destroyed, and 8 had been converted for purposes not 
prohibited by the Convention. Of the remaining 24, 12 were to be converted, and the rest 
(including 3 that had been converted temporarily for chemical weapons destruction purposes) 
were to be destroyed. (OPCW, 2004). 
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4. At sites of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW);277  
5. Continuous monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons at Chemical 
Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDF).278 
In Industrial and Research Sites inspections are made in: 
1. Facilities dealing with the chemicals listed in the Annex on Chemicals of the 
CWC, Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities are subject to the most stringent 
verification measures, which are more comprehensive than in any other arms 
control agreement. Included are rights to unimpeded access, to tag equipment, 
take samples and leave continuous monitoring devices behind. This also 
applies for CW production facilities, which have been converted for 
nonmilitary uses. Initial inspections require a 72-hours notice, subsequent 
inspections only a 24 hours notice.279  
2. In Facilities, which produce, consume or process the chemicals listed in the 
Annex on Chemicals of the CWC as Schedule 2 chemicals. On facilities 
producing schedule 2 and 3 chemicals, access must also be granted, but may be 
restricted to a certain extent, and some measures may need the prior consent of 
the host state. For production facilities pertaining to schedule 2, access is 
restricted to certain areas and equipment made explicit in the treaty.280  
                                                                                                                                          
276 So far only three State Parties of the CWC – Canada, Slovenia, and United States – had 
destroyed all the OCWs they had discovered and declared, though new discoveries were still 
expected.  
277 Four State Parties – Belgium, Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom – operate a number of 
CWDFs for OCWs on a semi-continuous basis.  
278 Between entry into force and 31 December 2002, OPCW inspectors confirmed the destruction 
of a total of 7,169 metric tonnes of chemical agents in the 4 States Parties (India, Russian 
Federation, the United States and … ) that had declared chemical weapons stockpiles. In 2002, 
seven declared full-scale CWDFs were operating at one time or another in four States Parties: 
one in India, one in the Russian Federation, four in the United States, and one in a State Party. 
In addition, a Category 2 chemical weapon, phosgene, which had been drained from munitions 
in 2001, was destroyed at one other facility in the Russian Federation. Two States Parties also 
destroyed or treated a limited number of Category 1 chemical weapons that were in a 
hazardous condition. (Sources:2004, opcw. www.opcw.org). 
279 As at 31 December 2002, 21 States Parties had declared a total of 26 Schedule 1 facilities 
subject to systematic verification through regular inspections: 8 single small-scale facilities, 17 
other facilities for protective purposes, and 1 other facility for medical, pharmaceutical, and 
research purposes. 
280 As at 31 December 2002, 33 States Parties had declared 438 Schedule 2 plant sites. These 
figures are based on annual declarations of activities over the previous 3 years and of 
anticipated activities for 2002. One hundred and fifty-six of the 438 declared Schedule 2 plant 
sites in 21 States Parties involved in production, processing, or consumption activities were 
above the inspection thresholds stipulated by the Convention. A combined total of 378 
Schedule 2 plant sites, or 86%, were declared by 11 States Parties – Australia, China, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States – 
each of which declared 10 or more Schedule 2 plant sites. One hundred and twenty of the 
156 inspectable Schedule 2 plant sites, or 77%, were located in 7 States Parties – China, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and United States. Each had 10 or more 
inspectable Schedule 2 plant sites. (For further details on declared and inspectable Schedule 2 
plant sites, see Annex 8). 
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3. Facilities, which produce the chemicals, listed in the Annex on Chemicals of 
the CWC as Schedule 3 chemicals.281  
4. And in other chemical production facilities. These are facilities that produce 
unscheduled discrete organic chemicals more than 200 metric tons per year, or 
produces unscheduled organic chemicals containing phosphorous, sulphur and 
fluorine, called PSF chemicals, more than 30 metric tons per year. Under 
schedule 3 such access needs the prior consent of the host country, and that 
also applies to taking samples and reviewing records. The precise inspection 
standards for schedule 2 will be determined by “facility agreements” negotiated 
in the OPCW Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and approved by the 
Executive Council, in a manner similar to that of "facility attachments" used by 
the IAEA for the implementation of NPT agreements. The number of 
inspections in each state is limited; annually a maximum of two per site, and an 
overall maximum of 20 per country.282 
Table 5: Facilities, by Type, declared as at December 31 2002 and related details 
Schedule 1 21 26 26/21 
Schedule 2 33 438 156/21 
Schedule 3 34 497 437/34 
OCPFs [3] 60 4,117 3,990/58 
By June 2002, OPCW inspections had carried out about 1200 inspections at more 
than 500 sties in 51 countries283 throughout the world. 284 As in previous years, most 
OPCW inspection activities were devoted to chemical weapons-related facilities – 
60% of all inspections and 81% of all inspector days for 2002. Forty-four rotations or 
missions were conducted to monitor the destruction of chemical weapons at CWDFs. 
Inspection teams also continued to verify the destruction or conversion of CWPFs 
(40 inspections) and the non-removal, except for the purpose of destruction, of 
chemical weapons from CWSFs (31 inspections). Five inspections of ACWs, and 7 
of OCWs, were also conducted in 2002. 
                                                 
281 As at 31 December 2002, 34 States Parties had declared 497 Schedule 3 plant sites. These 
figures are based on annual declarations of activities in 2001 and of anticipated activities for 
2002. 2.14 Of the 497 Schedule 3 plant sites declared, 437 in 34 States Parties were above the 
inspection threshold. Three hundred and sixty Schedule 3 plant sites, or 82% of all inspectable 
facilities, were located in 7 States Parties – China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russian 
Federation, and United States – each of which had 10 or more inspectable Schedule 3 plant 
sites. (For further details on declared and inspectable Schedule 3 facilities, please see Annex 
9).  
282 By 31 December 2002, 60 States Parties had declared 4,117 plant sites that produced discrete 
organic chemicals (DOCs). Of these, 3,990, in 58 States Parties, were above the inspection 
threshold (for details on declared and inspectable DOC facilities, see Annex 10). 
283 See annexes. 
284 OPCW, 2003, available at www.opcw.org/html/global/ar/2k2/chapter_2.html. 
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Table 6: A summary of all inspections conducted in 2002 
Type of Facility No. of Inspections 
Budgeted 
No. of Inspections 
Completed 
No. of Sites No. of Inspector 
Days  
CWDF 95 44 9 5,444 
CWPF 33 40 21 953 
CWSF 35 31 30 915 
ACW 5 2 2 77 
OCW 7 6 6 94 
EDCW/DHCW n/a 2 n/a 171 
Schedule 1 18 9 9 168 
Schedule 2 40 21 21 564 
Schedule 3 42 23 23 436 
OCPF 32 32 32 572 
Total 307 210 152 9,394 
3.1.2 Non-compliance 
If states have serious compliance concerns about a certain country, they may request 
challenge inspections at any site. Such a request can only be turned down by a three 
quarter majority of the Executive Council, and must be accepted by the challenged 
state. Such intrusiveness is unprecedented in arms control agreements. A member 
country does not have the right to refuse a challenge inspection or to block access to 
the challenged site. No member country has yet requested a challenge inspection 
against another member country. And the OPCW has never had to carry out so far an 
inspection to check whether chemical weapons have been used. 
However, access to facilities is limited in two ways. First, the host country can 
negotiate with the inspection team about the location of the perimeter within which 
the inspection will take place. Second, inside the perimeter the formula of “managed 
access” may be applied, which requires negotiation over the extent of access to 
particular places and over certain inspection activities. For example, sensitive papers 
can be removed, sensitive equipment may be covered, computers logged off, and 
inspectors may only be allowed into a given percentage of rooms or buildings chosen 
at random.  
Strict timetables have been set for the negotiations and transfers, which take place in 
the time between the request of a challenge inspection and the actual inspectors' 
entry into the site. The total delay can amount to a maximum of 120 hours, which 
according to most experts still makes it possible for an inspection team with 
sophisticated equipment to determine whether chemical weapons related material has 
been present at the site.285  
The Convention does not specify how the decision on whether or not a state has 
violated the agreement, will be made. The US in particular has opposed that the 
Executive Council or the Conference of the States be explicitly given the power to 
make such determinations. The Conference of States does have the authority to “take 
the necessary measures to ensure compliance ... and to address and remedy any 
situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention” (Article VIII, 20k), 
possibly leading to actions by the Security Council. Provisions have been made for 
settling disputes between states over application or interpretation of the Convention 
through the International Court of Justice, an improvement over many arms control 
agreements, which do not have such provisions.  
                                                 
285 See for example, C.C. Flowerree, The Chemical weapns Convention: A Milestone in 
International Security, in: Arms Control Today (October 1992), p. 5. 
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Information obtained by inspections is likely to be suggestive rather than speculative. 
As Micheal Krepon noted: “Perceptions are likely to rest heavily on information 
collected and released by national governments or the organization created by the 
treaty, the suspect state's efforts to satisfy concerns, and the standing of the states 
lodging and dodging accusations of cheating”.286  
3.1.3 Evaluation 
It is clear that the insistence on protecting sensitive information has allowed for 
serious gaps in the verification regime. Routine inspections relating to schedule 2 and 
3 “dual use” chemicals may leave many questions unanswered, while challenge 
inspections only offer limited means to address concerns over compliance.  
If the annual quantity of scheduled chemical processed, consumed and/or produced 
in a declared facility exceeds a specified threshold, the facility becomes liable to 
routine inspection by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. It is not obvious, in 
retrospect, that this simple quantitative method for triggering the international 
inspectorate into action within civil industry is really the best way of ensuring that all 
industrial 'dual use' facilities that are especially vulnerable to abuse are brought 
within the ambit of routine inspection. As set out in the treaty, the trigger is clearly a 
compromise.287 
The most difficult task of verifying the CWC will relate to activities in undeclared 
facilities. These will have to be detected by national technical means and human 
intelligence, 288 and subsequently subjected to challenge inspections. Since the entry 
into force of the Convention, no State Party invoked a challenge inspection in any 
other State Party in order to clarify and resolve any question concerning possible 
non-compliance; neither was the OPCW requested to carry out any investigation of 
the alleged use of chemical weapons in the year under review.289  
Critics of the Convention have argued that with relatively lean challenge inspections, 
cheating would be most likely to take place in undeclared facilities, thus rendering 
the costly routine inspection regime useless. Even if undeclared facilities would be 
detected and inspected, it would be very difficult to come up with hard evidence of 
non-compliance. Cheating would hardly be prevented in this way. 
                                                 
286 M. Krepon, Verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, in: Arms Control Today (October 
1992), p. 23. 
287 J.P. Robinson, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, Briefing Paper No 11, The 
CWC Verification Regime: Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical Industry, 
1998, p. 9.  
288 The experience of UNSCOM (see section on UN) has born out the importance of intelligence 
information in detecting undeclared activities. At the same time, this brings up the question of 
unequal access to the necessary means for doing so. Only a few states have the technical means 
to provide evidence for triggering challenge inspections. Most of those means are in the hands 
of the United States. 
289 The Secretariat did, however, participate in a trial challenge inspection in the United Kingdom 
and in a similar exercise in the Netherlands jointly organised by that country and the United 
Kingdom. The Secretariat also took part in a tabletop challenge inspection exercise in the 
United States. In addition, all inspectors who might be assigned to challenge inspections or 
investigations of alleged use took regular refresher courses with a view to maintaining a high 
level of readiness. (OPCW, 2004, available at www.opcw.org). 
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Another view is that it is sufficient to create a certain risk for cheaters to be detected, 
and thus deter states from non-compliance.290 Verification of the CWC is not an 
impossible task: if it is indeed difficult to pinpoint CW production in the early stages 
of activities, it is equally difficult to hide traces of CW once they have been 
produced. Cheating would most probably only be possible in low quantities. In 
response to the criticism concerning the cost of routine inspections, it has been 
stressed that such inspections have an important confidence building aspect.291 
Further, routine inspections are very intrusive with respect to schedule 1 chemicals, 
and pose a significant risk of detection for misuse of schedules 2 and 3 chemicals. 
Without these inspections there would be no minimum guarantee against cheating, 
nor would verification be provided for the destruction of declared CW stockpiles and 
production facilities.  
The question whether the costs of verification will outweigh the benefits is an 
important one, though. During the negotiation of the CWC, Kathleen Bailey, among 
others, has argued that estimated annual implementation costs of $500 million (plus 
one time costs of $1 billion) and additional costs borne by national governments and 
industry, are too heavy a burden compared to the limited effectiveness the 
verification measures would have.292 The issue becomes even more pertinent when 
taking in mind that most of the routine inspections will take place in Western 
industries, where non-compliance is least likely.293  
OPCW’s cash shortfalls in 2002 had lead to less destruction activity at CWDFs 
during the year 2002 than had been expected, of the 307 inspections originally 
budgeted for the year 2002, only 210, or 68%, were conducted. Only 85, or 64%, of 
the 132 industry inspections budgeted for were carried out in 2002. Because of the 
cash Article VI inspections were substantially cut back in 2002. Nine of the 18 
Schedule 1 inspections budgeted for, 21 of the 40 Schedule 2 inspections budgeted 
for, and 23 of the 42 Schedule 3 inspections budgeted for were conducted in 2002.294  
However, in the final analysis, the choice is between an imperfect (yet far-reaching) 
treaty or no treaty at all. Most observers have concluded that the first option is to be 
preferred. Patricia Bliss McFate, for example, noted: “The CWC will not stop 
proliferation and its verification regime will be far from perfect. On balance, 
                                                 
290 J.B. Tucker, Verifying a Multilateral Ban on Nuclear Weapons: Lessons from the CWC, in: 
The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Winter 1998), available at 
cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/52/tucker52.pdf. 
291 See T. Bernhauer, The Control and Disarmament of Chemical Weapons, in: S. Sur (ed.), 
Verification of Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements, UNIDIR, Geneva 1992. 
292 For an excellent overview, see K. Bailey, Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban, in: Orbis. 
A journal of world affairs (Spring 1992), pp. 239-251. The costs estimates she presents are 
from the US Congressional Budget Office. Lower costs have been mentioned. Brad Roberts, 
for example, mentions $150 million a year, dropping more than a half per year once the 
destruction phase is completed. See B. Roberts, Chemical Disarmament and International 
Security, Adelphi Paper 267, Spring 1992, p. 32. The costs are to be shared following the 
United Nations weighted assessment system.  
293 It has been proposed to substitute a large part of routine inspections by an “ad hoc” inspection 
regime which would provide a register of activities in the entire chemical industry that would 
be subject to some form of periodic inspection by the OPCW or national authorities. This 
proposal, however, met strong resistance mainly from the so-called non-aligned countries and 
China. 
294 OPCW 2004. 
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however, a CWC that slows the proliferation of chemical weapons is in the interest 
of the international community even if there are major flaws in its verification 
regime.”295  
Many observers have stressed the need for complementing the verification measures 
with protective measures and export controls.296 In this respect it is worth mentioning 
that the Convention contains provisions, which prohibit any trade or assistance in the 
field of chemistry to non-parties, and suggest the lifting of export control for those 
states, which adhere to the treaty. The so-called Australia Group has made 
arrangements for implementing these 'carrots and sticks' in its export control 
regime.297 Another 'carrot' for countries to adhere to the treaty, is the provision that 
assistance will be given to states being threatened or attacked with chemical 
weapons. 
A true assessment of the verification regime can only be made when actually put all 
the instruments of verification specially challenge inspection to the test. At the 
international level, the Secretariat has carried out over 1,000 routine inspections 
accepted by militaries and chemical industries around the world. It has also 
processed a huge amount of national security and confidential business information, 
apparently with no significant breaches of its strict classification procedures. At the 
national level, many states parties have enacted legislation to implement the CWC 
and enforce its prohibitions. Many National Authorities have a much clearer picture, 
not just of activities involving scheduled chemicals on their territory, but of activities 
involving all toxic chemicals and precursors. The significance of these achievements 
cannot be understated.298  
The effective implementation of the convention depends to the large extent as always 
on the political resolve of the unsolved issues of the CWC implementations.299 For 
example, will challenge inspections prove to be too heavy a political instrument, 
which rarely will be used, or will they be more of a routine procedure to address 
concerns? Other aspects also remain uncertain: can appropriate standards for facility 
agreements and access rights be established? What will be the frequency of 
inspections? Will countries live up to their financial obligations? How will 
improvements in verification techniques be incorporated over time?  
                                                 
295 P.B. McFate, Where do we go from here? Verifying future arms control agreements, in: 
Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1992), p. 81. While expressing concern over flaws in the 
verification regime, she also notes: “The regime meets the standard of military significance if 
only military use of chemical weapons is considered; it meets this standard because of the 
synergies inherent in the combination of on-site inspections and the advanced means of 
gathering multiple sources available to the United States. The convention is hardly the answer 
to chemical weapons proliferation, but it will provide the infrastructure for improving 
international security by setting a standard of compliance for its signatories...” 
296 See, for example, G.S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: the Web 
of Deterrence, in: The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1993), p. 156. See also, U. Cipolat, The 
new Chemical Weapons Convention and export controls: towards greater multilateralism?, in: 
Michigan Journal of International Law 21/3 (Spring 2000), pp. 393-444. 
297 See section on export controls. 
298 D. Feakes, Evaluating the CWC verification system, no. 4, 2002, pp. 11-23 available at 
www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1822.pdf. 
299 OPCW document C-VII/3 dated 10 October 2002. I. Kenyon, The Chemical Weapons 
Convention and OPCW: The challenges of the 21st century, in: The CBW Conventions 
Bulletin 56 (June 2002), pp. 1-2, available at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb56.pdf. 
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3.1.4 Conclusion on the CWC verification regime 
The verification regime of the CWC cannot but reflect the ambivalence of combining 
the obligation to accept inspections with the right to protect industrial national 
security secrets. It will be difficult to come up with hard evidence of non-
compliance, and any interpretation of the facts will probably to a large extent depend 
on the reputation and status of the state concerned. In a global agreement many 
different viewpoints have to be incorporated, and the verification regime is thus 
inevitably a mixed result of compromises. Since accession to the treaty by as many 
countries as possible has been an important objective, verification measures could 
not be too stringent in order to be accepted by all concerned.  
Despite its shortcomings, the convention is a remarkable achievement introducing 
intrusive challenge inspections in a non-discriminatory, broadly based global regime. 
The presence of an international inspectorate could induce actors entangled in 
regional disputes to sign the convention jointly, as, for example, Pakistan and India 
have done.300 
3.2. Biological Weapons Convention 
The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992 has raised 
expectations about establishing a verification regime for the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention. In fact, there is a considerable degree of overlap between the 
two types of weapons as they share some important characteristics. However, 
biological weapons have distinct features, which make a ban on them even more 
difficult to verify than on their chemical counterpart. 
3.2.1 Nature of weapons  
Biological warfare agents are living organisms, which can produce and spread 
epidemic diseases. Toxins are generally considered to fall under this definition; they 
resemble chemical weapons in nature but have a biological origin. Biological 
weapons (BW) can be used in very small quantities, and once brought about, the 
epidemics can easily spread. One irresponsible country could in fact endanger the 
entire world.  
Delivered under optimal conditions, the pound for pound killing capacity of 
biological agents exceeds that of nuclear weapons. It is estimated that in a major 
urban area the detonation of a one megaton hydrogen bomb would result in between 
570,000 and 1,900,000 deaths. One hundred kilograms of anthrax spores delivered 
optimally would result in between one and three million deaths. Under less optimal 
conditions (sunny, windy, bright light, etc…) the same amount might kill between 
130,000 and 1,400,000 people. Chemical weapons, while horrific, are comparatively 
less powerful. The same amount of sarin nerve gas, delivered on under optimal 
conditions, would be unlikely to kill in excess of 8,000 people.301 
                                                 
300 I.R. Kenyon, Chemical Weapons in the Twentieth Century: Their Use and Their Control, in: 
The CBW Conventions Bulletin (June 2000), pp. 1-15. The CWC at the Two-Year Mark: An 
Interview With Dr. John Gee, in: Arms Control Today 29/3 (April/May 1999), pp. 3-9, 
available at www.armscontrol.org/ACT/aprmay99/jgam99.htm. Prospects for Progress: 
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301 From the United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559, August 1993, pp. 53 f. 
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The development, storage and development of BW require the strictest safety 
measures. As in the case of chemical weapons, doubts have been expressed about the 
military utility of BW; the reaction over an area is delayed, it is dependent on 
meteorological circumstances, and an attack could backfire. However, rapid progress 
in bio-technology has caused a re-evaluation of the threat they present302. Techniques 
have advanced and new fields have been opened for research, while the cost factor 
has been reduced. For example, dramatic improvements in fermentation technology 
permit the production of huge amounts of biological agents in small facilities.  
“The outlook for biological weapons is grimly interesting. Weaponeers have only 
just begun to explore the potential of the biotechnological revolution. It is sobering to 
realize that far more development lies ahead than behind.” 303  
It is obvious that genetic engineering could easily be abused to construct more 
effective biological weapons. Anthrax and plague are already very dangerous and 
lethal diseases, but from a bioweaponeers point of view they are less than optimal to 
serve military purposes. Genetic engineering may help to change this. 
Microorganism can be made resistant to antibiotics or vaccines, even more lethal, 
easier to handle, harder to detect, or more stable in the environment.304 
Many possibilities for the abuse of genetic engineering to create weapons have 
emerged. Examples305 are “Invisible” Bioweapons,306 Drug-Resistant 
Bioweapons,307 Making Harmless Microbes Deadly308 and Cloned Toxin Genes. 309 
                                                 
302 See E. Geissler, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention through Greater 
Transparency, in: Verification Report, op. cit., 1992. 
303 M. Meselson, Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology, CBW Conventions Bulletin, 
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Most experts would agree with the assessment of the United States that “the 
biological weapons threat is real, growing, extremely complex, and extremely 
dangerous”.310 
These developments are of great relevance to the civil industry, but have also caused 
international concern about the proliferation of BW, making verification of the BWC 
a more pressing issue. At the same time, the increasing relevance of biotechnology 
makes control over it even more difficult. Many biological agents are dual-use 
goods: they can be applied for either civil or military uses. Countries have a 
legitimate interest in access to biotechnology for civil purposes, but this implies an 
inherent capability to develop weapons with it. Biological agents can be made 
operational for military use within a relatively short time. This makes verification of 
a BWC a very difficult exercise. 
3.2.2 The Convention; an emperor without clothes 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was opened for signature in 1972 
and came into force in 1975. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition and retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, which 
have “no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful uses” (Article I). 
Some 120 states have signed and ratified the treaty. Only few countries have 
incorporated the treaty obligations into national law, and a considerable number of 
signatories, among which the five permanent Security Council members have 
preserved the right to retaliate against the use of BW. About 11 countries are 
believed to possess biological weapons programs.311 
The BWC was the first international treaty to ban a whole category of weapons, but 
it lacks a verification regime. It only provides for consultation and cooperation in 
application of treaty provisions “through appropriate international procedures within 
the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter”. Complaints 
regarding non-compliance may be referred to the Security Council. Independent of 
the Convention, investigations of possible use can be carried out by UN fact-finding 
missions312. There have been several allegations of use, yet most have been 
supported by little evidence and have been impossible to prove. The most well 
known cases are the “Sverdlovsk” and “Yellow Rain” incidents. Both concerned US 
accusations against the USSR; in 1980 the US claimed that an outbreak of anthrax in 
Sverdlovsk had been caused by an accident in an illicit Soviet biological facility; in 
1981 the Soviet Union was accused of using trichotecene mycotoxins in Laos, 
Kampuchea and Afghanistan. However, expert opinions differed whether the 
biological agents involved were accidents resulting from civil use and natural 
                                                                                                                                          
309 The cloning of toxin genes in bacteria makes it possible to produce formerly rare toxins in 
large quantities. Also covered under the Chemical Weapons Convention, toxins include many 
of the deadliest substances on earth and pose threats to humans, animals, and plants. 
310 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, New ways to strengthen the international 
regime against biological weapons, Fact sheet, Washington, DC, 19 October 2001, available at 
www.state.gov/t/ac/bw/fs/2001/7909.htm. 
311 These include China, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Laos, Libya, North Korea, Syria, the former USSR, 
Vietnam, and possibly Taiwan. United Kingdom Defence White Paper, Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1992, p. 74, para. 3. 
312 See the section on the United Nations. 
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circumstances, or were related to military purposes.313 UN fact-finding missions 
dispatched to investigate the “Yellow Rain” case in 1981 and 1982, did not produce 
any conclusions. In retrospect, it has become clear that the Soviets were in fact 
cheating in the biological area by their continued programs in the offensive 
domain.314 
3.2.3 Review Conferences and Confidence-Building Measures; the path to 
verification 
The need to add verification measures to the BWC has been discussed at the three 
Review Conferences (scheduled every five years) held so far in 1980, 1986 and 
1991. These discussions only resulted in the adoption of a series of voluntary 
measures to enhance transparency of activities involving biological agents. The 
Second Review Conference established the following CBM's: 
declaration of laboratories 
declaration of unusual outbreaks of disease 
encouragement of publication of research results 
encouragement of international contacts and conferences 
At the Third Review Conference, these measures were made more precise, while 
declarations of biological defense programmes, vaccine production facilities, and of 
national legislation related to BWC were added to the list. However, the 
implementation of voluntary measures has been insufficient. Although the number of 
countries, which have submitted the required information to the UN, has increased 
over the years, only about a third of all signatories responded to simple yes/no forms 
in 1992.315 Proposals for establishing an international committee to oversee the 
implementation of the CBM's and to systematize as well as assess the provided 
information have proved controversial, nor has it been possible to agree on making 
up a list of biological agents with military potential. Other proposals have 
concentrated on introducing declarations of items used for civil purposes, and 
monitoring export and import of material relevant to the provisions of the 
Convention.316 
It has been even more difficult to agree on developing actual verification measures. 
The United States, for instance, took the view in 1991 that the Convention is not 
effectively verifiable317. At the 1991 Review Conference a compromise was found in 
                                                 
313 See, for example, E. Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two cases of Soviet 
Noncompliance?, in: International Security (Spring 1987). 
314 B. Roberts, Arms control and the end of the Cold War, in: Washington Quarterly (Autumn 
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315 G.S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: the Web of Deterrence, in: 
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establishing a mandate for an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to 
identify and examine potential verification measures.318  
At the first meeting of the group of experts in April 1992 (VEREX I), 21 potential 
verification measures were identified, and grouped according to whether they were 
off-site or on-site.319 A second meeting in November-December 1992 (VEREX II) 
and following meetings have concentrated on examining the utility of each measure. 
The most likely proposal to emerge from discussions would be a system of on-site 
inspections mainly based on declarations by states and possibly on various other 
sources of information.320  
At the Fourth Review Conference of the States parties to the BWC in 1996, the work 
of the Ad Hoc Group was discussed and the progress made thus far was welcomed. It 
also mandated the Ad Hoc Group to conclude its work on the future protocol at the 
latest by the Fifth Review Conference to be held in 2001.  
On 23 September 1998, an Informal Ministerial Meeting of the States parties to the 
BWC was held in New York at the initiative of Australia in order to demonstrate 
high-level political support for the negotiations. 
At its 24th session (23 July –17 August 2002), which was the last scheduled session 
before the Fifth BWC Review Conference, the Ad Hoc Group was unable to 
conclude the negotiations on the draft protocol.  
The Fifth Review Conference was convened from 19 November to 7 December 2001 
in Geneva. Due to persisting divergent views and positions on certain key issues, 
however, the Conference decided to adjourn its proceedings and resume its work 
from 11 to 22 November 2002 in Geneva.  
The US particularly opposed mandatory non-challenge visits.321 After more than two 
dozen negotiating sessions, talks on the Verification Protocol were suspended in 
November 2001 when the United States declared that it would not support, and not 
permit the conclusion of a binding multilateral verification agreement. Among the 
reasons that US officials cited for the refusal was that the US believes that other 
countries are cheating and that the US should not be subject to the same standards as 
the rest of the world, and that the intellectual property of the US biotechnology 
industry would be put at risk by spying inspectors.322  
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In May 1999, (former) US Secretary of Commerce William Daley rejected 
transparency visits on the basis that they “offer no national security benefits”.323 In 
addition, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) has 
lobbied heavily for a Protocol with limited declarations and without mandatory non-
challenge visits.324  
Despite the European Pharmacy industries, European countries conducted mock 
inspections of biotechnology facilities of a type likely to be required by the 
Verification Protocol. They concluded that intellectual property would not be put at 
risk by the inspection regime. NGOs pointed out that even if a very aggressive 
inspection regime posed minor risks to intellectual property, this is more than an 
acceptable price to pay for dramatically decreasing the chance of a biological arms 
race.325 
The states-parties resumed the fifth review conference in November 2002. The 
participants failed to agree on any verification measures, including the proposed 
protocol. The states-parties agreed instead to hold three meetings before the next 
review conference in 2006. They will discuss non-proliferation measures during the 
meetings, but the agenda does not include any discussion of verification measures. 
No decision was taken regarding the Ad Hoc Group, and its future remains 
unclear.326 
A major obstacle is that of confidentiality of information. On-site inspections need to 
be designed in such a way that they are flexible enough and yet still sufficiently 
intrusive.  
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But the main question remains whether biological weapon programmes can actually 
be detected, since the line between civilian and military applications is so very thin 
and the weapons can be quickly produced in small effective quantities. The UN 
Special Commission's experience in Iraq may offer some hope in this respect. 
Through on-site inspections, UNSCOM felt confident in making an assessment of 
Iraq's capabilities and the purposes of certain sites. Although no weapons, filling 
equipment or documents were found, the teams were able to identify indications of 
concealed activities327.  
Critics of BW verification may argue that no tangible evidence has been produced 
and that Iraq represents a special case of maximum intrusiveness of inspections. 
Others, opposing an absolutist view on verification, have argued that it is sufficient 
to at least create a risk for states to be detected, and a climate of political 
unacceptability. Deterring non-compliance would thus be the objective of 
verification provisions.328  
3.2.4 Conclusion on the BWC verification regime 
Verification of the BWC is a very complicated issue329, but needs to be addressed 
considering the rapid growth and relevance of bio-technology. The position of the 
United States, as in the case of the CWC, will probably be a decisive factor. It 
remains to be seen whether the US will again be prepared to accept the formula of 
“managed access”. It is certain that any verification regime for the BWC will have 
important flaws, but it seems important to at least create a risk of detection. 
Verification efforts in the context of the BWC could be complemented by export 
controls and regional arrangements for banning weapons of mass destruction.330  
4. Regional Verification 
The bilateral framework mainly refers to the restricted negotiations of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, while the multilateral framework has the disadvantage 
of having to accommodate very different opinions and situations around the world, 
but the regional framework offers a means of trying to address specific problems 
between certain countries in specific areas. This evidently poses the question of the 
relationship between regional arrangements and multilateral verification. In some 
cases, the regional framework provides an alternative, but more often it can provide 
an addition to the multilateral controls. This is probably due to two reasons, 
representing two sides of the same coin: 
1. From an international verification point of view, states other than those in the 
immediately affected region will want an assurance of non-compliance, which 
may only be credibly provided by an international authority representing a 
collective international interest. 
                                                 
327 See K. Jansen, Biological Weapons Proliferation, in: S. Mataija and J.M. Beier (eds.), 
Multilateral verification and the post-Gulf environment: learning from the UNSCOM 
experience, Symposium proceedings, Toronto 1992, pp. 111-116.  
328 See, for example G.S. Pearson, op. cit., and J.R. Walker, The UNSCOM 
experience:orientation, in: S. Mataija and J.M. Beier (eds.), op. cit., p. 92. 
329 A good survey of the problems can be found in: B. Roberts, Biological Weapons of the future, 
CSIA, Washington 1993.  
330 For example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay signed the “Mendoza 
Commitment”, a Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, 18 September 1991. 
 
 92 
2. From a regional point of view, distrustful states within the region may want to 
assure compliance with the arrangement by involving guarantees from outside 
states or that of an international organization.331 
In Europe, the CSCE and the MBFR negotiation process during the Cold War 
provided a means for building confidence between the two parts of the divided 
continent. As the tensions eased at the end of the eighties culminating in the end of 
the Cold War, several arms control agreements were concluded which addressed the 
transition to the new European realities. 
In Latin America, the South-East Pacific and Africa, countries managed to establish 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, involving specific verification aspects. Their example 
could be followed in the Middle East too.332 
The situation has been more complicated in South-East Asia, which is partly 
dependent on attempts to establish bilateral verification arrangements such as those 
between India and Pakistan, North- and South Korea, but also on relations with a 
regional nuclear superpower, China, in the wider international framework of non-
proliferation. 
By contrast, Argentina and Brazil have succeeded in overcoming their nuclear rivalry 
by a bilateral verification regime guaranteed by IAEA safeguards, as an alternative to 
signing the NPT, which both states rejected for reasons of principle. This agreement 
has paved the way for the full implementation of the Latin American Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone (LANWFZ). 
Yet another case is represented by the trilateral approach in the Sinai, in which it is a 
third country i.e. the United States, which carried he verification of the agreement 
between Israel and Egypt, while the United Nations was involved to some extent.  
In discussing the bilateral approach to arms control and verification, one tends 
automatically to think of the United States and the former Soviet Union. There are, 
however, other relevant cases in which two adversaries have tried to overcome or 
control armed rivalry through verified agreements. These relationships bear 
resemblance to superpower arms control, but differ in specific characteristics in that 
they are more part of regional security settings and more susceptible to external 
pressures. Whereas the superpowers were more or less “untouchable” in their 
dealings, the regional bilateral endeavours suggest bilateral verification333 as an 
alternative to international efforts of arms control. 
                                                 
331 The negotiation of regional security regimes, and other limitation agreements, are outside the 
purview of the CD, which, as noted, is a global structure. Indeed, efforts by some States to use 
global institutions, including the CD, the UN, the IAEA, NPT Review Conferences, etc., to 
pressure States, whose vital interests are threatened by regional conflicts, to accept limits in the 
absence of a regional security framework, have been unsuccessful and counterproductive. See 
G.M. Steinberg, The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, in: Nonproliferation Review 4/1.(Fall 1996). 
332 Egypt and Iran co-sponsored in 1974 a United Nations General Assembly draft resolution 
calling for “the establishment of nuclear – weapon – free zone the region of the Middle East” 
which was adopted by the U.N General Assembly in its 29th ordinary session. The U.N 
General Assembly continues to consider the issue in its successive sessions and to support the 
establishment of the zone without achieving any tangible result. 
333 Regional security must consider mutual verification regimes on a regional basis. In this regard 
see S. Freier, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and Effective Verification, in: 
Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations 16/3, pp. 66-91; G.M. Steinberg, 
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Three cases will be dealt with, each of which concerns the verification of nuclear 
non-proliferation: India-Pakistan, North- South Korea, and Argentina-Brazil. These 
cases differ in the degree of conflict and mutual distrust, type of government, the 
stage of development of nuclear weapon programmes, incentives for bilateral 
cooperation, external influences, regional settings and specific circumstances. In 
each case, these factors influence the viability of arms control and particularly 
verification measures. 
4.1. European Regional Agreements 
Europe has formalized the principle of regional arms control agreements on an 
higher level than any other region to date. In fact, twentieth century conceptions of 
arms control verification date back to the end of World War I. Three historical 
examples deserve mention. First between 1920 and 1926 the victorious Allies set up 
the Inter-allied control Commissions (ICC) to verify Germany's compliance with the 
strict disarmament measures imposed by the Versailles Treaty. These commissions 
operated somewhat successfully in overseeing the initial force reduction efforts, but 
by 1923, the passive German resistance was transformed into open obstruction of 
Allied rights to supervision and rejection of the Versailles commitments and the 
allies did nothing to prohibit it. 
Again in 1940, the concept of verified disarmament was imposed on a defeated 
power through the German and Italian Armistice Commissions, which monitored the 
demilitarized zones imposed on the parts of France left unoccupied. While these 
controls were fairly effective in preventing military buildup in the zones to which 
they applied, they were unable to impede some clandestine military organization and 
arms buildup, particularly in the North African territories. 
The last effort to verify arms limitations was once again a post-war project to ensure 
defeated powers' compliance with “non-production” commitments. This time, 
however, verification was a cooperative effort, conducted under the auspices of the 
Western European Union (WEU) whose seven member countries (signatories of the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948) established the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(ACA). Between 1954 and 1985 all WEU countries exchanged detailed information 
on their force levels and structures, about ten percent of which was randomly 
selected for verification through on-site inspections. Challenge inspections, although 
theoretically possible, were never de facto implemented. 
From these historical precedents, one lesson from European regional efforts was 
made clear: In neither example of imposed verification regimes, was the regime 
capable of preventing the controlled side from cheating – technical capabilities and 
political will to ensure compliance were not sufficient to oppose a determined 
cheater.  
Only in the WEU where common alliance members jointly delegated authority to a 
“supranational” agency (ACA), as the result the verification regime was able to 
implement its task fully. Whereas today's regimes may not all be “supranational”, 
they are all based on voluntary participation, equality of membership, respect of 
sovereign states' rights. Technical capabilities and political will are addressed 
through verification provisions and institutions within each regime. 
                                                                                                                                          
Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, in: Survival 36/1 (Spring 1994). For a 
general discussion of the link between conventional weapons limitation and nuclear arms 
control, see H. Muller, Reforming the CD Agenda, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996).  
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Three agreements form the pillars of European regional arms control today – the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Helsinki 
Agreement of 1975, which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). Each pillar is unique in its manner of addressing extra-regional 
participants, the availability of verification technology, and the sharing of 
information. 
4.1.1 The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
Two fundamental objectives of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
Treaty are to ensure the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the 
development of nuclear energy in the Community, and to ensure that all users in the 
Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels. The 
Euratom Supply Agency, operative since 1960, is the body established by the 
Euratom Treaty to ensure this supply by means of a common supply policy based on 
the principle of equal access to sources of supply. It has legal personality and 
financial autonomy. This Euratom safeguards system was established in accordance 
with the Euratom Treaty, which was signed in Rome in 1957, well before the NPT 
safeguards were established. The Treaty provides the framework for nuclear energy 
development in the EU member states and ensures that materials declared for 
peaceful use are not diverted to military use. In the EU, IAEA safeguards are 
implemented under specific agreements and IAEA inspection activities are carried 
out in close co-operation with inspection teams from Euratom. 
An existing example of cooperation between an international organization and a 
regional/multinational system is the IAEA/Euratom interaction with regard to the 
NPT and Safeguards in the European Community, based on 3 Safeguards 
Agreements:  
one between the IAEA, Euratom and Euratom's Non-Nuclear Weapons States 
(NNWS);334 
one between the IAEA/Euratom and the UK;335 
one between the IAEA/Euratom and France;336 
4.1.1.1 The EURATOM Safeguards System. 
In 1957, both the IAEA and Euratom were created. The former was an American 
initiative that was directly related to the Atoms for Peace programme: the US was 
willing to loosen its strict policy to a certain extent (also for commercial reasons) on 
the condition that an international watchdog organisation would be created. The main 
targets from the American point of view were the European states. Euratom in 
contrast aimed at establishing a European free zone for nuclear fuel, i.e. uranium. It 
would also control the civilian nuclear fuel cycle in the six member states. The treaty 
contained no explicit non-proliferation goals.337 
                                                 
334 See INFCIRC/193. 
335 See INFCIRC/263 (UK/EURATOM/IAEA).  
336 See INFCIRC/290 (France/EURATOM/IAEA). 
337 B. Goldschmidt, Proliferation and non-proliferation in Europa, in: H. Müller (ed.), A 
European non-proliferation policy, Bruessels 1995, p. 18.  
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The Euratom nuclear safeguards system was established in 1957 by the Euratom 
Treaty and is currently implemented, through Euratom Regulation 3227/76.338 The 
general objectives of the Euratom safeguards system, as defined in the Euratom 
Treaty include making “...certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials 
are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended”. 
The Euratom safeguards system is based on European law339 and includes, as an 
ultimate step, strong sanctions for infringements. It applies to all civil nuclear 
materials from the moment they are mined on Community territory or arrive, in any 
form, from non-Community countries. The system, whilst principally concerned with 
detecting diversion from peaceful to non-peaceful use is also concerned with 
checking that declarations of specific use are correct and that obligations imposed by 
material suppliers are respected.340 
In order to translate the requirements of the Treaty into an applicable scheme of 
safeguards measures the obligations for operators of nuclear plants are clearly 
defined.341 
The details of the obligations are specific to each installation under safeguards, and 
are laid down in the so-called “Particular Safeguards Provisions” (PSPs), a legally 
binding document issued by the Commission according to the provisions of the 
Safeguard Regulation after consultation between the Commission, the Member State 
and the operator concerned.  
The Safeguards applied follow more or less similar procedures to those of the IAEA 
and include inter alia: 
developing and reviewing surveillance films; 
evaluation of the analysis of samples which have been destructively analysed; 
evaluation of shipper/receiver differences between installations; 
evaluation of overall material balance data for each “material balance area” (MBA); 
                                                 
338 In the European Union (EU) there exists a very comprehensive regional system of safeguards 
operated by Euratom. This system was established in accordance with the Euratom Treaty, 
which was signed in Rome in 1957, well before the NPT safeguards were established. The 
Treaty provides the framework for nuclear energy development in the EU member states and 
ensures that materials declared for peaceful use are not diverted to military use. In the EU, 
IAEA safeguards are implemented under specific agreements and IAEA inspection activities 
are carried out in close co-operation with inspection teams from Euratom. See inter alia 
Euratom Regulation 3227/76. 
339 The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly called the 
Euratom Treaty, constitutes the legal basis of Euratom Safeguards. It covers all civil nuclear 
materials in the European Union from the moment they are mined (in the European Union) or 
arrive, in any form, from outside the European Union. The responsibilities and rights of all 
parties are specified in Chapter VII of the above Treaty. The obligation to implement the 
Treaty provisions is given to the European Commission. On the actual development of 
Euratom, see the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Operation of the Euratom Safeguards Office 1999-2000. COM(2001) 436 final. Brussels, 
26.07.2001. 




assessment of certain performance data over a period of time, e.g. data on the book-
physical inventory difference resulting from a physical inventory exercise, data on 
discards and wastes, etc. 
In case of anomalies, which require an explanation, Euratom can initiate follow-up 
actions by following a graduated response such as:  
a significant increase of inspection frequency and intensity, or a change in inspection 
strategy; and, ultimately, 
sanctions as specified in article 83 of the Euratom Treaty, ranging in severity from a 
warning to the withdrawal of source or special fissile material. 
4.1.1.2 Cooperation with the IAEA in the Safeguards area. 
The IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards Office co-operate in the 13 Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States following the arrangements laid down under the New Partnership 
Approach (NPA) as agreed in 1992 between the European Commission and the 
IAEA.342  
The tasks of the IAEA and Euratom are, to a large extent, similar. The IAEA deals 
with states, whereas Euratom deals with the individual nuclear operators. To 
implement the Non Proliferation Treaty a safeguard agreements exist between the 
IAEA, Euratom and its NNWS.343 It defines the application of NPT safeguards in 
Euratom Non-Nuclear Weapon States, maintaining the special role of Euratom as a 
multinational system through a regional protocol. 
The two Nuclear Weapon states, the United Kingdom344 and France345, each made 
“Voluntary Offers” to accept IAEA safeguards on their territory. All “civil” nuclear 
material in both France and the UK is subject to Euratom safeguards under the 
Euratom Treaty on the same basis as that which apply in the NNWS. 
There is of course a difference between a “State System for Accounting for and 
Control” and an established regional safeguards system – like EURATOM 
Safeguards. The State system has to follow the decisions of the State's authorities and 
may be instructed to perform or not non-peaceful activities. 
The basic problem for the IAEA is how to take due account of such a regional 
system, or similar ones to be established in Nuclear Weapon free zones, for example 
                                                 
342 See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Operation of 
the Euratom Safeguards Office 1999-2000. COM(2001) 436 final. Brussels, 26.07.2001. pp 15-
16. 
343 See IAEA INFCIRC/193. 
344 The safeguards agreement between the IAEA/EURATOM, and the United Kingdom, 
(INFCIRC/268) is an example of the agreements concluded pursuant to the offers by the five 
,recognized' nuclear-weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on some or all of their civilian 
nuclear plants. To encourage the widest possible acceptance of the NPT, the United States and 
the United Kingdom made such offers in the late 1960s and included all their civilian plants in 
their offers ('subject to exclusions for national security reasons only' in the terms of the United 
Kingdom's offer). Since then France, the Soviet Union and, most recently, the People's 
Republic of China, have offered to accept safeguards on some of their civilian nuclear plants. 
345 France offered to accept safeguards on a more limited selection of its plants. With this 
difference the agreement between IAEA/EURATOM and France (INFCIRC/290) is essentially 
the same as that with the United Kingdom.  
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in order to draw independent conclusions. The example of Euratom/IAEA 
cooperation augurs well in this respect. 
4.1.2 Verification and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in 
Europe: the CSCE 
The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR itself 
radically changed Europe's needs for arms control. The situation now is in sharp 
contrast with the sphere of mutual distrust that marked the negotiations of the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, founding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE)346. The series of confidence building measures (CBM's) then 
adopted -while limited in military relevance- were a remarkable result in the era of 
Cold War competition. They were designed to reduce the secrecy surrounding 
military activities in Europe through such measures as prior notification and 
observation of military manoeuvres.347  
It was not until the Stockholm agreement in 1986 that CBM's were extended and was 
made verifiable by inspections. These measures are widely believed to have 
contributed to overcoming the division of Europe by establishing a basis for 
confidence. The Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 further built on this, and 
adapted to a changing situation. With the threat of a massive surprise attack gone, 
CSBM's have obtained a new function. On the one hand, they are to create co-
operative, positive relationships and on the other, they aim to prevent, defuse and 
manage new threats, emerging no longer from the East-West confrontation but 
within individual states or across borders -mainly along ethnic lines.348  
4.1.3 Definition 
Discussions on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) are ongoing 
across the globe in the Americas, Africa, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, and the 
Middle East. CBM's (they were later called CSBM's so as to include the rather 
ambitious goal of “security-“ in addition to confidence building) represent a 
relatively new phenomenon of arms control in the world. Other than the traditional 
method of limiting numbers of military personnel or weapons, CSBM's refer to 
practices and conditions, which aim to limit abilities to use force.349 Their main 
                                                 
346 See, H.G. Brauch, G. Neuwirth (eds.), Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe – 
From the Stockholm to the Vienna Document, 1992; H.G. Brauch, G. Neuwirth (eds.), 
Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe II – From Vienna 1990 to Vienna 1992, 
1992. 
347 V.-Y. Ghebali, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures within the CSCE Process: 
Paragraph by paragraph analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes, UNIDIR Research 
Papers, No. 3, New York 1989. H.J.v.d. Graaf, The Stockholm Document on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, in: S. Sur (ed.), Verification of 
Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: Ways, Means and Practices, 
Aldershot 1991, pp. 311-340. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, in: S. Koulik and 
R. Kokoski, Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification, Oxford 1994, pp. 133-
155. 
348 See J. Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm 
Conference, Washington, DC 1988, p. 261. J. Borawski, Stability through Openness: The 
Vienna Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, in: J.B. Poole 
(ed.), Verification Report 1991: Yearbook on Arms Control and Environmental Agreements, 
London and New York 1991, pp. 67-72. 
349 CSBM’s aim limiting or reducing the level of fear among parties in conflict is essential for 
building confidence and a sense of security. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) aim to 
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thrust is to lessen unjustified fears of aggression and thus to avoid feeding a 
reciprocal escalation of fear among states finding threats in each other's security 
measures. CSBM's can contribute to mutual confidence by reducing misperceptions 
of the purpose of military moves. They do so by restricting opportunities to use 
force, by making early warning of attack likely, and by providing credible 
information to show absence of aggressive intent.350  
CSBM's can be categorized as “constraints” (on the locations, deployment, training 
and exercise of forces) and measures to increase “transparency” of forces' 
capabilities and purposes. Distinctions between the two concepts are not always 
clear, however, nor are distinctions between constraints and arms limitations. In fact 
there has been considerable overlap between the CSBM negotiations and the CFE 
treaty.351 
4.1.4 Development of CSBM's in Europe 
CSBM's were partly born out of the belief of many Western and non-aligned 
countries in Europe that the CSCE should include a military dimension, and the 
frustration over failing talks on conventional arms reduction in MBFR, which both 
NATO and Warsaw Pact members preferred to place outside the CSCE 
framework352. The CSCE has been marked for a long time by an ambivalence 
resulting from Soviet efforts to gain recognition and stabilization of the East-West 
division through the CSCE, while Western governments emphasized a role for this 
institution to overcome the status-quo. For both it served the purpose of detente. 
The ambivalence affected the positions East and West would take on CSBM's. 
NATO governments, facing large offensively oriented Warsaw Pact forces, insisted 
on a technical-military oriented approach to CSBM's including disclosure of forces' 
locations, armaments and operational principles, and limitation of activities that 
appeared threatening. The USSR and its allies long advocated “political” CSBM's, 
meaning plans for collective security arrangements and unilateral declarations that 
forces and strategies were solely for defense. The inclusion of CBM's in the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975 had been a relatively small concession from the Soviets to achieve 
                                                                                                                                          
lessen anxiety and suspicion by making the parties' behavior more predictable. Although 
`CBMs' may refer specifically to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and `CSBMs' to the 1986 
Stockholm Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe, the terms are often used interchangeably in the academic literature. CSBMs is 
preferred as the generic term in this article since it makes explicit the goal of building military 
security. See M. Efinger and V. Rittberger, The CSBM Regime in and for Europe: Confidence-
Building and Peaceful Conflict Management, in: M. Pugh (ed.), European Security – towards 
2000, Manchester 1992, pp. 104-123.  
350 Such a definition has been suggested by J. Mackintosh, Confidence Building Measures; a 
conceptual exploration, in: R.B. Beyers, F.S. Larrabee and A.Lynch (eds.), Confidence 
Building Measures and International Security, New York 1987, pp. 15-17. 
351 CSBM and CFE negotiations used to be strictly divided, because the latter focused on reducing 
specific military items among a limited group of 23 countries (NATO and Warsaw pact), while 
CSBM's had a more general political objective negotiated by the 35 CSCE members. In the 
1992 Helsinki Document they have been brought together in a “Forum for Security 
Cooperation”.  
352 See S. Lehne, The Vienna meeting of the CSCE in Europe 1986-1989; a turning point in East-
West relations, Boulder, 1991. See M. Bandini, The CSBM negotiations in Vienna: a 
commitment to build a new European military security system, in: NATO Review 5 (October 
1990), p. 12. As ol end December 1990, 44 inspections had been conducted. 
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their larger objective: recognition of the East-West division in Europe. Negotiations 
to strengthen the regime remained deadlocked for 11 years. 
In 1986, after Gorbachev had come to power in the Soviet Union, significant 
progress was made with the adoption of the Stockholm Document on CSBM's. This 
agreement requires notification, observation and annual forecasts of military 
activities above 13.000 troops, as well as on-site inspection with no right of refusal. 
The accord broke new grounds in arms control as the first international agreement in 
which the Soviet Union accepted verification on its own territory. Also, provisions 
were made for the first ever -limited- aerial inspection regime, which would become 
an important precedent for the INF and Open Skies agreements. The Soviet 
willingness to agree on inspections most probably originated from Gorbachev's 
desire to show the West that he was serious about taking away the perception of a 
Soviet threat.  
4.1.4.1 CSBM's in a new Europe 
After the far-reaching events in 1989, negotiations were made for an agreement to be 
endorsed at the Paris CSCE summit in 1990, which was designed to adjust the CSCE 
process so as to reflect the “new realities of Europe”. The so-called Vienna 
Document of 1990 built upon previous provisions and developed CSBM's in new 
ways such as:  
1. annual exchange of information on military manpower, equipment, deployment 
and budgets;  
2. establishment of a communications network among the participating states for 
CSBM and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) purposes;  
3. an annual meeting to review CSBM implementation; 
4. improved inter-military contacts, including mandatory visits to airbases;  
5. mechanisms giving states the right to an explanation of unusual or hazardous 
military activities and, to call a bilateral or a full CSCE meeting if the 
explanation is not satisfactory; 
6. CSBM's were tied to the newly established Conflict Prevention Centre, which 
would maintain a databank compiled on the basis of exchanged military 
information. 
A few additional CSBM's were agreed to in the 1992 Vienna Document.353 These 
include reduced ceilings on exercises requiring notification (9,000 troops or 250 
                                                 
353 Summarizing implementation of the Vienna Document CSBMs through 1993:  
 Notifications. Four activities were notified in 1991, all by NATO states; six others which had 
been forecast (mostly by Eastern states) were either cancelled or reduced below notifiable 
level. Five activities were notified in 1992, all by NATO states. Two activities were notified in 
1993, one by NATO states and one by Sweden; five others which had been forecast (all by 
NATO states) were cancelled or reduced below notifiable levels.  
 Observations. Two programs were hosted in 1991, four in 1992, and two in 1993. All but one 
were hosted by NATO states, with the exception (in 1993) hosted by Sweden.  
 Inspections. During 1991, four inspections were conducted (two by NATO states and two by 
the USSR). Four were conducted in 1992 (two by NATO states, two by Russia). A significant 
increase was noted during 1993, when 11 inspections were conducted (ten by NATO states and 
one by Russia).  
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tanks), new ceilings on exercises open for observation (13,000 troops, 300 tanks or 
3,500 amphibious or parachute troops), public demonstration of new weapons and 
the obligation to report large reserve formations to be called to duty for three weeks.  
At the Helsinki Summit in July 1992, it was decided to set up a “Forum for Security 
Cooperation” with an extensive “Programme of Immediate Action”. This Forum is to 
negotiate conventional disarmament measures, provisions to harmonize obligations 
arising from various international instruments, as well as CSBM's. Negotiations on 
CSBM's will complement those of the Vienna 1992 Document and develop new 
measures.  
So far no agreement has been reached on CSBM's on naval and air forces. The US, 
supported by its NATO partners, has been reluctant to accept limits on the US ability 
to control the seas and transport material over them, and seeks to retain flexibility in 
its manoeuvres. As to air forces, NATO countries -which have always relied on their 
air superiority- have argued that methods to verify air force exercises would either be 
too intrusive or too weak to be reliable.354 
4.1.4.2 Verifying CSBM's: the inspection regime 
Although the concept of CSBM's has some aspects of verification of its own by 
increasing transparency, adding inspections to provisions for notification and 
observation gave the regime a means for checking compliance with the agreed 
measures. The use of inspectors meant an important improvement over the previous 
reliance on observers. The latter are relatively passive as they are guided by their 
hosts and see little that their hosts do not want them to see. Inspectors are far more 
intrusive and enjoy greater freedom. Their capabilities were enhanced in the two 
Vienna Documents which allowed equipment such as video cameras and night vision 
devices.  
As of 1993, the main modalities of inspections are that:  
Each participant state may inspect on the territory of another;  
A request cannot be refused;  
Permission must be given within 24 hours and the inspection may begin within 36 
hours. No state is obliged to accept more than three inspections or more than one 
inspection by the same state;  
Certain areas and objects cannot be inspected;  
Inspections are allowed from the ground and the air;  
Per team no more than 4 inspectors are allowed; the teams may be multinational.  
In the Vienna 1990 Document, the so-called evaluation visits were added to the 
regime to check information provided under the provisions on 'Information on 
                                                                                                                                          
 Evaluations. This compliance-verification activity has amassed an impressive implementation 
record since the provisions came into force on July 1, 1991, to include significant participation 
by NNA states. 24 evaluation visits were conducted during 1991, 46 during 1992, and 54 
during 1993. A total of 22 (of the 52 CSCE) states have conducted evaluations of the 
information provided by a total of 33 states. (Seven states reporting military forces have not yet 
been subject to evaluation visits: Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Yugoslavia.). 




Military Forces and on Information on Plans for the Deployment of Major Weapons 
and Equipment Systems'.355 
The implementation of CSBMs has been a success in so far that there have been very 
few examples of non-compliance.356 Observations, notifications and inspections have 
become more accurate and complete over the years, and there has been an 
increasingly cooperative and flexible attitude in implementing obligations.357 
However, CSBM's have long been fairly modest in nature. Compliance with the 
Helsinki 1975 provisions have been mixed. Aside from the flagrant Soviet violations 
incited by the events in Poland in 1981, there were errors in notification and the 
amount of information they contained varied greatly. As to the measures adopted 
since 1986 and their satisfactory implementation, it could be argued that these were 
the results rather than the initial causes of the sharp lessening of rivalry. The safest 
overall judgement would perhaps be that the CSBM regime facilitated the process of 
transition in Europe while at the same time adjusting to it. 
During the first years following the Stockholm agreement extensive use was made of 
the inspections. Although several technical problems and questions of interpreting 
the Documents arose and several parties criticized each others' performance, no 
formal complaints were filed, and all have expressed general satisfaction with 
procedures.358 Most parties have been quite flexible in applying the Document's 
provisions during visits, thus confirming an expectation voiced by an American 
officer leading the first inspection of a Soviet military exercise, that some items of 
implementation must be worked out on the ground; that is at the scene during the 
actual inspection. There seems to be some evidence that this first experience of 
undergoing inspections showed the Soviets that it did not threaten their national 
security, and they learned to tolerate CSBM's as means to enhance transparency 
instead of suspecting them to be intelligence gathering activities.359  
From 1989 on the number of inspections undertaken decreased gradually to very 
small numbers in 1992. This has had much to do with reduced defence budgets and 
fading threat perceptions both leading to reduced field training exercises and more 
reliance on war-gaming and simulations. It would also be plausible to attribute the 
decline to increased confidence resulting from previous satisfactory inspections.  
                                                 
355 For further details on the CBM s stipulated in the Vienna Document, see S. Koulik and R. 
Kokosik, Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification, Oxford 1994, pp. 144-155. 
356 V. Rittberger, M. Efinger and M. Mendler, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
(CSBM): An Evolving East-West Security Regime?, in: Journal of Peace Research 27/1 (1990), 
pp. 55-74 (reprinted in: D. Dewitt and H. Rattinger (eds.), East-West Arms Control. Challenges 
for the Western Alliance, London 1992, pp. 89-118).  
357 See J. Garrison, Confidence Building-Measures: Foundation for stability in Europe, in: The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 15/3 (September 1992). 
358 See D. Stovall, The Stockholm accord; On site inspections in Eastern and Western Europe, in: 
L.A. Dunn and A.E. Gordon, op cit., 1990. 
359 See D.O. Stovall and M.R. Audritsch, The future direction of on-site inspections in arms 
control through the provisions of Confidence and Security Building Measures, in: Arms 
Control (December 1992), pp. 421-422. These authors even suggest that the CSBM experience 
induced the Soviets to agree on the inspection measures in the INF treaty. 
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4.1.4.3 Prospects for CSBM's in Europe; issues of contention 
The end of East-West confrontation has made intensive security cooperation 
possible. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has expanded the number of CSCE 
members to 53 and its geographical scope now stretches from “Vancouver to 
Vladivostok” (instead of only the Urals). Unfortunately, this has also added an area 
of new states full of lingering or already existing conflicts. It is still unclear how the 
former Soviet republics will make use of the CSBM arrangements.  
CSBM's may help to provide a framework which could try to suppress any tendency 
of a multi-centred Europe to return to its old patterns of rivalries. (For regions where 
this has already happened, it is needless to say that CSBMs have limited relevance.)  
In October 1998 the OSCE, with the approval of the United Nations, undertook its 
largest mission to date, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).360 The KVM was 
supposed to verify that all sides of the conflict were in compliance with UN 
resolutions.361 It was also directed to monitor elections and help establish a police 
force and other institutions in Kosovo. The Mission had to be withdrawn in March 
1999 before NATO initiated its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. Withing the 
framework of a political settlement for Kosovo, concluded in June, the OSCE was 
responsible for democracy – and institution- building under the auspices of the UN. 
OSCE monitors were deployed to assess the human rights situation throughout the 
region, and in August a new OSCE-administered police training school was 
inaugurated. Later in the year the OSCE commenced the training of judicial and 
administrative officers. At that time the OSCE mission consisted of 1,400 personnel. 
The Vienna Document 1999 represents the latest review of the OSCE’s confidence- 
and security-building measures (CSBMs).362 The Vienna Document 1999 contains 
provisions regarding the exchange and verification of military information between 
participating states, including: 
an annual exchange of military information (including the size of defence budgets, 
the location, size and strength of military units and formations); 
prior notification of certain military activities (i.e. major troop exercises and 
movements); 
observation of certain military activities; 
exchange of annual calendars of military activities; 
constraining provisions for military exercises; 
verification measures (inspections and evaluation visits); 
                                                 
360 From October 1998 to March 1999, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the largest and 
most challenging OSCE operation up to that date, was deployed to verify FRY compliance 
with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199; to verify the cease-fire, 
monitor movement of forces, and promote human rights and democracy-building. Following a 
deterioration in the security situation, the KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo in March 1999. 
See OSCE Mission in Kosovo Programmatic Priorities for 2004. 
361 The OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established by the OSCE Permanent Council on 1 July 
1999. It forms a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). 




military contacts and co-operation (visits to airbases, military facilities, exchange of 
observers, demonstrations of new weapons systems); 
There is still a lot of room for improvement and extension of existing measures, 
especially in the relatively underdeveloped area of constraints. Specific attention is 
likely to be given to measures designed for regional (or even bilateral) problems 
within Europe.  
There may also be a problem in the fact that the current system relies heavily on 
challenge inspections. In the current cooperative political climate most states hesitate 
to demand the inspection of one another, since this might be interpreted as a sign of 
distrust. Inspections on a routine basis possibly could avoid this problem. Challenge 
inspections can be very useful, however, in the case of unannounced military 
exercises or possibly dangerous build-ups near borders.363 
The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, lent a new quality 
to regional arms control and confidence-building is the first implementation of the 
CBM’s verification regime.364 The Verification agreement is modelled on the Vienna 
Document 1992. Three sets of negotiations of relevance to arms control are specified 
in Annex 1-B of the treaty, devoted to “Regional Stabilisation”:  
Confidence and security-building measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article II)  
Disarmament and arms control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Croatia (Article IV)  
Establishment of a regional balance in and around former Yugoslavia under the aegis 
of the OSCE (Article V), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe concluded on 
June 10, 1999 also reflects the approach towards arms control and CSBM measures 
adopted in Dayton. In the debate on the “Security Issues for Arms Control” Germany 
was the driving force behind the establishment of a Regional Arms Control 
Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) for South Eastern 
Europe in Croatia. The latter was opened in October 2000 and has since been 
providing support in implementing the arms control provisions agreed on in Dayton. 
In addition, the RACVIAC is doing preparatory work for further confidence- and 
security-building measures. The Bundeswehr Verification Centre provided 
significant support in planning, establishing and operating the RACVIAC. 
The following are subject to inspections:365 
(a) declared sites, which are those containing one or more objects of inspection, such 
as: any formation or unit at the organisational level of brigade/regiment, wing/air 
regiment, independent battalion squadron or equivalent as notified in the Exchange 
of Information; any storage site not organic to formations and units, such as 
maintenance units holding armament/equipment limited by the agreement; units 
below the level of battalion holding conventional armaments and equipment directly 
subordinate to a unit or formation above the level of brigade/regiment; or reduction 
sites.  
                                                 
363 See Stovall and Audritsch, op. cit., 1992, p. 429. 
364 See P. Dunay, Verification of Conventional Arms Control, in: T. Findlay (ed.), Verification 
Yearbook 2000, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, London 2000, 
pp. 101-114. 
365 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Protocol on Inspection, section 1: Definitions. 
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At least two lessons can be drawn from the Dayton verification regime: the 
importance of access to information OSCE inspectors are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the entities because they do not have access to all of the JCC’s amendments to 
inspection procedures.366 The ineffectiveness of short-notice changes to the annual 
inspection schedule for Confidence Building Measures to all parties, an annual 
inspection schedule is prepared by the Personal Representative based on input from 
the parties and has to be approved by them. However, this annual inspection schedule 
is subject to short-notice changes, which makes it difficult for countries with small 
verification agencies to be always in a position to nominate inspectors as well as to 
perform as effectively as those who are well prepared in advance. 367  
The Open Skies368 agreement concluded in 1992 offers the possibility to add to the 
limited provisions for aerial verification in the CSBM documents.369 
While negotiations on CSBM's will continue, considerable overlap could emerge 
with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).370 This institution was 
designed in 1991 by NATO to respond to requests from Eastern European countries 
and Soviet successor states looking for shelter in the North Atlantic security 
framework. NACC was described as a forum for discussing political and security 
issues, and includes such objectives as improving communications between the 
military establishments of its members. The first cluster offers standard-type CSBMs: 
a programme for military contacts and cooperation (now overtaken by NATO's more 
sophisticated Partnership for Peace programme), a set of provisions on Defence 
Planning (aimed at enhancing transparency in an unprecedented military cooperation 
                                                 
366 The JCC has taken approximately 30 decisions so far, some of which have directly altered the 
agreement. Since these decisions are incorporated in the minutes of the JCC meetings, it is 
currently impossible for inspectors to know whether they are following the latest procedures. 
However, an updated version of the agreement on CSBM’s may be issued later in 2001. See 
Personal communication with Senior Operations Staff Officer, Office of the Verification Co-
ordinator, OSCE, Vienna, 3 April 2001. 
367 See D. Rothbacher, Verification of the Dayton arms control agreements, in: Verification 
Yearbook 2001, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, London 2000, 
pp. 173-185. 
368 The Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on 1 January 2002, and currently has 30 States 
Parties. The Treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire 
territory of its participants. The Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and 
confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information 
about military forces and activities of concern to them. Open Skies is one of the most wide-
ranging international efforts to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces 
and activities. 
369 Provisional application of portions of the Treaty took place from signature in 1992 until entry 
into force in 2002. During that period, participants conducted joint trial flights for the purpose 
of training flight crews and testing equipment and sensors. With entry into force of the Treaty, 
formal observation flights began in August 2002. During the first Treaty year, States Parties 
conducted 67 observation flights. For 2004, States Parties have planned 82 missions. The 
OSCC continues to address modalities for conducting observation missions and other 
implementation issues. Open Skies Treaty Enhances Mutual Understanding, Fact Sheet, 
Bureau of Arms Control, Washington, DC 14 August 2002.  
370 See L. Zannier, Relations between the OSCE and NATO with particular regard to crisis 
management and peacekeeping, in: The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security, The 
Hague 1997.  
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field) and a regime for the global exchange of military information (noteworthy by 
its world-wide area of application and naval armaments component).371 
Another area of overlap concerns the CFE treaty. In 1992, most functions of the 
former CFE and CSBM delegations have been brought together in the CSCE Forum 
of Security Co-operation, where harmonization of the separate regimes of CSBM's 
and CFE is one of the issues on the agenda. There is indeed an unintended symbiotic 
relationship between the two arrangements. For example, evaluation visits, exercise 
observations, and inspections under the Vienna Document could assist in 
determining TLE numbers and personnel numbers within CFE. On the other hand, 
different objectives make it difficult to melt inspections into one common regime. An 
inspection to verify equipments counts is not the same as an inspection to clarify 
what may be a dangerous military mobilization, out of garrison or near a border. It is 
also relevant to note that unlike in the CFE treaty, CSBM inspections may not be 
refused. 
4.1.5 The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty marks extraordinary progress in the 
political will to verify conventional weaponry, yet twentieth century conceptions of 
conventional arms control verification in Europe date back to the end of World War 
I. Three examples deserve mention. First, between 1920 and 1926 the victorious 
Allies set up the Inter-allied Control Commissions (ICC) to verify Germany's372 
compliance with the strict disarmament measures imposed by the Versailles Treaty. 
These commissions operated somewhat successfully in overseeing the initial force 
reduction efforts, but by 1923 passive German resistance was transformed into open 
obstruction of Allied rights to supervision and rejection of the Versailles 
commitments.373  
Again in 1940 the concept of verified conventional disarmament was imposed on a 
defeated power through the German and Italian Armistice Commissions which 
monitored the demilitarized zones imposed on the parts of France left unoccupied. 
While these controls were fairly effective in preventing military buildup in the zones 
to which they applied they were unable to impede some clandestine military 
organization, particularly in the North African territories. 
The last effort to verify conventional arms limitations was once again a post-war 
project to ensure defeated powers compliance with “non-production” commitments. 
This time, however, verification was a cooperative effort, conducted under the 
auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) whose seven member countries 
(signatories of the Brussels Treaty of 1948) established the Agency for the Control of 
                                                 
371 V.-Y. Ghebali, After the Budapest Conference: The Orgnisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, in: NATO Review 43/2 (March 1995), pp. 24-27. 
372 For the European context, especially Germany, see T.G. Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and 
the Divided Continent, New York 1993 and P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and 
Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Cambridge, Mass. 1995. For the American view, 
consult M.R. Beschloss and S. Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of 
the Cold War, Boston 1993. For the state of the Soviet Union, see J.B. Dunlop, The Rise of 
Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, Princeton, NJ 1993. 
373 R. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order, Boston 1995, pp. 1-77. See also T. Graham 
and J. Mendelsohn, Features on CFE, in: Arms Control Today (April 1996). 
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Armaments (ACA).374 Between 1954 and 1985 all WEU countries exchanged 
detailed information on their force levels and structures, about ten percent of which 
was randomly selected for verification through on-site inspections. Challenge 
inspections, though theoretically possible, were never implemented.  
From these historical precedents, two lessons can be drawn as regards contemporary 
efforts at conventional arms control verification. First, it is difficult if not impossible 
to verify manpower limitations, as these forces are easily concealed in para-military 
or other organizations. Second, in neither example of imposed verification regimes 
was the regime capable of preventing the controlled side from cheating – technical 
capabilities nor political will to ensure compliance were not sufficient to oppose a 
determined cheater. Only in the WEU, with ACA was able to fulfill a verification 
task.375 
CFE is an unusual example of a regional arms control regime in that it emerged from 
negotiations between what were once two hostile camps. The Mutually Balanced 
Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations began in 1973 as an effort to establish parity 
between NATO alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). While these 
negotiations never achieved an agreement, the negotiation format (bloc-to-bloc) was 
maintained. In 1989, in answer to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's 
1986 proposal for a more comprehensive reduction of forces (both conventional and 
nuclear) in an expanded geographic region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals 
(ATTU) and the conclusions of a NATO High-Level Task Force on Conventional 
Arms Control,376 a CFE mandate was agreed  
“to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of 
a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include 
conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of 
disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter 
of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating 
large-scale offensive actions.”377 
The Treaty on CFE was signed on November 19, 1990 by each NATO and WTO 
member, placing limits on five categories of conventional armaments – battle tanks, 
artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters – and 
limiting deployment of a sixth – armoured vehicle launched bridges. The signatories 
accepted obligations as individual sovereign nations but also as members of “groups 
of states”. The treaty was due to progress in four phases: 
1. The Baseline Validation phase (first 120 days), it involved inspection to verify 
the initially declared levels of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLEs) in each state. 
                                                 
374 See Protocol IV of the Brussels Treaty of 1948. 
375] V. Kunzendorff, Verification in Conventional Arms Control, Adelphi Paper 245, pp. 19-20. 
376 Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, December 11, 1986; North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO Communiques 1986; NATO Information Service 1986, pp. 31-32. 
377 Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, reprinted in: SIPRI 
Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford 1989, pp. 420-421. 
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2. The Reduction phase scheduled to last three years began November 15, 1992. 
During this time equipment was to be destroyed during verified reduction 
events or re-categorized according to Article VIII.378  
3. The Residual Level Validation phase allowed 120 days for baseline data to be 
reverified after the completion of reductions 
4. The Residual phase to last indefinitely under a regime of challenge inspections 
at declared and undeclared sites, each state being obliged to accept a certain 
quota of them each year. 
Since the treaty's signature, WTO – has been dissolved, the Soviet Union – has 
decomposed into several states, and two of the signatories – the FRG and the GDR – 
have united and remained in NATO. Consequently, the Joint Consulting Group 
(JCG) established by the treaty as a forum of discussion and interpretation has played 
a role in mediating the assumption of treaty responsibilities. Within the JCG in 
October of 1991, it was agreed that USSR would ratify the agreement on behalf of all 
republics that had not yet been recognized as independent. NATO invited all former 
WTO states and Soviet republics to participate in a forum of discussion – North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) – and established a High Level Working 
Group to negotiate the rights and obligations of all of these states under the CFE.379 
Although the participants consented that “treaty obligations assumed by the former 
Soviet Union should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent states in 
the area of application and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all 
Parties to the Treaty”,380 it seems some TLE's have remained unaccounted for during 
the confusion between the time initial levels were declared and July 17, 1992 when 
the Treaty entered into force. 
The politico-military setting has changed in a number of ways since the first wave of 
NATO enlargement in 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined 
the alliance and the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE 
Treaty)381 was reshaped by the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty 
(Agreement on Adaptation).382 
                                                 
378 Each country must have reduced 25% of their declared liabilities by November 15,1993, 60% 
by the following year and 100% by the third year of the reduction phase. Reduction can be 
accomplished through destruction of the TLE's – in which case the destruction event must be 
observed by other parties to the treat – adaptation of the equipment to non-military functions 
(within guidelines set out in the treaty), or transfer of the items to other treaty parties who must 
then accept liability for these items. The latter transaction – called “cascading” – allows, for 
example, the United States to transfer more modern equipment once held in Germany to allies 
in the south, where older equipment will be destroyed.  
379 For a description of CFE negotiations regarding the WTO and USSR dissolution, see J.O. 
Sharp, The CFE Treaty and the Dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in: 
Verification Report, op. cit. 1992; J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie (eds.), Verification Technology 
Information Centre, Ule 1992, pp. 25-37. 
380 HLWG Meeting on 10 January 1992: Chairman's summary, NATO Press Release, point 2. 
381 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 Nov. 1990, available at 
www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfetreate.htm. 
382 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Istanbul, 19 
Nov. 1999, available at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfeagree.htm. A 
consolidated text showing the amended CFE Treaty as adapted in accordance with the 1999 
Agreement on Adaptation is reproduced in the appendix to this volume. It was originally 
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4.1.5.1 Specific Characteristics of the CFE Verification Regime 
Several aspects set the verification regime established through the CFE apart from 
others of its kind. First, the nature of the object of verification (OOV), presents a 
unique verification dilemma. As the first agreement to cover the number of 
conventional weapons in Europe, this regime must consider over 100,000 items, a 
much larger number than earlier strategic arms agreements, and many of them small 
and highly mobile.  
On the other hand, because a larger number of these items would be necessary to 
create a meaningful military advantage, it is reasonable to accept a lower standard of 
numerical precision from the monitoring regime while still guaranteeing “adequate 
verification”. Thomas J. Hirschfield describes an example whereby if one country 
successfully hid 100 operational SS-20 intermediate-range missiles and could deploy 
them, Western Europe could be devastated. Yet the military advantage of 
successfully hiding 100 tanks in an environment where treaty members possess 
20,000 of them would be negligible.383 
The second unique aspect of the CFE pertains to the methods of verification 
envisaged by the treaty. Whereas many previous verification arrangements had relied 
solely or primarily on the use of NTM to verify compliance, CFE involves a far more 
intrusive system combining on-site inspections, detailed information exchanges and 
the possibilities of NTM. Each country began by declaring starting levels of 
liabilities through a detailed information exchange regarding the number and location 
of military forces within the region. These levels were then verified through baseline 
inspections throughout the first 120 days of the treaty. This data must be resubmitted 
annually and any permanent force structure changes or changes involving 10% of a 
country's TLE's must be pre-announced.  
During the second phase of the treaty the parties notify one another when they are 
scheduling reduction events and these are verified through passive OSIs to ensure 
that the requirements of Art VIII, detailing acceptable means of reduction, are met. 
Challenge inspections can be conducted at any specified area where a TLE is 
suspected to exist. Quotas reflect the number of such inspections that each state must 
accept and are determined according to the number of OOVs declared.384  
If a state refuses a challenge inspection, it must provide reasonable evidence that no 
TLEs are present at that site. While the treaty permitted such inspections during the 
baseline inspection period and continues to permit them during the reduction period, 
few countries have yet taken advantage of this possibility.  
In the last phase of the treaty these inspections will likely be far more important as a 
means of monitoring continuous compliance with agreed levels and locations. NTMs 
or multinational technical means, though not as useful in verifying the levels of CFE 
                                                                                                                                          
presented in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 
Oxford 2000, pp. 627-642. 
383 T.J. Hirschfield, The Toughest Verification Challenge: Conventional Forces in Europe, in: 
Arms Control Today (March 1989), p. 17. 
384 During the baseline inspection period (the first 120 days after the treaty enters into force) the 
quota of challenge inspections that had to be accepted was 20% of declared OOVs, during the 
three year destruction period, the quota is 10%, during the post-destruction validation period 
(120 days) the quota is 20% and each year thereafter it is 15%. 
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items, are recognized under the treaty and can be anticipated as a valuable means for 
individual nations to select potential sites for challenge inspections.  
Follow-on talks also offer the opportunity to negotiate additional methods of 
verification, much discussed in the context of CFE verification but not included in 
the original treaty – among these are aerial inspections (taken up by the Open Skies 
Treaty), production monitoring, the use of tags to identify equipment, and the use of 
short-range or remote sensing equipment for the monitoring of storage sites and 
borders.385 
The signatories of CFE are another remarkable characteristic of the treaty and its 
verification regime. As the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have dissolved, the number 
of signatories has climbed from twenty-two to thirty and the original references to 
the respective East and West alliances have evolved. NATO has continued to play its 
originally-conceived role in establishing consensus among its members on treaty-
related issues, and NATO states continue to hold to a commitment not to inspect one 
another. However, the former members of the WTO and Soviet successor states have 
virtually abandoned the cooperation anticipated by the treaty. For this reason, it is 
significant that, while the treaty referred to Groups of States (the WTO and NATO), 
the signatories were individual nation-states. The Soviet successor states that had not 
yet been granted independence at the time of the treaty agreed to accept the USSR's 
commitments as their own.  
This issue leads us to another aspect of the CFE, the format for continuous 
multilateral cooperation and interpretation of the treaty. In some ways the CFE 
provisions are similar to those of other verified arms control agreements. First, the 
Joint Consulting Group (JCG), modeled after the ABM Treaty's Standing 
Consultative Commission, was established as a forum for resolving interpretation 
differences, working out technical questions of implementation, adopting additional 
measures to enhance the treaty and resolving compliance questions.386 Second, a 
series of review conferences such as those for the NPT, to be held each five years 
beginning six months after the end of the reduction phase or at the request of any 
three treaty members, offer the possibility of amendment. Finally, the treaty commits 
all parties to continue to pursue the CFE mandate through follow-on negotiations, 
such as the CFE IA talks on manpower limitations, which have already been signed 
and are considered politically binding.  
Yet, the effects of political change in Europe since the treaty's signature in November 
of 1990 produced a unique framework of cooperation in implementing verification. 
First, the High Level Working Group which negotiated the redistribution of treaty 
obligations among Soviet successor states, has to some extent duplicate the objective 
of the JCG in serving as a forum for discussion of implementation problems of the 
treaty. A practical division of labour evolved whereby the JCG conducted day -to-
                                                 
385 A wealth of literature exists on the various ways these technologies can be useful in verifying 
the CFE. Among the best is R. Kokoski and S. Koulik (eds.), Verification of Conventional 
Arms Control in Europe: Technological Constraints and Opportunities, Stockholm 1990. See 
also R. Maxfield and A.J. Meerburg, Two Techniques for Verifying Conventional Reductions, 
in: Arms Control Today (August 1989), pp. 18-21.  
386 I.H. Daalder, The CFE Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment, The Johns Hopkins Foreign 
Policy Institute, 1991. 
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day work in Vienna , while high-level meetings in Brussels focused attention in 
NATO headquarters on their discussion of CFE issues.387  
Second, in line with the treaty's provision for cooperation among alliance members, 
NATO established a Verification Coordination Committee (VCC) to oversee the 
organization of inspections in the East and distribute NATO's quantity of inspection 
quotas among the states. Since April of 1993, however, the VCC, has begun to 
organize Joint Multinational Inspection Teams that include the other parties to the 
treaty. Participating in about 20% of reduction inspections, these teams offer national 
inspection agencies the possibility to share the costs of inspections and interact with 
one another. While not yet a truly common inspection regime or database, the VCC 
efforts set a precedent for evolving cooperation in implementing national verification 
rights. 
In addition, by inviting one another to participate in common inspections, NATO 
countries must not compete with Eastern countries for limited quotas of inspections 
and raise confidence in the quality the inspections performed by other teams. The 
Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducts on-site inspections under this 
Treaty. Initially, DTRA conducted 70 inspections per year of Eastern Group 
countries and escorted about 12 inspections per year of U.S. facilities in Europe. 
Following the conclusion of the residual level validation period, activity declined to 
approximately 25 inspections and nine escort missions from March 1998 to February 
1999. DTRA inspectors have also been part of multinational inspection teams. 
Moreover, recently NATO has agreed to open the VERITY database – storing 
information on declared liabilities and inspection reports – for use by all treaty 
members.  
4.1.5.2 Potential issues of contention 
Despite the success the CFE has exhibited in adapting to the rapidly changing 
European security environment, several issues must be mentioned as potential 
tripwires for these achievements: First, political developments in the east provide 
two types of disruptions to the regime: The first is increased sensitivity about who 
inspects who. NATO resolved concerns about Greece and Turkey inspecting one 
another by agreeing not to inspect alliance members, but at the time of treaty 
signature, WTO states, desiring to inspect the USSR, insisted on the possibility of 
examining one another. Now, with nationalist tensions the more dominant security 
threat, Rumania and Hungary for example or Russia and the Ukraine for another, are 
more interested in inspecting one another than inspecting an American base in 
Germany. Armenia and Azerbaijan are a stark example of how two states with the 
legal right to inspect one another, may not see it in their security interest to permit 
such inspections. As some writers on arms control have asserted “the CFE Treaty 
may not be viable over the longer term since it was intended to be implemented by 
two alliances, not by NATO on one side and, on the other, thirteen disparate and 
sometimes quarrelling states.”388 Secondly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
leaves many questions about the number and location of liabilities declared in the 
beginning. These liabilities were declared by the USSR before treaty ratification, but 
                                                 
387 P. Dunay, CFE and the CIS: The Difficult Road to Ratification, in: Peace Research Institute 
Frankfort Reports 29 (February 1993), p. 9. 
388 J. Dean and R.W. Forsberg, CFE and Beyond, in: International Security (Summer 1992), p. 77. 
 
 111 
accountability for these TLE's is poor and some may even have been taken out of the 
ATTU region before baseline inspections began.  
Second, the treaty specified dates within the reduction period, by which certain 
percentages of liabilities must have been destroyed. It is likely that at least one or 
two Eastern states will not be able to keep this commitment for financial or technical 
reasons. Depending on how the reduction is accomplished, it can cost more to 
destroy a TLE than to build it, and some small states, such as Belarus, are left with 
large numbers of liabilities during times of economic crisis. Other treaty participants 
thus have three options if one or more states fail to meet requirements: One can tear 
up the treaty in response to this non-compliance and try to renegotiate conventional 
arms control in the region.  
This is ineluctable because the consequence would be high levels of conventional 
forces remaining in the troubled area of Eastern Europe. Even more dangerous some 
states that have been convinced to ratify the CFE and support arms control in the 
region, may, given time, decide that their security interests lie more in maintaining 
arms stockpiles than in appeasing Western wishes. Alternatively, one can agree to 
ignore, at least temporarily, this non-compliance and insist that the reduction process 
continue. Lastly, one can raise the issue of non-compliance within the JCG, perhaps 
offering assistance in meeting this commitment. The most likely form of assistance is 
technical advice on how to most efficiently reduce the TLEs – for example, Poland 
quickly and cheaply destroyed its tanks by smashing them with a large steel ball 
while the Czech Republic disassembles each tank and stores the scrap metal for 
eventual meltdown and reuse. A less likely but non-excludable possibility would be 
to offer financial assistance or security guarantees to those unable or hesitant to 
comply with their treaty commitments. 
Third, the CFE verification regime risks the development of “have” – “have not” 
divisions among its participants. Already several participants have expressed 
inability to participate in inspections due to the financial burden. Because CFE 
provides national responsibility for verification, each national agency must bear the 
costs of organizing and conducting inspections, as well as the handling of data, 
inspector and escort training. Moreover, as the reduction phase ends, high technology 
national technical means should play a much greater role in verification.  
To quote a United Nations report, “The other participant will have to rely on less 
sophisticated means or will have to rely on the willingness of the 'have's' to get the 
necessary information. History has proven that states should not expect too much of 
the latter. This inequality violates the principle that each participant should be able to 
detect possible violations in a timely manner.”389 The Open Skies Agreement 
attempts to bridge this gap by permitting equipment sharing and joint overflights and 
the increasing capabilities of commercial observation technology narrows the gap 
still more. 
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A last issue is that of overlapping responsibilities between the CFE verification 
regime and the confidence building measures incorporated in the OSCE.390 It is 
sufficient to note here that the information exchanged within these two regimes and 
the nature of the objects and activities inspected is similar enough to raise doubts 
about the cost-efficiency of duplicating such efforts and the bureaucracy that 
accompanies them.  
4.1.6 A WEU Satellite Centre  
As the relevance of verification in Europe increased through such agreements as the 
CFE treaty, CSBM's and the emergence of conflict prevention mechanisms under the 
CSCE, it becomes increasingly strange to note that an indigenous European 
capability for satellite imagery analysis was lacking, especially since the European 
Community after the Maastricht treaty took up a stronger role in European 
security.391 The WEU satellite centre,392 established in 1991, possibly provides the 
initial means for the purpose. The centre has been placed in Torrejon, Spain, and was 
in an experimental phase until 1995, when WEU member states may reconsider their 
participation. In the mean time, a study group in Paris was examining “the necessity 
and desirability of a medium and long term realisation of a European space based 
observation system”. 
The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC),393 located in Torrejón de Ardoz in 
Spain, is now the successor of the Western European Union Satellite Centre 
(WEUSC). Its initial infrastructure has been provided by the WEU.  
At present the Centre's main activities concern the development of interpretation 
methods, training, and responding to tasks concerning treaty verification, crisis 
monitoring, and environmental monitoring. 
Initially, use was to be made of satellite images from SPOT, LANDSAT and ERS. In 
addition, high quality imagery is available from the French/Italian Spanish HELIOS 
programme. EUSC will continue to exploit commercial imagery as its prime data 
source. For specific tasks, France, Italy and Spain make limited quantities of higher 
resolution imagery from the HELIOS military satellite available. Some of its 
products have been made available to the EU and NATO and it has carried out 
specific tasks for the former. The transformation of the Centre into an EU asset 
provide Europe with a dual military/civil earth observation facility.  
The WEU data centre, after having gained experience with a limited group of 
participants, can open the organisation to other interested European states as well. At 
                                                 
390 J.D. McCausland, Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit, in: Arms Control Today 
29/6 (September/October 1999); W. Boese, Executive Summary of the Adapted Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, in: Arms Control Today 29/7 (November 1999). 
391 For details on regional satellite monitoring agencies, see B. Jasani, A Regional Satellite 
Monitoring Agency, in: Environmental Conservation 10/3 (1983), pp. 255-256. B. Jasani and S. 
Mara, The Western European Union Satellite Centre, in: Journal of the British Interplanetary 
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392 Now called The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), located in Torrejón de Ardoz in 
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393 The EUSC was set up in 2002, based on a Council Joint Action on 20th of July 2001, (OJ L 
200, 25th July 2001). Its task consist of providing material resulting from the analysis of 
satellite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery as appropriate to the Union, 
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the same time perhaps data analysis should not be restricted to data obtained from 
Western sources, but also include producers like the Russian Soyuskarta. One could 
also consider linking the WEU satellite centre to the CSCE machinery, since without 
extensive monitoring capabilities of their own the emerging European institutions 
could not react quickly and adequately to events in and outside Europe, for which 
they claim responsibility.394  
4.1.7 The Open Skies Treaty 
The Open Skies agreement was originally proposed by President Dwight B. 
Eisenhower in 1955 as a confidence-building measure395 whereby the US and USSR 
could monitor one another's strategic arsenals, but was rejected by Nikita Khruschev 
as a “bald espionage plot” according to standing Soviet policy on verification. Faced 
with radically different political and technological circumstances, US President 
George Bush resurrected Open Skies in a 1989 proposal and on March 24, 1992 all 
members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, including three successor states to 
the USSR, signed the Open Skies Agreement.  
The treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002. Of the original 27 treaty signatories, 
all but Kyrgyzstan have ratified the accord and are now states-parties. Since the 
treaty entered into force, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden have become states-parties. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia have also been 
approved by existing states-parties to join the treaty.  
Russia conducted the first observation flight under the treaty in August 2002, while 
the United States carried out its first official flight in December 2002. 
In this unprecedented agreement, the twenty-nine state parties396 agreed to allow 
short-notice inspection by unarmed surveillance aircraft equipped with sensing 
devices. The agreement provides full territorial coverage, without exceptions, of the 
area from “Vancouver to Vladivostok” – including all of North America, Europe, 
and the Asian part of Russia. Unlike other agreements discussed in this paper, 
however, Open Skies does not verify any particular commitments, but rather serves 
as a complementary verification tool and a confidence-building measure within its 
extended region.397 Now that the treaty has entered into force, members of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe not party to the accord may 
                                                 
394 See H.J.v.d. Graaf, op. cit., 1992, pp. 132-138. 
395 The Treaty on Open Skies, represents the most wide-ranging multinational effort so far to 
enhance military transparency and confidence building through mutual aerial observation 
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Technology Information Centre (VERTIC), Verification 1993, London and New York 1993, 
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apply to accede. If no state-party objects to a country’s application, the country may 
join the treaty. Finland, Sweden, and Cyprus have expressed interest in acceding. 
After July 1, any other country may also ask to join the accord.398 
In principle, any state party has the right to overfly the territory of any other 
participant it chooses. The inspecting party must provide advance notice of an 
overflight and designated point of entry, and upon arrival must submit a detailed 
flight plan, permit a 24-hour inspection of the aircraft and sensors, and take on two 
host-country monitors for the duration of the flight. The treaty while attempting to 
maximize the openness of the host country provides a strict ban on SIGINT sensors 
and recorders and a ban on “loitering” over a given point in order to provide as much 
protection as possible to sensitive military communications. 
Although Open Skies may have begun primarily as a political initiative, it has a 
significant role to play in the field of verification399. First, Open Skies permits 
independent monitoring and verification by participants that do not have observation 
satellites. The means of aerial surveillance permitted by the treaty are limited to 
those equally available to all participants on an unrestricted commercial basis and the 
treaty provides the possibility of borrowing or sharing surveillance equipment for the 
purpose of inspection.  
Second, Open Skies demands that the United States and Canada share the burden of 
intrusive monitoring by bringing North America into the territory covered by the 
agreement.  
Third, as a confidence-building measure, Open Skies enables participants to satisfy 
themselves regarding the peaceful intentions of the other side.400 “It would be 
virtually impossible to hide plans for a conventional attack from frequent, random 
reconnaissance flights.” 
Fourth, Open Skies serves as a stimulus to continued progress in arms control as it 
will stand separately from any other arms control agreement and could help fulfill the 
verification requirements of current and future accords401. In fact, the timely 
conclusion of the CFE treaty can be at least partially attributed to the existence of the 
Open Skies talks because it allowed the negotiations to avoid lengthy debate over 
aerial reconnaissance guidelines, leaving them to be dealt with in Open Skies. 
Finally, the aerial reconnaissance regime serves as a valuable complement to existing 
technical means of verification. One of the fundamental criticisms of the agreement 
is that it has been rendered largely obsolete by the substantial surveillance 
capabilities of the United States and Russia. Yet, overflights offer several advantages 
over conventional satellites including additional coverage of objects of interest, 
ability to fly below cloud cover, and the possibility of carrying air-sampling devices 
for detection of chemical or nuclear weapons production. Moreover, because the 
photographs taken during overflights are not highly classified (as is most NTM 
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400 See P. Jones, Open Skies: a new era of transparency, in: Arms Control (May 1992).  
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intelligence), they can be made public and employed as an effective political 
instrument in times of crisis. 
While not as intrusive a regime as originally intended, Open Skies is an important 
step forward in aerial verification. As a major confidence-building measure, it may 
have an important impact on related security fields. The treaty may also expand its 
scope, as it establishes provisions to expand the membership of the treaty, (especially 
to CSCE member states) if the demand arises. Further, it is possible that non-military 
sectors, such as environmental monitoring may eventually be incorporated.402 While 
aerial verification undoubtedly suffers from disadvantages in terms of cost, 
complexity, and technology transfer, it still has a significant role to play in 
verification regimes. The flexibility of use and its accessibility to the majority of 
states are significant advantages. Moreover, the Open Skies agreement lays the 
groundwork for the creation of an aerial reconnaissance regime, which might be 
applied to other arms control agreements.  
Even though, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) does not foresee 
aerial inspections. However, images of chemical weapon sites from Open Skies trial 
flights have been very informative. Delegates at the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, Netherlands, have used the 
information successfully in bilateral exchanges. The general disclosure of such 
imagery to all CWC states parties will require the consent of the observed state. This 
should be supported by diplomatic efforts.403  
4.2. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ); the regional approach  
In contrast to the multilateral NWFZ treaties concerning Antarctica, Outer Space and 
the Moon, the treaties of Tlatelolco404 and Rarotonga prohibit the presence and 
development of nuclear weapons in populated regions, respectively Latin America 
and the South Pacific and the 1992 Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korea 
have entered into force, while two other such agreements – the 1995 Treaty of 
Bangkok regarding Southeast Asia and the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty regarding Africa 
have been opened for signature.405 
These regional arrangements provide a tool for nuclear non-proliferation, which can 
substitute, reinforce or even go beyond obligations contained in the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In General Assembly Resolution 3472B of 11 December 
1975, a nuclear weapon-free-zone was basically defined as follows: “the total 
                                                 
402 For example, in 1995 a German–Russian trial flight over Siberia monitored huge amounts of 
weapon systems which had been brought over the Ural Mountains from the European part of 
Russia shortly before the conclusion of the CEF Treaty. Open Skies flights have a much wider 
area coverage than on-site inspections under the CEF Treaty. 
403 E. Britting and H. Spitzer, The Open Skies Treaty, in: Verification Technology Information 
Centre (VERTIC), Verification 2002, p. 232. 
404 All 33 States in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean have signed, ratified and have 
waived Article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Member States of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
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Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all signed are all full Parties to the Treaty. 
405 See P. Gasparini Alves and D.B. Cipollone (eds.), Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st 
Century, Geneva 1997. 
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absence of nuclear weapons within a delimited area, which is subject to an 
international system of verification and control in order to guarantee compliance”.406 
4.2.1 The Treaty of Tlatelolco 
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, for long was the only proud example of its kind in the world, 
but has suffered from the lack of recognition by the region's major countries. For this 
reason the far-reaching regional verification machinery largely remained a “sleeping 
beauty”, as a result of amendments to the treaty, submitted by Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile, and adopted in August 1992.407  
The treaty of Tlatelolco established a nuclear-weapon-free zone including all Latin 
American and Caribbean states, and a portion of the adjoining Atlantic and Pacific 
seas.  
The treaty was signed in 1967, and entered into force in 1968 before negotiations on 
the NPT were completed. The treaty was to a great extent a reaction to the Cuban 
crisis in 1962, which highlighted the dangers of a nuclear build up in Latin 
America.408  
It was no surprise that Cuba was not one of the signatories. Argentina signed, but did 
not ratify the treaty. Brazil and Chile did, but invoked Article 28, which provides that 
the treaty does not enter into force until all parties have agreed to it. Other Latin 
American countries, including some non-NPT members, have waived Article 28 and 
have abided by the treaty. In addition, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which became 
parties to the NPT only after 1993, considered to be discriminatory in dividing the 
world into have's and have-not's as far as nuclear capabilities are concerned. 
Argentina and Brazil have been the only two countries known to have nuclear-
weapon potential.  
The relevance of the Tlatelolco treaty has thus been to a large extent dependent on 
overcoming their rivalry. However, in their July 18, 1991 agreement for the 
exclusive peaceful use of nuclear energy, both countries undertook to prohibit in 
their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by 
other means of any nuclear explosive device, as long as no technical distinction can 
be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for 
military purposes.409  
One possible weakness of the treaty is that, like the NPT, it permits “peaceful nuclear 
explosions”, which were thought to have great economic potential at the time it was 
signed. The US and also the IAEA have considered it impossible to distinguish 
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between peaceful or military uses of nuclear explosions.410 Another problem is that 
the treaty does not expressly ban the transport or the transit of nuclear weapons 
through the region, the right of which the US has been eager to reserve and which 
has been contested by others. Outside states have been involved through two 
protocols; the first requires those that control territory within the zone to apply the 
terms of the treaty, the second commits nuclear weapon states to respect the NWPZ 
and not to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty members. 
4.2.2 The Treaty of Rarotonga 
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, was 
signed in 1985 on the fortieth anniversary of Hiroshima Day by the members of the 
South Pacific Forum: Australia, New Zealand and eleven small island states411. The 
treaty established a Nuclear Free Zone comprising a vast area, most of which is 
ocean.412 The treaty entered into force for its parties in 1986413 It The treaty's 
provisions are similar to those of Tlatelolco: banning the acquisition, development, 
stationing and testing of nuclear weapons. However, Rarotonga goes even further: 
it bans the dumping of radioactive waste in the seas. For this reason it has been 
referred to as a Nuclear Free Zone, even though the use of nuclear energy is not 
prohibited.  
it explicitly bans “peaceful” nuclear explosives. The creation of a NFZ originated 
mainly in a strong anti-nuclear sentiment resulting from an excessive amount of 
foreign nuclear tests in the region.414 
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412 This presents a specific problem since coastal states only possess jurisdiction over their own 
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413 The 5 September 1995 French nuclear test in the Mururoa Atoll solidified public and political 
support for rapid accession of the nuclear-weapon states to the South Pacific NFZ protocols. 
Because the French testing facilities, on Mururoa Atoll and Fangatau in French Polynesia, are 
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Political Transcripts, 11 April 1996 (LEXIS/NEXIS). 
414 The South Pacific NFZ treaty places a heavy emphasis on environmental protection, leading to 
the conclusion of two additional treaties dealing with the management of natural resources 
within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the parties and the dumping of wastes. 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific 
Region, Noumea, 1986, entered into force 22 August 1990 (Senate Treaty Document 101-21, 
101st Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, DC 1990). 
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The relevance of Rarotonga has been disputed.415 Neither of the small island states 
nor New Zealand have nuclear capabilities, while Australia (a signatory of the NPT) 
cannot develop a nuclear weapon program. Moreover, there are no serious tensions 
between the countries, and there is a long tradition of cooperation. Therefore, no 
need was perceived for a very rigorous verification regime.  
Controversial aspects of the treaty lie mainly in the involvement of outside states, as 
the South Pacific is an important strategic area. Therefore, the treaty clearly spells 
out the rights of members states to individually approve or deny port calls and transit 
by vessels carrying nuclear weapons. This was agreed so as not to upset US 
involvement in the region. It means that the region stricto sensu is not nuclear 
weapon free. Several nuclear weapon states reserved the right to rescind non-use 
obligations under the treaty in case of aggression or non-compliance by one of the 
others. The US signed the two additional protocols for outside states (which are 
similar to those of Tlatelolco), only in 1996416 because of its desire to maintain 
strategic naval operations in the zone in support of its regional security interests and 
obligations.417 A special protocol aimed at restraining France from conducting 
nuclear tests in the zone has not been effective. France has conducted over 150 tests 
in the region since 1966. After having ignored Raratonga's provisions for some time, 
it announced an indefinite moratorium on tests in April 1992. France has signed the 
protocol of the treaty in 1998.418 
4.2.3 The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa) 
The African treaty was opened for signature in 1995, but its entry into force may 
depend on the ratification of its Arab parties, which will depend on the evolution of 
the situation in the Middle East. Even if the necessary number of ratifications is 
achieved, the effective implementation of the treaty will come only when there is a 
perception that Israel is keen to abandon its presumed nuclear weapons and effective 
Non-proliferation measures for Mass Destruction Weapons are implemented in the 
Middle East region. 
The idea of an African NWFZ goes back to the 1960s, as a reaction against French 
tests in Algeria. Afterwards, the acquisition of some nuclear weapons by South 
Africa made impossible any improvement until this country was the first in the world 
to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Currently, South Africa is the only party with 
nuclear power plants, whereas Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Libya and Zaire have research 
reactors.419 
On 11 April 1996, over fifty African states and the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and China sent representatives to Cairo and signed the Treaty of 
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Pelindaba, named for the site of South Africa's former nuclear weapons complex.420 
The Treaty created the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, embracing not only the 
African continent but also all islands, which have been declared by the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) to be part of Africa.421 Because the OAU has declared 
Mauritius to be part of Africa, and the government of Mauritius has in turn asserted a 
claim to the Chagos Archipelago, the treaty zone includes, for some purposes, the 
island of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia, upon which the United States operates an 
important military facility, is, of course, a British Indian Ocean Territory; 
accordingly, the official treaty map of the African NWFZ contains a footnote that the 
island is shown within the Zone “without prejudice to the question of sovereignty”. 
In the definition of the zone there is a dispute over the sovereignty of Diego Garcia 
island, where the United States has a base for nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft. A 
reference in the agreement to the freedom of the seas is intended to preclude 
restrictions on the presence of nuclear weapons beyond the territorial sea limits of the 
parties.422  
While sharing the indefinite duration and withdrawal with 12 months' notice with the 
Treaty of Rarotonga, the Pelindaba Treaty has several interesting innovations. First, 
it also bans research on nuclear explosive devices (i.e., implosion technology, 
hydronuclear testing and computer simulations), though it is uncertain how these 
activities can be monitored. Second, it requires the destruction of any nuclear device 
that a party might have had previously to signing the Treaty. This affects only South 
Africa. Third, Pelindaba prohibits dumping nuclear waste not only at sea, but in the 
whole region, though presumably controlled repositories are allowed. Finally, the 
agreement prohibits conventional attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, which has 
important implications for future Middle East participation. The Pelindaba Treaty 
states support for peaceful nuclear activities, which Tlatelolco and Rarotonga do not 
mention. 
As in Rarotonga, there is an explicit prohibition on testing any nuclear explosive 
devices, but the African treaty also permits visits of aircraft or ships carrying nuclear 
weapons. The Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits the manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or 
acquisition by other means, as well as possession and control of any nuclear 
explosive device (in assembled, unassembled, or partly assembled forms) by the 
parties. In addition – and this is an important novelty – research on, and development 
of, such a device are banned.423 
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Under Protocol II, open for signature by the five nuclear weapon states, the 
signatories should undertake not to test or assist in or encourage the testing of any 
nuclear explosive device within the African zone. Article 1 defines nuclear explosive 
device in exactly the same way it is defined in the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
In a clear allusion to the past South African nuclear weapon program, Article 6 of the 
Treaty of Pelindaba requires the dismantlement and destruction of any nuclear device 
that was manufactured prior to the coming into force of the treaty, as well as the 
destruction of the relevant facilities or their conversion to peaceful uses424. All such 
operations must take place under the supervision of the IAEA. These provisions aim 
to dispel any lingering suspicion that some nuclear items have been hidden away in 
South Africa425 or that certain prohibited activities are still taking place there. Article 
6 sets a precedent for future nuclear weapon-free-zone treaties concluded with the 
participation of nuclear threshold states. 
Parties to the treaty may supply nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear-
weapon states only if the latter accept full-scope safeguards (Article 9c). 
Furthermore, the treaty obliges the parties to observe international rules regarding the 
security and physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment in 
order to prevent their theft or unauthorized use (Article 10). Any action aimed at an 
armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the 
African zone is forbidden (Article 11).426  
4.2.4 Verification regimes for the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties  
Both the treaties arrange for IAEA safeguards to be carried out for the verification of 
the non-diversion of nuclear material to nuclear devices. Tlatelolco does not specify 
the scope of the safeguards, whereas Rarotonga and Pelindable requires them to be 
full scope, i.e. covering all nuclear activities of the parties. 
The regional machineries set up for verification are rather different, with the Latin 
American version being initially more institutionalized and more rigorous. The 
Treaty of Tlatelolco provided for the creation of the Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to which parties must submit semi-
annual reports. OPANAL may request a special report from the parties, or initiate 
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destroyed before South Africa had acceded to the Treaty. At the invitation of the South African 
authorities, Agency experts visited the facilities involved in the abandoned nuclear-weapons 
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of the programme and verifying that all the nuclear material used in the programme had been 
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a State, which had covertly developed nuclear weapons and then dismantled them, 
subsequently invited IAEA to verify the fact of the discontinuance of its weapons programme 
and the dismantlement of the weapons. With full access to all relevant facilities. See 
submission by B. Pellaud, Document of the Study Group SVG/CRP.13. 
426 See: S. Ogunbanwo, Accelerate the Ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty, in: Nonproliferation 
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these itself. Upon the request of any party suspecting violations of the treaty, the 
Council (consisting of only five OPANAL members) must immediately arrange for 
special inspections. Legal and political qualification of the facts is subsequently left 
to OPANAL's General Conference, which may refer the case to the Organization of 
American States or to the UN if it is judged a violation endangering peace and 
security.427  
Under Rarotonga every party has the right to receive the information about the 
conclusions of IAEA reports. Only 'significant' activities must be reported to a 
secretariat within the South Pacific Forum. The Consultative Committee, an 
assembly of state representatives meets at the request of a Party and has the authority 
to trigger an inspection. It may report violations to the South Pacific Forum, which is 
the supreme body for making decisions on compliance issues. No explicit sanctions 
are foreseen and no referral to the UN is provided for. Nuclear explosions can be 
verified by seismographic equipment in Australia and New Zealand. 
Under the treaty of Pelindaba, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy 
(AFCONE), which will have its headquarters in South Africa, is to be charged with 
ensuring compliance with all the above undertakings (Article 12). It will be 
composed of 12 members elected by the parties for a three-year period, bearing in 
mind not only the principle of equitable geographical distribution, but also the 
advancement of the members’ nuclear programs. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
are to be elected by AFCONE, while the Executive Secretary is to be designated by 
the Secretary-General of the OAU (Annex III).428 
Neither treaty requires verification of the obligations to which the nuclear weapon 
states have subjected themselves in the respective regions. The NWS have not been 
willing to confirm or deny reports regarding the presence of their nuclear weapons in 
the prohibited areas.429 
4.2.5 The verification regimes in practice 
The IAEA safeguards have worked satisfactorily -in so far as they have been applied, 
but both regional verification machineries have not been put to test. In the case of 
Tlatelolco this has been a result of the non-participation by the region's major states, 
while the South Pacific area has been a zone of peace and quiet. 
Latin America's rigorous (in comparison to Rarotonga) verification system has 
remained a dead letter. Since its creation, OPANAL has not performed any special 
inspections, nor has it set up a machinery which could carry them out. The agency, 
which has a small budget of USD 300,000 has not even requested or initiated special 
reports430. On August 26 1992, 18 members of the Tlatlelolco treaty adopted 
                                                 
427 J. Simpson, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime After the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1996. See also J. Rissanen, Contested Language in Main 
Committee II (Safeguards and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones), Sixth NPT Review Conference, 
Briefing No. 12, 12 May 2000, available at www.acronym.org.uk/www.acronym.org.uk/ 
npt12.htm. 
428 S. Ogunbamwo, Special Reference to the Establishment of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zone, OPANAL, 14 October 2002, avalable at www.opanal.org/Articles/cancun/can-
Ogunbamwo.htm. 
429 J. Goldbladt, NPT and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, in: Arms Control (May 1990). 
430 The Agency has been requested studies by the General Conference. In 1985 a Good Offices 
Commission was established and assigned the task of solving problems of interpretation 
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amendments which affect the treaty's inspection procedures and were designed to 
protect nuclear industrial secrets of member states. The amendments eliminate 
OPANAL's ability to conduct special inspections, authorizing only the IAEA to 
conduct them. The results of such inspections are to be transmitted to OPANAL and 
access to detailed technical reports submitted by member states is to be restricted.431 
With the adoption of these amendments, the three hold outs -Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile – have committed themselves to implement the treaty, while Cuba has 
indicated that it would adhere to the treaty once all the states in the region assume 
their obligations. These amendments were made possible by the bilateral agreement 
reached on 13 December 1992 between Argentina and Brazil in which they opened 
their nuclear installations for mutual inspections and accepted IAEA safeguards, but 
without acceding to the NPT. 
As for Rarotonga, the conclusion of a UNIDIR report provides an accurate analysis: 
“The verification system or the treaty of Rarotonga is, on the whole, well 
suited to the political, military and economic conditions in the South Pacific. It 
is lean, economical and relies heavily on the ‘Pacific way’ of consensus 
building and informality. Despite the hopes of its negotiators it is not, however, 
pathbreaking, since it lacks some of the rigour of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and 
subsequent arms limitation agreements. (...) In addition, apart from the 
involvement of the IAEA in applying nuclear safeguards, it is an inward 
looking system, perhaps suited to the “Pacific way” of managing conflict, but 
removed from the broader conflict resolution process of the international 
community.”432 
4.2.6 Conclusions on the NWFZ verification regimes 
The Tlatelolco case shows that regional arrangements for nuclear non-proliferation 
can provide an alternative for states which refuse to accede to the NPT, but agree to 
be subjected to international safeguards. It also gives the possibility to extend these 
safeguards with regional provisions. This may include regional institutions for 
dealing with non-compliance and inspections, and as in the case of Rarotonga, 
inclusion of provisions on the dumping of nuclear waste.  
Even so, most of the verification effort has been entrusted to the IAEA as a credible 
independent agency. The amendments to the Tlatelolco treaty showed that Brazil and 
Argentina apparently did not want to put their trust in OPANAL for inspections, 
especially with regard to the protection of industrial secrets.  
It is thus clear that the region's major powers can make or break the verification 
regime, and that it can operate only to the extent that the political situation allows it 
to. The difference between the Tlatelolco and the Rarotonga regimes makes clear as 
well that the specific political and other characteristics of the region, including the 
                                                                                                                                          
concerning article 18 (peaceful nuclear explosions), drafting safeguard agreements, the scope 
of inspections and the protection industrial secrets. There have been plans for convening a 
seminar to discuss the difficulties concerning non-NPT members, but they never materialised. 
For further details see M.E. Estrada Oyuela, The Tlatelolco Treaty, in: S. Sur (ed.) Verification 
of Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: Ways, Means and Practices, 
UNIDIR, Geneva 1991. 
431 Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to implement Tlatelolco Treaty, in: Arms Control Today 
(September 1992). 
432 T. Findlay, The Rarotonga Treaty, in: S. Sur (ed.), op. cit., 1991. 
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role which outside states play in the region, determine the nature of the 
arrangements.  
An important aspect of the regional approach is that it can help diffuse regional 
tensions and instability that usually increase the incentive for countries to opt for 
nuclear weapons. The process of regional confidence building is often a sine-qua-non 
for countries to give up the nuclear option, and thus possibly provides a more 
credible basis for compliance than adherence to a global regime. The case of NPT-
signatory, Iraq and North Korea illustrates that formal acceptance of non-nuclear 
weapon status is no guarantee against nuclear proliferation as long as the political 
will to acquire nuclear weapons exists and the necessary technology can be imported 
from advanced industrial countries. The Confidence building measure of ANWFZ 
are articulated in Article X that commits states to maintain high standards of 
“effective physical protection” of nuclear materials, and in Article 11 where by it 
prohibits state parties from making, assisting, or encouraging an attack by 
conventional or other means on “nuclear installations” inside the zone. 433  
The effective implementation of the treaties will depend for some of the treaties the 
interest and the condition of ratification of nuclear powers. For instance, the United 
States has no military facilities inside the Zone South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, and 
unlike the Treaty of Tlateloco and SEANWFZ treaty, the zone, for most purposes, 
only encompasses the land territory, internal waters, and archipelagic waters of 
individual states. The ANWFZ treaty provides a legally binding to the so called 
negative security assurance (NSA)434 to neither use, nor threaten to use, nuclear 
weapons against “a party to the treaty”, or any territory within the zone for which a 
party is internationally responsible (eg., French and Spanish possessions). Further the 
ANWFZ has a clause in each relevant protocol requiring twelve months advance 
notice of a states' intention to withdraw for circumstances affecting its “supreme 
national interests”. There are at least two challenges, first, the presence within the 
zone of the U.S. Naval Facility in British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia 
poses political problems.  
Despite the fact that ANWFZ does not pose any textual problems with respect to the 
legality of continued U.S. military operations at Diego Garcia, there is language in 
Article 2 of all three Protocols (which both the United States and the United 
Kingdom signed) requiring a state not to “. .. contribute to any act which constitutes 
a violation of this Treaty, or this Protocol”. That language could be used by 
                                                 
433 See African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Jun. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 698 [hereinafter 
ANWFZ]. The Treaty of Pelindaba has been signed by all 53 eligible African Nations. See 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (visited Sept. 26, 1997), aviable at 
www.acda.gov/treaties/afnwsigs.htm. 
434 The U.S. negative security assurance (in which the United States pledges not to use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states which adhere to the NPT norms) 
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Assurance on Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1978, at 52 (quoting 
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associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.”); A. Gore, 
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opponents of a U.S. nuclear capable presence in the Indian Ocean.435 Practically 
speaking, U.S. accession to ANWFZ has no legal significance on whether there will 
be political impacts associated with DOD's continued use of Diego Garcia. But, a 
possible harbinger of future political problems was manifest by Russia's last minute 
decision not to sign the Treaty because of its reservations with “U.S. use of the 
U.K.'s strategic island base of Diego Garcia.”436 
4.3. The opportunities and challenges of Regional Verification Regime  
4.3.1 The case of the Middle East  
One of the greatest challenges of pursuing non-proliferation would be to establish a 
NWFZ in Middle East. Political efforts to change this situation have focused on the 
possibility to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area. 437 Back in 1974, Iran 
supported by Egypt raised the issue in the UN General Assembly.438 Since that time, 
the UN General Assembly has every year adopted a resolution recommending the 
establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZME). Since 
1980, this annual resolution has been adopted by consensus, i.e. with the support of 
all Arab states, Iran and Israel.439 In 1990, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the 
establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East 
(WMDFZME). 440 
In such a tense, unstable and heavily armed region, a NWFZ would be an 
achievement of the utmost importance, but it seems that any settlement of the nuclear 
question in the region is dependent on a comprehensive political solution for 
overcoming patterns of rivalry in the area441, most obviously the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Israel is the only country in the Middle East, which has the capability of 
producing nuclear weapons within a very short time.442 As a small country in a 
hostile environment without geographically close allies, Israel relies heavily on a 
nuclear deterrent to ward off aggression. It is not likely to give up the nuclear 
weapon option without a comprehensive political settlement and/or waterproof 
security guarantees.443 In turn, it is not likely that Arab countries will accept a 
NWFZ without the inclusion of Israel. (It could even be argued that Arab calls for 
                                                 
435 M.E. Rosen, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Time For A Fresh Look, unpublished paper, 
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establishing an NWFZ are aimed at putting international pressure on Israel, rather 
than born out of sincere concerns about nuclear proliferation.)  
Other problems in establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East concern the scope of the 
area and involvement of outside states. The IAEA definition of what would be a 
significant zone runs as follows: “the area extending from the Libyan Arab 
Jamahirya in the West, to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the East, and from Syria in 
the north to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South.”444  
The presence of neighbouring states complicates the definition of an effective zone. 
In both the Tlateloclo and Rarotonga treaties, there were few neighbours around the 
periphery of the zones. In the IAEA definition, neighbouring states would include 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Djibouti, Somalia, the Arab states west of Libya. It must also 
be noted that such a zone would border both NATO members and the territory of the 
former Soviet Union. Commitment of all of these states would have to contribute to 
the success of the zone. This would also apply to the desirability of including several 
of the international straits in the zone, as these are subject to the regime of transit-
passage and are frequented by the naval vessels of several of the declared nuclear 
weapon states. The support of these states as guarantors of the zone is thus essential. 
This could be achieved through the use of additional protocols, similar to those used 
in the treaties of Tlateloclo and Rarotonga. 
Of the parties present in the proposed zone, Algeria, Mauritania, Oman, the United 
Arab Emirates and Israel are the only states, which are not parties to the NPT. 
Nevertheless, Algeria, and Mauritania has accepted IAEA safeguards, and Oman and 
the UAE do not have nuclear facilities, which require safeguards445. As mentioned 
above, Israel is reluctant to commit itself to IAEA safeguards on its Dimona reactor, 
which is commonly cited as the source for Israel's nuclear weapon capability. If it did 
agree to do so, the Dimona reactor could not be used to produce weapons-grade 
fissionable material, although, from an Arab point of view, the introduction of 
safeguards at Dimona would not neutralize any stockpiles of material, which could 
already have been produced.  
Apart from Israel, the conclusion of a NWFZ is complicated by the presence of NPT 
signatories Iraq, Iran and Libya. These three countries' commitment to non-
proliferation is uncertain at best. 
Just getting all parties into one room as part of the Middle East peace talks after so 
many years of mutual hostility has been a significant achievement. The participants 
in the arms control-working group have slowly begun to address the issue of 
establishing and verifying an NWFZ.446 The linkage with other questions relating to 
security is essential. As one analysis notes: “One would have to expect that the 
negotiation of a nuclear weapon free zone would become related to other measures to 
reduce the danger of hostilities and to strengthen Israeli confidence that a true and 
lasting peace was being built.”447 No state will associate itself with the nuclear-
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weapon-free zone unless it feels that its security will be enhanced, and not 
diminished by such action.  
A lengthy process of confidence-building, perhaps supplemented with security 
guarantees from nuclear weapon states, is most probably required to create the 
conditions in which the creation of an NWFZ and verification provisions could be 
accepted by all parties. Given the tense situation, even initial and modest confidence-
building measures will require some verification procedures and possibly the 
involvement of outsiders, including the IAEA. In addition, progress in the nuclear 
disarmament proposals is closely intertwined with adherence to arms control 
agreements concerning chemical and biological weapons.448  
Second, the verification regime would need to be more robust than those prescribed 
in the NPT as confidence-building measures among the countries in the region. In his 
report to the IAEA's General Conference in September 1992, the IAEA Director-
General listed some intermediate steps that Middle Eastern states might take to 
improve chances for an NFWZ. These include unilateral or collective commitments 
to use nuclear technology only for peaceful, non-explosive purposes:  
to ban research, manufacture, possession, or control or use of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear explosive devices;  
to ban deployment or testing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices 
anywhere in their territories;  
to ban research on, manufacture, possession, control or use of any nuclear weapons 
usable material;  
to report all imports, exports and production of nuclear weapons and relevant 
equipment, and non-nuclear material;  
to accept safeguards on all nuclear materials and installations located in their 
territories or under their control, including an undertaking to facilitate prompt access 
by inspectors and;  
to report annually on all nuclear-related research and development.  
Beside the UN efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area449 the UN 
report was later followed Mubarak plan.450 Where by in 1990, President Mubarak of 
Egypt proposed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in 
the Middle East (WMDFZME).451 
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Many Midle East scholar and diplomat like Mahmoud Karem promote the issue of 
establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.452 Shai Feldman and 
Abdullah Toukan made important analytical contributions in 1997.453 Eric Arnett has 
analyzed the effect of a comprehensive test ban on nuclear proliferation risks in the 
Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, and Israel.454 Most recently scholars like, Ibrahim 
Karawan455 and Gerald Steinberg disused also the NWFZ in the Middle East.456  
4.3.2 Argentina and Brazil 
On 13 December 1991, Argentina and Brazil reached an agreement in which they 
accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. In July of the same the year, the two countries 
had already decided to set up a control system for the mutual inspection of their 
nuclear installations, in order to verify that nuclear materials would not be diverted 
for military uses. These agreements came about after a decade in which a series of 
nuclear confidence-building and co-operation arrangements had been negotiated. The 
success of Argentina and Brazil in overcoming their nuclear rivalry may point to a 
promising bilateral approach both for non-proliferation and verification.  
4.3.2.1 From competition to co-operation 
Argentina and Brazil have since long competed for a leading role in Latin America. 
Especially during military rule, this was apparent in the nuclear sphere. Both 
countries have been involved in ambitious nuclear programmes. Although these 
programmes have only had limited success, each side had enough reason to worry 
about the nuclear capabilities of the other, and both states indicated that if one side 
would develop a nuclear weapon, the other would follow suit457. Both countries had 
achieved all the necessary requirements for an independent national fuel cycle. 
Argentina had already advanced considerably in developing ballistic missile 
technology.458  
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Since both Argentina and Brazil are not signatories to the NPT, they have had 
difficulties in getting access to all the necessary nuclear technology.459 Hampered 
also by economic difficulties, they set up co-operation agreements in 1980 for 
developing nuclear technology.460 However, it was evident that co-operation in such 
a sensitive area could not proceed very far without some kind of a mutual inspection 
system, especially since significant parts of the programmes were carried out in 
secret by the military. Distrust thus prevailed. By 1985 when Argentina and Brazil 
had returned to democratic government, there appeared to be room for a fresh 
initiative. A joint declaration in November of that year aimed at strengthening the 
institutional structures of co-operation through the creation of a joint working group, 
consisting of representatives of both foreign ministries, the two countries' atomic 
energy commissions, and their nuclear industries. This initiative was followed in 
subsequent years by further joint declarations, culminating in the creation of a 
common system for accounting and control of nuclear materials, approved by 
Presidents Collor and Menem in November 1990. A mix of several incentives 
probably enhanced these achievements:461 the need for technological co-operation, 
economic constraints, returns to democracy, economic integration, and external 
pressures.462  
4.3.2.2 A common system for mutual control and IAEA safeguards 
In the Declaration of November 1990 it was established that within 45 days the first 
steps were to be carried out for laying the basis for a control system; this included 
exchange of information on lists of all nuclear facilities and inventories of nuclear 
materials, and reciprocal inspections of centralized register systems. An agreement 
on “the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy” of 18 July 1991 established a 
Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC), to verify 
the non-diversion of nuclear activities into nuclear weapons or explosives. The 
SCCC is to provide for, inter-alia, a reporting system reflecting nuclear inventories, 
measuring systems, procedures for carrying out physical inventories, procedures for 
determining and evaluating non-accounted material; the implementation of 
containment and surveillance systems.463 
For the purpose of administration and implementation the Argentine-Brazilian 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was set up. This 
is was the first bi-national verification organization in the world. The ABACC is 
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made up of a Commission (two members from each state) and a Secretariat 
headquartered in Rio-de Janeiro. The Secretary of ABACC is a national of one of the 
two states, and is appointed by the Commission. The latter also appoints professional 
staff, and prepares a list of qualified inspectors upon which the Secretariat may draw 
to carry out on-site inspections. Inspectors of Argentina control Brazilian facilities 
and vice-versa, but are responsible exclusively to the Secretariat, which also makes 
the actual decision, under the guidance of certain rules and procedures set out by the 
Commission, of when and where an inspection will take place.  
This bilateral framework enabled Argentina and Brazil in December 1991 to accept 
the IAEA safeguards in an arrangement very similar to that which non-nuclear 
weapon states of Euratom concluded with the IAEA; the SCCC takes the place of 
Euratom safeguards, whereas the ABACC takes up a task similar to that of Euratom. 
In fact, a comparison of the two agreements hardly reveals any differences of 
substance between them.464 The IAEA estimates that implementing the agreement 
costs USD 2 million for start-up and familarization costs, and 500.000 annually for 
regular operations, which began in 1994.465  
4.3.2.3 Conclusion 
The success of Brazil and Argentina in overcoming their nuclear rivalry may be of 
relevance for other conflict areas. However, the specific circumstances must be kept 
in mind: relations between the two countries have never been as antagonistic as in 
other parts of the world, and the democratization of both countries as well as US 
pressure had an important influence. It must also be noted that Argentina and Brazil 
only had to worry about each other, where-as, for example, countries on the Korean 
Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent have to deal with a more complex situation. 
Even so, the development of an Argentine-Brazilian mutual inspection system has 
been a remarkable one, and several lessons can be drawn: 
The process of confidence building by gradually increasing nuclear co-operation and 
opening of nuclear installations for inspections is essential. It seems that confidence 
and control are mutually reinforcing approaches leading to the same objective: a 
significant and verifiable arrangement. 
The Argentine-Brazilian model provides an alternative to the NPT, while at the same 
time it applies IAEA safeguards.  
The advantage over the global approach is that the sensitive question of have's and 
have-nots, which pervades the NPT is avoided.  
Second, mutual inspections have confidence-building aspects as they bring the two 
countries together.  
Third, there may be clear benefits arising from the reciprocal inspection and control 
system: increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the two nuclear industries, the 
possibility of embarking on new projects beyond the reach of the protagonists 
separately, and a strengthening of general economic integration and co-operation. 
4.3.3 North and South Korea 
An inter-Korean dialogue started in 1990 and resulted in several agreements, one of 
which concerned the denuclearization of the peninsula, but major obstacles stand in 
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the way of implementing these agreements with verification measures. The 
admission by North Korea in October 2002 that they may be pursuing a non-
safeguarded uranium enrichment program presents yet another obstacle to the goal of 
a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.466The central issue has become North 
Korea's non-compliance with the NPT,467 which has raised the question of whether 
the crisis can be solved -if at all- through international concerted action, or through 
continuation of inter-Korean talks.  
4.3.3.1 Background 
Ever since the Korean War armistice in 1953, North and South Korea have been 
locked in a military stalemate backed up by Cold War competition. The Soviet Union 
and China supported the communist North, while American forces stationed along 
the Demilitarized Zone (dividing the peninsula) and American nuclear weapons 
guaranteed the protection of the South. For years, the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) argued in favour of a nuclear-weapon free zone (NWFZ), aimed at 
having American tactical nuclear weapons removed from the peninsula. This would 
have been to the advantage of the North, which at that stage did not have nuclear 
weapons, and could count on conventional military superiority as well as backing 
from both Moscow and Beijing.  
The situation started to change in the late 1980's, when the Soviet Union withdrew its 
support for North Korea, and the rapidly industrializing South gained the upper hand 
in the arms race by its much larger GNP.468 The nuclear option thus became more 
attractive to Pyongyang, as it would secure a military balance in a relatively cheap 
way. Since countries such as the US and Japan have indicated that the DPRK would 
only be given economic assistance if it would provide credible guarantees that it was 
not pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, North Korea has been caught in a 
dilemma: its crisis-ridden economy has been desperately in need of assistance (for 
which the most obvious sources would be South-Korea and Japan), but a nuclear 
deterrent against the much stronger South is also very much desired.469  
4.3.3.2 North and South-Korean dialogue 
The South-North High-Level Talks began in September 1990, but it was not until the 
Fourth round in October 1991 that the nuclear issue was brought up. North Korea 
proposed an NWFZ, and linked acceptance of IAEA safeguards to the withdrawal of 
US forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea. Further, the IAEA's inspections 
of North Korea's nuclear facilities should be performed simultaneously with the 
inspections of South Korea's military bases by the North. The proposal included a 
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ban on the transit, landing and visiting rights of nuclear capable aircraft. This was 
unacceptable for the South, which preferred to keep the option of US nuclear 
protection open, but given the changed circumstances started it to study the proposal 
for denuclearization seriously.470  
When US President Bush unilaterally announced the elimination of tactical nuclear 
weapons on 27 September 1991, including those deployed in South Korea, Seoul 
launched a diplomatic campaign to prevent Pyongyang from developing nuclear 
weapons.471 
At Round Five of the talks in December 1991, the 'Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation' was reached, providing a 
framework for improving relations between the two countries. The agreement 
included provisions for a hot line between the two-sides military authorities, and the 
establishment of a South-North Joint Military Commission (JMC), which is supposed 
to negotiate and implement the following measures:472 
the mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises  
the peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone 
exchanges of military information and personnel 
verification of phased arms reduction including the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction and surprise attack capabilities. 
South Korea proposed South-North mutual inspection of nuclear related installations 
and materials, and suggested carrying out simultaneous pilot inspections of one 
military and one civilian site designated by each other. On 18 December 1991 Seoul 
declared South-Korea nuclear weapon free and pressed North Korea to sign an IAEA 
safeguard agreement, hinting that the 'Team Spirit' Korea joint military exercise 
would then be cancelled.  
After two ad hoc meetings on the nuclear issue, North Korea dropped its previous 
position of insisting on the prohibition of US nuclear assistance and exercises in the 
South. At the third meeting on 31 December the two sides agreed to a 'Joint 
Declaration of the Korean Peninsula', which forbids testing, manufacturing, 
production, receipt, possession, storage, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. 
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The declaration, which also provides for a Joint Nuclear Control Commission 
specifies that to verify denuclearization, the South and North will carry out 
inspections of objects that will be chosen by the other side and agreed upon between 
the two sides. From the activities subject to the declaration it could be derived that 
verification measures would aim at locating and monitoring civilian nuclear 
installations, as well as detecting existing nuclear weapons and stocks of enriched 
plutonium.473 
As promised, North Korea signed a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
on 31 January 1992. At the sixth high-level talks, the above-mentioned agreements 
were formally brought into effect, but no consensus was reached on implementation. 
While the talks remained inconclusive, IAEA inspections proceeded in North Korea 
and raised questions of possible non-compliance with the NPT.474 Backed up by 
evidence provided mainly by US intelligence, the IAEA demanded special 
inspections of non-declared sites. North Korea refused and announced its withdrawal 
from the NPT, after which the case was referred to the UN Security Council.475 
Negotiations between the US and North Korea followed, in which Pyongyang agreed 
to resume negotiations with the IAEA and restart bilateral talks with South Korea.476  
North Korea’s nuclear facilities – a small, plutonium-producing reactor, a fuel-rod 
fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and two partially completed larger reactors – 
had been frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. That 
agreement was concluded after a tense standoff following the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s (IAEA) discovery that Pyongyang had been diverting spent fuel 
from the reactor for a nuclear weapons program.  
Seoul's response to North Korea's477 withdrawal from the NPT has been cautious, 
preferring not to isolate the North internationally. The South did, however, impose 
limited economic sanctions on its neighbour.478  
In the spring of 2003, North Korea reportedly admitted to having nuclear weapons. 
Solution to the current crisis requires North Korea to accept verifications of its 
nuclear weaponization programs. In addition, North Korea will have to take other 
verification steps, including re-establishing the “freeze” over its plutonium 
production facilities and coming into compliance with its safeguards agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including resolving outstanding 
issues raised by the IAEA in the early 1990s.479  
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Positive development on the Korean Peninsula have important positive implications 
for the prospect of building a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in East Asia. It can 
restrain the ongoing trend of military arms race between the U.S.-Japan alliance on 
the one hand, and China, on the other, by limiting the justification for fast 
rearmament of Japan and the ever more strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Second it will facilitate the implementation and institutionalisation of the 
denuclearization of the peninsula, which they agreed to in late 1991.  
4.3.3.3 Obstacles to verification of North-South agreements 
By 1993 there are several issues, which have not been resolved in South/North 
negotiations so far.480 The North had insisted that in exchange for accepting IAEA 
(regular) inspections of nuclear facilities, it wants to inspect US military bases in the 
South. Seoul argued that such a proposal is asymmetric in matching inspections of 
civilian facilities of the North with inspections of military bases of the South. Since 
South-Korea is already subject to IAEA safeguards, it wants to allow inspections of 
military sites only in exchange for similar inspections in North Korea. As a 
confidence-building measure, Seoul has proposed a North-South pilot inspection, 
separate from the IAEA safeguards, of nuclear facilities as well as of military bases. 
The South also pressed for an agreement on implementing the Joint Nuclear Control 
Commission, arguing that the nuclear issue is a litmus test for the North's 
determination to implement inter-Korean agreements. Pyongyang on the other hand 
demanded joint efforts to cope with nuclear threats from outside and an international 
guarantee on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. A complicating factor is 
that Pyongyang is highly sceptical about US/Seoul claims that nuclear weapons have 
been removed from South Korea. Verifying that that these weapons have in fact been 
removed is genuinely difficult, and it is hard to imagine a verification regime which 
could satisfy the North.481  
Since North Korea is an extremely closed society and basically opposed to the 
concept of openness, it will be difficult to agree to any verification measure. The 
DPRK has not even allowed an initial step in the arms control process such as 
exchanges of observers of military exercises and movements. Reference to 
verification has only been made without any specification. Another aspect of North 
Korea's closed society is that it is extremely difficult to determine what Pyongyangs' 
motives really are: for example, did it accept IAEA safeguards because it thought it 
could get away with cheating and what has been the effect of the transition of power 
from Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jung?482  
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The fact that the South has made the nuclear issue the litmus test for North-South 
cooperation, precludes a confidence-building process with verification measures for 
less contentious issues. Since worries over North's nuclear ambitions have developed 
into an international crisis, the situation has become even more complicated, as the 
credibility of the NPT has come to be at stake. Punitive action alone is not likely to 
produce a lasting solution.  
Pyongyang's security concerns have to be taken seriously; it cannot count on external 
support anymore, and faces a much stronger opponent backed up by the United 
States. North Korea's desire for nuclear weapons can most probably only be dealt 
with by a package deal including international guarantees, bilateral arms reductions 
and economic assistance. It has perhaps been a mistake that no 'carrots' were offered 
to North Korea when it signed the safeguards agreement:483 Team Spirit exercises 
continued, inspections of military bases to verify withdrawal of American nuclear 
weapons were not allowed, and no change in political and economic relations with 
Pyongyang was made. Lack of South Korean diplomatic initiative in this regard 
might have been the result of the strong influence of the military. North Korea has 
continued to call on the United States to sign a “non-aggression treaty” with 
Pyongyang in order to resolve the current situation. North Korea’s statement 
announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, however, suggested a softening in this 
position. It indicated that it might halt its nuclear activities if the United States “drops 
its hostile policy to stifle” North Korea – language suggesting that North Korea 
might want KEDO to resume fuel oil shipments. 484 
The question of who should perform the verification activities in North Korea is a 
matter of great sensitivity. It can hardly be expected that North Korea will grant the 
members of the verification regime its unconditional good faith. The deeply 
embedded distrust between North Korea and the international community, 
particularly the United States, will likely be a stumbling block in the initial phase of 
the verification process. In addition, the North has largely regarded the IAEA as 
representing the interests of the United States and other Western countries.485  
Thus, various types of verification regimes would need to integrate the strategic 
interest of not only the two countries but also strategic partners: the difficulties are 
mainly demonstrative when it comes to the discussion of “limited nuclear free zone” 
(LNFZ) for Northeast Asia. Since the proposal would directly affect the United 
States' ability to fulfil its security commitments to Korea, Taiwan and Japan, 
Washington is unlikely to rapidly embrace the proposal. Similarly, China is not 
likely to warm immediately to the proposal even though it officially advertises a “no 
first use” policy. A LNFZ would prevent China from using its nuclear arsenal for 
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intimidation purposes, or to defend against or deter an attack by one of its neighbours 
(with a smaller but far technologically superior conventional force).486  
4.3.3.4 Conclusion 
Verification has become a crucial issue in the arms control talks between North- and 
South Korea487. There are strong doubts about Pyongyang's willingness to accept 
verification measures, and renounce the option of a nuclear weapon program488. Yet, 
North Korea's international isolation and devastated economy are obvious incentives 
for better cooperation with South Korea. The nuclear question has grown into an 
international crisis with active involvement of the United States, Russia489, China 
and Japan.490  
As such, the present bilateral approach might well be substituted to a trilateral or 
multilateral effort. So far, the international community has moved very cautiously, 
relying on quiet diplomacy to persuade North Korea to adhere fully to the NPT. 
Economic incentives and security guarantees will be important factors in these 
efforts. But significant progress in the field of verification can probably only be 
obtained by a process of confidence-building between the two Korea's. One of the 
possible option for building confidences is the reunifcation of the two countries.491  
The North Korea issue may be a test case for diverging views about verification: the 
absolutist or 'global' position that everyone must adhere to the same standards with 
equal enforcement and sanctions, versus the more regionalist or ad hoc view that 
inspection activities may have to be tailored to specific cases.492 The key to 
successful verification of the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program 
depends primarily on determining how best to construct an effective and intrusive 
verification system that would achieve the goal of complete, accurate, and credible 
verification.493 
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4.3.4 India and Pakistan 
Since Pakistan declared in February 1992 that it had developed the capability to 
produce a nuclear bomb, there has been growing international concern over a 
possible nuclear arms race between India and its smaller neighbour Pakistan.494 
Although the two states have agreed to several confidence-building measures, there 
is hardly a sign of a promising process of nuclear arms control. Since India insists on 
retaining the nuclear option also for reasons other than its rivalry with Pakistan495, 
bilateral talks alone are not likely to offer significant prospects. In the area of 
conventional warfare, which is more of a bilateral issue, arms control might stand a 
better chance. 
4.3.4.1 Background 
After the violent partition of 'hindu' India and 'muslim' Pakistan in 1947, relations 
between the two states continued to be extremely hostile. Related to religious and 
ethnic tensions, the main conflict lies in the dispute over Kashmir, which resulted in 
wars between India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1965. In 1971, Indian troops sided with 
Bengali separatists in civil war in East-Pakistan, resulting in the creation of 
Bangladesh.  
During the Cold War, India had special ties with the Soviet Union, while Pakistan 
had strong bonds with the United States. Although no longer influenced by 
superpower conflict, the bilateral relationship has remained problematic: “As was the 
case with the US-Soviet rivalry, relations between India and Pakistan are exacerbated 
by deep mistrust, a quick tendency to blame the other side for any misfortune, belief 
that the other side is dedicated to gaining the upper hand and, in Pakistan, the idea 
that India directly threatens the survival of the country.“496  
India demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1974, when it exploded what it called a 
“peaceful nuclear device”. Like Pakistan, it claimed that no nuclear weapons had 
been developed, but that it has the option, or “defensive preparedness” to do so.497  
Neither Pakistan nor India are not members of the NPT; Pakistan has stated its 
readiness to join if India does, while India has maintained that it only will renounce 
the nuclear option if all states do so, including the five acknowledged nuclear 
weapon states. India has pursued the nuclear weapons option with an eye on the 
regional superpower: i.e. China, rather than on Pakistan. The Sino-Indian war of 
1962, when Chinese troops easily moved into disputed border areas and then halted, 
has been a traumatic experience.  
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4.3.4.2 A slow confidence-building process 
The first real sign of an emerging dialogue was the 1972 Simla Summit, where 
reportedly some CBM's were discussed498. From 1978 on bilateral contacts between 
high officials increased, and summit meetings were organized both through the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and bilaterally. In 1983, India 
and Pakistan set up a Joint Commission to meet annually to try to promote 
cooperation in “the economic, trade, industrial, education, health, cultural, consular, 
tourism, travel, information, science and technology fields”, but the talks aborted in 
1989. 
Some progress was made after the military crisis of May 1990, which had resulted 
from military exercises too near to the border.499 In July of that year, the first foreign 
secretary-level talks started (followed by several other rounds), which have resulted 
in an Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop 
Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and Permitting 
Overflights and Landings by Military Aircraft. The latter agreement establishes “no 
fly” zones near joint borders, while the former requires advance notification of 
military exercises involving division-size levels of armed troops and exercises within 
about 50 miles of the border, and also provides for exchanges of “military visitors”. 
The agreements are slowly being implemented. A “hot line” which had been 
established previously, is already working satisfactorily; and every week there is a 
phone conversation between top military commanders.  
In January 1992, the 1988 agreement obligating both countries not to attack each 
other’s nuclear installations was finally implemented, when India and Pakistan 
exchanged lists of the facilities involved.500 Confidence may also be built as a result 
of the two countries having jointly signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
1993, a global agreement which will subject both of them to international 
inspection.501 
In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. 
This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan 
involving China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state.502 In the wake of the May 
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1998 nuclear tests, U.S. diplomatic efforts focused on obtaining India's commitment 
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but India has still not become a 
member. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1998, Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said, “[the May 1998 tests]...do not signal a 
dilution of India's commitment to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament... In 
announcing a moratorium [on further tests], India has already accepted the basic 
obligation of the CTBT.” Earlier that month, Vajpayee spelled out India's position on 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: “It is a discriminatory treaty...[that] has given 
the right to five countries to proliferate vertically in disregard of universal opinion 
against the very existence of nuclear weapons.”503  
4.3.4.3 Problems and prospects 
As long as the question of Kashmir remains unsolved, relations between Pakistan and 
India will continue to be tense. It seems that both sides are willing to take measures 
to avoid the risk of unintentional war, but there is little enthusiasm to go much 
further than that. There may be some possibility of establishing a verifiable 
demilitarized zone at the border. A significant part of the border area is desert, which 
may simplify verification procedures.504 The United Nations is already present, since 
1949, monitoring at least part of the border, the so-called Line of Actual Control in 
Kashmir. In June 1989 Prime Ministers Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto apparently 
reached a “notional understanding” that the Indian and Pakistani forces would be 
withdrawn from the border area to the pre-Simla Agreement lines. Talks had begun 
in Beijing to that end, but change of government in the two countries left the 
agreement unclear.  
The most difficult issue is the nuclear question. Pakistan has tabled several 
proposals: establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a system of bilateral 
inspections, simultaneous acceptance of IAEA safeguards, a bilateral or regional test 
ban treaty, and a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia.  
India has not been prepared to accept any of these proposals for reasons already 
mentioned. An additional motive for India's reluctance to accept an NWFZ may lie in 
the fact that such an agreement might mean that the United States would resume 
some or most of its military and economic aid to Pakistan.  
The US has taken strong interest in controlling nuclear build-up in India and 
Pakistan, fearing most of all export of nuclear technology from these countries. The 
US had already been urging Pakistan and India to negotiate bilateral measures 
including a ban on all fissile material production, a regional nuclear test ban, mutual 
security assurances and acceptance of IAEA safeguards on new (and some old) 
nuclear installations505. Thus, while experience from IAEA activities relevant to the 
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NPT in other parts of the world is important, the South Asian context raises unique 
difficulties. Present IAEA experience is primarily concerned with the detection of 
unauthorized production of fissile materials and international transfer of these and 
other materials related to fissile materials production.506 
A strategy dealing with the nuclear issue in South Asia would probably need to 
combine global and regional elements.507 India however has promoted a global 
approach on such issues as opposed to the regional approach.508 Thus, also trilateral 
talks between India, Pakistan and China sponsored by the US and Russia (as 
proposed by the US) may not produce any tangible results. 
Even if the India-Pakistani509 nuclear rivalry were solely a bilateral issue, the arms 
control process is constrained by the factor of strong nationalism: “Complicating 
things further is the fact that no political leader on either side can step away from a 
position half way on board the nuclear tiger without grave political risk; achieving 
nuclear weapons know-how is as much a symbol as a deterrent for the vast majority 
in India as it is in Pakistan, demonstrating, in their minds, how far their countries 
have come in less than half a century from the status of mere colonies.” “National 
security concerns and threat perceptions of nations are no doubt key factors in the 
process of proliferation. But a major motivating force can also be a desire to seek or 
enhance international prestige.”510 India's nuclear weapons program is described by 
its government as a necessary minimum deterrent in the face of regional nuclear 
threats: that include a considerably larger Chinese nuclear arsenal as well as 
Pakistan's nuclear arms.511 
However, India and Pakistan could learn from the experience of Argentina and Brazil 
which resisted moves to make them parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which aims at establishing 
a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America, for over twenty years 
before signing a 'Declaration on the Common Nuclear Policy of Brazil and 
Argentina' on November 28, 1990. With this agreement Brazil and Argentina 
formally relinquished their nuclear weapons programs and committed themselves to 
using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.  
A key decision in this bilateral agreement was to establish a Common Systems of 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to verify that nuclear materials 
in all nuclear activities of both parties were used exclusively for peaceful purposes, 
and to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 
the conclusion of a safeguards agreement based on the SCCC. A bilateral body 
consisting of 50 inspectors, 25 of each nationality, was created by the name of 
                                                 
506 C.E. Singer and J.W. Neuhoff, Nuclear Materials in South Asia, The bulletin of the Program in 
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, in: University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign 4/4 (May 1990). 
507 See, for example, J. Haus, Non-proliferation: new energy, new direction, in: Arms Control 
(April 1993), pp. 257-260.  
508 See B. Chellaney, The challenge of nuclear arms control in South Asia, in: Survival (Autumn 
1993), pp. 130 f. 
509 In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out 5 nuclear tests each in rapid succession. 
510 B. Chellaney, South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power, in: International Security 16/1 (1991), 
p. 43. 
511 India and Pakistan, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 45, March 2004. 
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Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC) to oversee the application of safeguards. A quadripartite agreement 
between the two countries, ABACC and IAEA was arrived at, which together with 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco will lead to a credible system of denuclearization of Latin 
America.512  
4.3.5  A Trilateral Approach to Regional Verification – The Sinai 
The most successful example of a trilateral approach to verification is the Sinai 
Agreements signed between Israel and Egypt after the 1973 war. As a third party, the 
United States and the United Nations supervised verification procedures, 
successfully integrating several tasks, forming an early-warning, inspection, 
monitoring and verification system for the region. Responsibilities for verification 
were distributed amongst the parties involved in an interlocking fashion, which 
contributed to the overall confidence-building function of the verification regime and 
the eventual signing of a comprehensive peace treaty in 1979. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 October War, Egypt and Israel signed a Six-Point 
Agreement on November 11, 1973, officially establishing a cease-fire. After 
intensive shuttle diplomacy by United States Secretary of State Kissinger, the Sinai I 
Agreement was signed on January 18, 1974, establishing a demilitarized buffer zone 
in the Sinai under UN control, flanked by limited force zones in which the nature of 
the armed forces and armaments, which could be deployed, would be limited.  
In order to assure compliance with these restrictions, several verification procedures 
were developed. The limited force zones were to be examined through on-site 
inspections by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which would include 
both Israeli and Egyptian liaison officers. Further, American reconnaissance aircraft 
would monitor the deployment of forces in the zones regularly. The verification 
arrangements were implemented through consultations between the military 
representatives of Israel and Egypt. Convened by the United Nations, these 
consultations became known as the “Kilometre 101” talks. In an effort to establish a 
relationship between military confidence building and political progress on a final 
peace agreement, it was further agreed that forces would gradually disengage 
through phased withdrawal.  
In 1975, Secretary Kissinger again sought to achieve a further disengagement of 
forces in the Sinai. The Sinai II Agreement, which was finalized on September 4, 
1975, built upon many of the principles embodied by the Sinai I Agreement. Israel 
agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Gidi passes which would then be included in 
an enlarged UN buffer zone. However, stressing its need for early warning (due to its 
reserve mobilization system), Israel refused to withdraw its strategic surveillance 
station at the western end of the Gidi Pass. To resolve this impasse, and to create 
strategic symmetry, Egypt was permitted to build a similar station at the eastern end 
of the Pass. 
The major innovation of the Sinai II Agreement was the depth of American 
involvement as guarantor of the agreement. Agreeing to thus accept responsibility for 
verifying force levels through aerial reconnaissance of the zones specified by the 
talks, monitoring the national surveillance stations, and monitoring the Mitla and 
Gidi passes. In November 1975, the US Sinai Support Mission (SSM) was formed by 
                                                 




presidential directive to provide Egypt, Israel and the United Nations with early 
warning of any unauthorized movement of armed forces in the Mitla and Gidi passes. 
The United States established a Sinai Field Mission (SFM) to operate three watch 
stations (staffed with civilian personnel), four unmanned sensor fields, a support 
camp and a communications network. The sensor equipment installed utilized a 
variety of techniques, encompassing seismic, acoustic, infrared, magnetic, 
electromagnetic, pressure, electric and earth strain detection capabilities. Data from 
the sensor fields was monitored at the watch stations and supplemented with visual 
inspections. This technology enabled the number of support staff required to be kept 
at a minimum level. 
The Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations were limited to visual and electronic 
surveillance, and were monitored by US civilian liaison officers. US aerial 
reconnaissance flights were made over the buffer zone and limited force zones every 
seven to ten days, or upon request. The results of the reconnaissance were made 
available to both parties. UNEF itself was responsible for checkpoints escorts and 
observation posts within the buffer zone. 
Between 1976 and 1980, there were ninety recorded violations of the zones, but all 
violations were deemed to be “... small infractions easily detected, identified, and 
corrected.”513 Many were attributable to the close proximity of reduced force zones 
to the buffer areas. All of these infractions were resolved without threatening the 
overall agreement. A Joint commission was established as a consultative mechanism 
to deal with ambiguous situations.  
The final culmination of the Sinai I and II process was the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty of March 26, 1979. Following a Soviet Security Council veto of UN 
participation in verifying the new treaty, the role of the existing US Sinai Field 
Mission (SFM) was expanded to encompass the supervision of the full Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai514. This included inspections of Israeli technical stations 
and Egyptian military installations in the limited forces zones. U.S. aerial 
surveillance, which had begun early on in the Sinai process, continued on a regular 
basis. The SFM was disbanded in April 1982 after Israel's final withdrawal from the 
Sinai, and security arrangements were turned over to a more traditional peacekeeping 
force, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). 
4.3.5.1 Evaluation 
The Sinai agreements are considered to be one of the major successes of verification. 
The role of third parties in verifying the treaty arrangements was key, as the United 
States and United Nations provided not only an impartial observer force, but also the 
trained manpower, financial aid and technical support required to implement the 
verification procedures. The successful integration of the verification structures of 
the United Nations, United States, Egypt and Israel was mutually reinforcing and 
greatly enhanced the overall impact of the system. 
Several key factors facilitated the success of the Sinai agreements:  
                                                 
513 B.S. Mandell, The Sinai Experience: lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and 
Risk Management, Arms Control Verification Studies No. 3, Department of External Affairs, 
Ottawa 1988, p. 1. 




Both parties to the conflict were committed to maintaining peace,  
and a credible third party was able and willing to perform a monitoring role.  
The situation was simplified by the fact that there were only two parties to the 
conflict, and one contiguous border. 
Further, the desert terrain, climate, and existence of natural barriers assisted in the 
ease of surveillance and detection.  
The technology-intensive nature of the verification methods greatly reduced the 
requirements for large forces, and thus reduced possible concerns about sovereignty 
and intrusiveness. 
On a more fundamental level, the fact that each successful agreement built upon 
previously-established verification arrangements served as incremental confidence-
building measures which contributed to the willingness of the parties to conclude a 
peace agreement. 
At the beginning of the process, both sides were primarily concerned with the need 
for early warning and prevention of surprise attacks. The verification system met 
these needs by reducing the risks involved in a cease-fire through reduction of forces 
in forward zones, immediate detection and notification of troop movements, and the 
reduction of incentives for a surprise attack. In this way, the requirements of the 
parties were satisfied. Mandell notes that: “In relinquishing strategic depth, Israel 
required a verification system that would warn of a rapid reinforcement of Egyptian 
forces.”515 The integration of technological verification with more traditional 
peacekeeping requirements accomplished this task. 
Despite its success, the Sinai verification regime did experience a number of 
difficulties:516 An initial problem of the verification regime was related to 
disagreement over the definition of allowable military structures, fortifications, and 
artillery. This was largely attributable to the differences between Israeli and Egyptian 
military organization and structure. The Joint Commission eventually resolved such 
issues. An additional complication was due to climatic factors: technical problems 
with the sensor equipment caused by dust and ground fog, however were quickly 
resolved through the addition of thermal imaging devices. 
In conclusion, the verification process associated with the Sinai Agreements was 
clearly an incremental learning process, which facilitated the eventual commitment 
to a peace treaty. It effectively illustrates the significant role, which can be played by 
a third party in designing and implementing verification procedures. The use of 
applicable technology was also an important factor in lessening the apparent 
intrusiveness of these procedures, and thus enhanced their political acceptability.  
The verification regime also succeeded in integrating ground and air surveillance by 
both third parties and by national means, forming an integrated package. However, 
by far the greatest accomplishment of the trilateral approach in the Sinai is that while 
it initially performed a risk-reduction function, the success of the agreements 
increased the confidence of the parties to such a degree that a fundamental political 
compromise was reached.  
                                                 
515 B.S. Mandell,. op. cit., 1988, p. 1. 
516 D. Barton, The Sinai peacekeeping experience: a verification paradigm for Europe, SIPRI 
Yearbook 1985, pp. 541-573. 
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5. The United Nations 
Since the Gulf War in 1991 highlighted the danger of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the lack of control over it, there has been growing attention for 
establishing adequate international arrangements to limit arms build up. The Security 
Council summit in January 1992 proclaimed arms proliferation a threat to 
international security, thus clearing the way for further Security Council action in 
this area.  
After the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council, 
through the binding cease-fire resolution 687, imposed a verification regime on Iraq 
for the destruction of its chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear potential and 
ballistic missiles. This represent a rather unique case of enforcement of such 
measures, and the first major United Nations exercise in verification of arms control.  
However, UN intrusion on national sovereignty for verification purposes is still 
considered too sensitive an issue by most states. If UN involvement is to be 
expanded, this is most likely to happen in its more usual roles in verification as table 
8 describes it includes: fact-finding, providing assistance with respect to data 
exchanges (including the UN arms register), and verification in the context of 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1. Forum for negotiation and discussion 
Although not directly involving a UN verification effort in practice, the various fora 
of UN organs have played a role in the development of international norms of 
verification, and the negotiation of some of the global arms control agreements. 
Since its creation in 1945, the UN has gone through different phases. From the early 
1960's to the mid-1970's,517 a period which some have considered something of a 
“belle epoque” for UN disarmament diplomacy, quite a number of agreements were 
brought about, such as the Non-Proliferation treaty, the Seabed treaty, the Biological 
Weapons Convention etc. As the multilateral disarmament agenda turned more and 
more to grandiose and overambitious objectives (much due to widening North-South 
and East-West cleavages), the superpowers preferred to conclude agreements with 
each other without involving the UN. Regional arrangements provided another 
alternative. 
By the late 1980's, the changed international situation had greatly improved the 
atmosphere of debates on disarmament. The organs related to the UN General 
Assembly, as well as their agenda's were streamlined. This may lead to the abolition 
of the UN Disarmament Commission, while the format, size and membership (now 
40) of the main negotiating forum, the Conference of Disarmament (CD) could be 
restructured.518 The 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention has been one of the few 
successes of negotiation within the CD framework. It has been proposed to have the 
CD focus on well-defined and urgent matters, or function as a permanent review and 
supervisory body for some existing arms control agreements519. The agenda of the 
First Committee of the General Assembly, which negotiates resolutions to be 
adopted in the Assembly's plenary session, was also being reconsidered. 
In 1988, the General Assembly endorsed a set of 16 principles of verification,520 
which is the guidelines in arms control agreements and negoication. A study on the 
UN role in verification was completed in 1990 by a representative group of 
governmental experts.521  
The UN study recommended providing technical assistance through a UN data bank, 
and organizing exchanges between experts and government officials. The 1990 
Experts Group agreed that the United Nations could play a useful role in making 
research and data relating to verification available to wider audiences. Increasingly, 
access to data and its availability have become essential building blocks for arms 
limitation and disarmament agreements and for confidence- and security building 
measures between States. The United Nations could take an active role in facilitating 
the operational international exchange of these data. Most of the data would be 
                                                 
517 The First Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1978 had 
already stressed the importance of adequate verification. The Final Document of that Session 
states: “Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of 
verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and 
ensure that they are being observed by all parties.” (UN-DocA/Res/S-10/2). 
518 See J. Simpson, Arms Control and the United Nations, Bulletin of Arms Control, April 1993, 
pp. 11-16.  
519 Report of the Secretary-General, New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament, in: 
the Post-cold War Era, 27 October 1992, A/C.1/47/7. 
520 See Annex, resolution A/43/81B.  
521 Study on the role of the United Nations in verification, UN doc. A/45/372, 1991. 
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provided voluntarily by States and the data bank would be accessible by other States; 
it would be computer-based and would have facilities for storage and retrieval, on-
line access and the capacity to interface with other relevant data banks to which 
Member States provide access. 
The main question is that of creating a UN body for actually conducting verification 
activities, possibly equipped with technical means such as overhead imaging 
systems. Proponents of such a UN agency argue that it would provide expertise in 
verification techniques, thus making them accessible to nations with limited 
resources for verification. They also believe it would give an impetus for further 
arms control agreements and remove any grounds for arguing that such agreements 
would not be verifiable.522  
Another view considers that verification is a treaty specific exercise, and the 
combination of techniques and capabilities employed under every individual 
agreement must be the product of negotiation and agreement by the states that would 
be parties to it. 523 It has not been possible thus far to bridge the gap between these 
two views, although the UN study found some common ground in proposing to 
extend the (non-intrusive) UN fact-finding missions for the verification of certain 
arms control agreements. 
The Assembly established a second group of experts in 1993 to revisit the issue, 
especially in light of the changes that had occurred since the end of the Cold War. In 
1995 the UN Secretary-General submitted an in-depth study on verification in all its 
aspects, prepared with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, 
which subsequently served as an important reference document.524 
This development has resulted in the introduction of verification provisions in arms 
control agreements ever since.525 It has positively influenced implementation and 
compliance also in other areas of international law. Examples can be found in 
peacekeeping, disengagement and crisis prevention526 but also in other areas such as 
environmental law,527 where international cooperation to support fact-finding, 
conflict management and confidence-building is essential for effective compliance.  
                                                 
522 The strongest supporters of the principle of an integrated multilateral verification system 
within the UN are the countries represented in the Six-Nation Initiative: Argentina, Greece, 
India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.  
523 See F. Bild and P. Jones, Multilateral verification, opportunities and constraints, in: 
Disarmament 14/2 (1991). 
524 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of 
verification. Report of the Secretary-General, UN-Doc A/50/377 and Corr. 1, A/52/269, 
A/54/166,A/54/555. The General Assembly has reaffirmed the critical importance of, and vital 
contribution that had been made by effective verification measures in arms limitation and 
disarmament agreements and other similar obligations (A/Res/50/61, 52/31, 54/46). 
525 S. Pawlak, The Legal Aspects of Verification, in: J. Dahlitz and D. Dicke (eds.), The 
International Law of Arms Control and Disarmament, UN Publications, 1991, pp. 127-144 
(131-142). 
526 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Cambridge MA 1995; T. Marauhn, Die Durchsetzung von Rüstungskontroll- und 
Abrüstungsvereinbarungen, in: Die Friedens-Warte 75/1-2 (1999), p. 159. 
527 U. Beyerlin and T. Marauhn, Law-Making and Law-Enforcement in International 
Environmental Law after the 1992 Rio Conference, Berlin 1997, pp. 70 ff. 
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Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of arms limitation and 
disarmament agreements, promoting implementation, confidence building and 
compliance. The definition of verification, which is not agreement-specific, includes 
any commitment undertaken by a party or parties which they would then seek to 
have verified by collecting, collating and analysing data in order to make an 
informed judgement as to whether a party is complying with its commitments or 
obligations. There is also no single verification instrument, which could be sufficient 
for all situations. Essential principles of verification include equality, non-
discrimination, reciprocity, and universality of the verification process, non-
interference with agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification and the 
protection of trade secrets. To build up confidence, it is also necessary to respect the 
social and cultural values of the nations involved. These principles are recognised as 
useful elements in negotiating and implementing arms limitation and disarmament 
agreements.528 
One issue concerns a possible UN role in equalizing the opportunities of verification 
between rich and poor countries. Principle (10) deals with “All states have equal 
rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to 
which they are parties.” This principle is obviously flouted, since states are permitted 
to veto the appointment of inspectors, even when some agreements state that these 
cannot be objected to on the grounds of nationality.529  
The United Nations Secretary-General has been given a permanent role in 
verification by some treaties. The Landmine Convention, for example, gives him a 
role in receiving annual compliance reports by States parties and in organizing fact-
finding missions. The Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA),530 at United 
Nations headquarters in New York and in Geneva, carries out these duties for the 
Secretary-General, as well as promoting and advancing the study of verification 
through publications and conferences. It also promotes transparency and openness in 
military matters that are vital to effective verification.  
The Conference on Disarmament (CD),531 the single multilateral forum devoted to 
negotiating disarmament agreements naturally also negotiates the accompanying 
                                                 
528 The International Law Association (ed.), Report of the Sixty-Seventh Conference, Helsinki 
1996, p. 316. See also Difth Report of the Committee National and International Verfication 
Measures, London Conference 2000. 
529 Disregard for this principle occurred when the UN prevented Israel from participating in the 
process of verifying the elimination of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range 
missile programs, even though Israel consider as victim of Iraqi aggression during the Gulf 
War. Having adversaries participating in the verification activities assures the world of a less 
lenient approach and increases the probability of fulfilling the verification mission. E. Asculai, 
Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case, Washington, DC 2002. 
530 The Department is responsible for the collation of information for the United Nations 
Conventional Arms Register and the confidence-building measures for the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention. 
531 The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single multilateral 
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, was a result of the first Special 
Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded 
other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). As originally constituted, the CD 
had 40 members. Subsequently its membership was expanded to 66 countries.  
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verification and compliance arrangements. Sometimes it establishes verification sub-
groups, like the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), which helped devise, 
both before and during the CD negotiations, the multilateral verification regime for 
the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United Nations 
Disarmament Commission (UNDC), which is composed of all United Nations 
members, meets annually in New York to discuss and produce reports on 
disarmament issues, which normally include consideration of verification and 
compliance.  
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) undertakes 
studies on verification and verification-related issues as part of its brief to research 
disarmament questions. The United Nations Security Council, the only United 
Nations body that is able to make binding, enforceable decisions, is able to impose 
unilateral disarmament measures and accompanying verification arrangements on 
States. It is also able to establish verification bodies, the two examples to date being 
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It is also 
empowered to impose sanctions, including the use of military force, for violations of 
arms control and disarmament agreements. 
5.2. Assistance in verification 
A number of arms control agreements provide for referral to the United Nations 
organs, the Secretary-General, or the International Court of Justice (see annex I). In 
most cases those provisions relate to a monitoring or co-operative role, as through 
certain types of exchange of information, and to the settlement of disputes regarding 
a certain implementation of a treaty, but not exactly to rendering compliance 
judgements. Most of these provisions have never been implemented.532 In practice, 
UN involvement in verification of arms control agreements has taken two forms: 
assistance in organizing data exchanges, and fact-finding: 
1. The UN assistance in data exchanges has evolved mainly through a clause, which 
first appeared in 1971 in the Seabed Treaty, and provides for verification “through 
appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and 
in accordance with its Charter”533. This makes it possible for Review Conferences of 
multilateral treaties to voice concern about verification and compliance, and ask for 
UN assistance. For example, the Third Review Conference of the Sea-Bed treaty 
requested the UN Secretary-General to report on technological developments 
relevant to the treaty and to the verification of compliance.  
The Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Treaty requested 
assistance with respect to data exchanges and a report on the implementation of 
confidence-building measures decided upon by States Parties, while the Third 
Review Conference requested the S-G to receive, compile and make available to 
States Parties information related to the implementation of the Convention and later 
                                                 
532 Study on the role of the United Nations in verification, UN doc. A/45/372, 1991, p. 29. 
533 On this issue see H. Mann, An international verification organization and the United Nations: 
some legal issues, in: Ellis Morris (ed.), International Verification Organizations, Toronto, 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, York 1991, pp. 227-252. 
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decisions.534 The increase of requests for UN assistance in organizing data exchanges 
has raised the question of making the data more accessible. There is at present a lack 
of organization and translation of the incoming information, which is often very 
complex. The UN is therefore now trying to develop a computerized data bank as 
had been recommended by a study group of governmental experts.535  
An additional effort has to be made in providing resources for making the UN arms 
transfer register operational. This register was established at the 46th General 
Assembly in 1991 and requires UN members to submit to the UN, on a voluntary 
basis, information on the import and export of conventional weapons, and 
background information on arms stockpiles, production of weapons and relevant 
policies.536 It is a confidence building measure, which in the longer term may form 
the embryo of a verification regime for restrictions on conventional arms trade.  
The various data exchanges mentioned above are more of a confidence building 
nature than part of an actual verification process. Situating them in the UN has been 
convenient mostly for reasons of cost effectiveness, but as soon as these data 
exchanges develop more verification substance, one could well expect the consensus 
on having this function to be performed by the UN to evaporate. 
2. Fact Finding. The Secretary-General may get involved in the verification of the 
arms control agreements as a function of executive organ of the GA and the Security 
Council (Article 98 of the Charter) and through Article 99 of the Charter which 
empowers him to bring to the attention of the SC any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of peace and security.  
Although the legality of such an authority to intervene has been disputed,537 the 
Secretary-General has undertaken fact-finding missions mainly in response to the 
alleged use of chemical weapons.538 From 1980 to 1984 -in the absence of 
verification provisions in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of 
chemical or biological weapons in war- several General Assembly resolutions paved 
the way by calling upon the Secretary-General to carry out investigations on the 
alleged use of chemical weapons in South East Asia and Afghanistan. In 1987 this 
was supplemented by a consensus resolution on fact-finding requesting the further 
development of technical guidelines, the compilation and maintenance of lists of 
qualified experts, and arrangements for using them.539 The 1989 Paris Declaration of 
States-Parties to the Geneva Protocol expressed full support for this UN 
involvement. 
                                                 
534 See C.d. Jonge-Oudraat, International Organization and Verification, in: S. Sur (ed.), 
Verification of Disarmament or limitations of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, 
Proposals UNIDIR, Geneva 1992. 
535 See UN doc. A/45/372, par. 262-266. 
536 Resolution 46/36 L “Transparency in Armaments”, adopted on 9 December 1991. 
537 See C.d. Jonge-Oudraat, op. cit., 1992. 
538 For an elaborate discussion, see G. Cottereau, The Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and 
Biological Methods of Warfare (1925) and related procedures, in: S. Sur (ed.), Verification of 
Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements, Ways, Means and Practice, UNIDIR, 
Geneva 1991. 
539 General Assembly resolution 42/37 C.  
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However, the Assembly resolutions were not invoked when the SG undertook fact-
finding missions from 1984 to 1988, in Iran and Iraq. These were based on requests 
by individual member states and/or Security Council resolutions. The Council's 
resolution 620 of 26 August 1988 made clear that action would be considered in case 
of any future use of chemical weapons in violation of international law, whenever, 
and by whomever committed. For instance, in 1991 a UN fact-finding mission was 
dispatched to investigate Azerbaijani claims that Armenia had used chemical 
weapons in the Nagorny-Karabagh conflict.  
UN fact-finding missions require of course the prior consent of the state involved, 
and only have as much freedom to observe as accorded to it by that state.540 Such 
lack of intrusiveness makes it difficult to come up with compelling evidence. Yet, the 
1984 Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran presents a case of a successful 
investigation. Authorized by the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General 
immediately put together a team of experts to investigate Iran's charges. Using 
procedures for collecting and processing samples and other data in advance, the 
inspection team obtained access to key areas in the war zone and to the gassed 
victims, and within a matter of days after the investigation (barely six weeks after the 
complaint had been filed by Iran) unanimously confirmed Iran's allegations. 
However, the success of this mission was probably highly dependent on specific 
cicumstances; direct access to the relevant sites and a clear violation, which was easy 
to verify.541 It must also be noted that no action has been undertaken in response to 
the violation.  
The use of UN fact-finding missions offers at least some means of verification which 
can be extended to cover other treaties, which lack verification regimes, as has been 
recommended by the UN study mentioned above.542 As for the described UN role in 
the Geneva Protocol, this has partly been covered by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, in which provisions have been included to address allegations of use of 
chemical weapons.  
5.3. UN verification in peacekeeping 
Since the UN peacekeeping operation dealing with the cease-fire following the Iran-
Iraq war, the term verification has been used in the mandates assigned to 
peacekeeping missions, such as those in Central America and Cambodia, while in 
one case it even appears in the official title: the UN Angola Verification Mission 
                                                 
540 The principle of national sovereignty has also been firmly established in General Assembly 
resolution A/46/59, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the field of the 
maintenance of International Peace and Security. The definition of aggression, which was 
reached by the United Nations General Assembly at the end of 1974 (29 UN GAOR, 6th 
Comm., UN Doc. A/9890) reflects the fears and doubts of our time, but it is a tributary of the 
stream, which is gradually moving States toward a more secure and peaceful international 
society. The Resolution was adopted without putting it to a vote. The 138 Member States were 
by no means agreed upon its meaning. If it had been put to a vote, China and a few others 
would have abstained. A few States noted some objections, and some special interpretations 
were noted for the record. See B.B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition Of 
Aggression: Sieve Or Substance, From the Washington Conference on Law and the World, 
October 1995. 
541 See J.A. Shear, Compliance diplomacy in a multilateral setting, in: M. Krepon and M. 
Umberger (eds.), Verification and Compliance, VERTIC, 1988, p. 267. 




(UNAVEM). These examples illustrate the increasingly recognized importance of 
verification in peacekeeping operations. 
In fact, from 1948 on, the UN has been involved in a range of tasks including 
supervision, confirmation, certification and other such terms with respect to armistice 
agreements, cease-fires and elections. These tasks all included a degree of 
verification in one way or another and the UN has thus developed a fair amount of 
expertise over the years. An experience, which to some extent may be applied to the 
area of, arms control.  
As UN peacekeeping operations are of course established with the consent of the 
parties to the conflict, verifying compliance is very much based on the cooperation of 
those involved. “Freedom of movement, access to information, the ability to inspect 
and ask questions is essential. One of the hallmarks of UN peacekeeping has been the 
personal rapport that builds between the peacekeeper and the protagonist. No matter 
what the problem, human interaction is often a catalyst in finding a solution. There 
are instances where technology has been very effective in the peacekeeping 
verification process but there are even more instances where the human factor has 
proven to be irreplaceable.”543  
Another relevant aspect of verification in the UN peacekeeping context is that 
violations may be reported to the Security Council, which may subsequently impose 
punitive actions. Since the end of the Cold War this seems to have become more than 
just a hollow threat. 
A task, which has become increasingly important for the UN is that of supervising or 
monitoring elections. The concept is not new to the UN: in the fifties and sixties UN 
teams performed similar tasks in various Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories 
as they moved towards self-determination. With its mission in Nicaragua in 1989, the 
UN, for the first time, observed an election in a member state at the request of its 
government. There the mandate included several functions, such as verifying that the 
political parties were equitably represented in the Supreme Election Council, that 
they enjoyed complete freedom of organization and mobilization, that they had 
access to state television and radio and that electoral rolls were properly drawn up. 
The object in such a case is national reconciliation, for which elections offer an 
instrument to test rival claims to the right to rule. The verdict of the polls is the most 
accepted test of legitimacy.544 In this context, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has 
stressed: “Elections must not only be fair, they must also be seen to be fair. The 
presence of observers, therefore, is deterrent to fraud. The observers' report can help 
legitimize an election in an emerging democracy. It is harder to steal an election 
when the whole world is watching.”545 
A request for UN assistance in elections may lead to confusion over the precise 
character of the UN role. If it concerns a peacekeeping operation or a regional 
security matter, it may involve the competence of the Security Council. If it merely 
concerns technical assistance, the General Assembly may take up the matter. This 
                                                 
543 D.A. Fraser, Verification in the United Nations context: a process in transition, in: S. Mataija 
and J.M. Beier (eds.), Multilateral verification and the Post-Gulf Environment: Learning from 
the UNSCOM experience, Toronto 1992. 
544 E. Luard, Conflict and peace in the Modern International System; a study on the principles of 
international order, London 1988, p. 136 f. 
545 UPDATE, Parliamentarians for Global Action, April 1990. 
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was the case in Haiti, where the UN Observer Group of Elections in Haiti 
(ONUVEH) not only observed the electoral process but also was involved in “public 
security” to keep the elections free of violence. It was the first mission launched in 
response to a call for help in ending the political and institutional instability that 
plagued the nation.  
Most cases of monitoring elections, however, take place within the framework of a 
peacekeeping operation involving a regional security plan. The UN activities in 
Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Western Sahara, Angola, Mozambique and 
Rwanda are obvious examples. Many third world states argue that if there is no 
regional security problem involved, there is no need for a UN presence in monitoring 
elections, as that would in their opinion imply a potential for foreign interference in 
internal affairs.546 
The recently established United Nations Situation Centre (SITCEN)547 provides 
information to the decision makers in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations 
and elsewhere. The need for the Situation Centre emerged as a result of the 
expansion of peacekeeping activities, and the evolution of its scope and goals. The 
objectives of present-day peacekeeping operations are not limited to monitoring lines 
of disengagement. They range from monitoring a situation to reviving civil society 
and re-building the infrastructure of a shattered state. The fact that peacekeeping 
missions have so many aspects – political, military, security, and humanitarian, 
economic, educational – means that the financial burden and the organizational 
responsibilities are shared among different departments, agencies, and external 
organizations such as NGOs. 
Although clearly not in the direct business of verification, SITCEN provides 
essential services to those who are directly involved in verification measures by 
assisting them in the reporting of their results to decision makers. 
The role of United Nations in verification aspects of peace and security have been 
often challenged due to the lack of:  
Clear mandates concerning arms limitations and other obligations so that verification 
objectives can be better defined; 
Adequate resources to support the verification objectives; 
Systematic and better collection and analysis of information from ground 
reconnaissance, aerial surveillance and information processing systems; 
Independent sources of information and analysis; 
Ability to exploit more fully advances in technology, especially in the areas of 
communications and surveillance. 
5.4. Verifying Sanctions 
Another aspect of (possible) UN activities in verification, which has not received 
much attention, concerns monitoring and enforcing compliance with mandatory UN 
                                                 
546 See The World in Turmoil: Testing the UN's capacity, in: J. Kaufmann, D. Leurdijk and N. 
Schrijver (eds.), Academic Council on the United Nations System, New York 1991, pp. 38-39. 
547 The Situation Centre was created in April 1993 and was intended to form part of the UN 
Headquarters Information Management System, supporting the decision-making processes, and 
connecting all civilian and military flows of information at the strategic level.  
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sanctions. The Security Council has applied sanctions only eight times in history,548 
but five of them since 1990. Since sanctions have become an increasingly policy 
option, growing attention has been paid to improving their implementation. This may 
have relevance in the field of arms control, especially in the case of arms embargo's 
which may be seen as compulsory global export and import controls on arms trade.  
A number of arms control and disarmament agreements expressly provides that the 
Security Council may deal with cases of non-compliance.549 Measures to be taken by 
the Security Council include the determination of the existence of a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Art. 39 UN Charter); sanctions not 
involving the use of force (Art. 41 UN Charter); and military sanctions (Art. 42). 
The Security Council so far has established a number of committees to oversee 
implementation of sanctions,550 in respect of South Africa,551 Iraq, the former 
Yugoslavia,552 the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia, Haiti, the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Rwanda,553 respectively, with the 
scope differing from case to case. Some are limited to embargoes, while others are 
more comprehensive554. The committee on the former Yugoslavia, established in 
1991, was given a mandate that included the power to recommend measures in 
response to violations555 and to approve exceptions to the embargo.556  
                                                 
548 To date, the Security Council has established eight committees to oversee implementation of 
sanctions, in respect of South Africa, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Somalia, Haiti, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and 
Rwanda, respectively, with the scope differing from case to case. Some are limited to arms 
embargoes (South Africa, Somalia, UNITA in Angola, and Rwanda), while others are more 
comprehensive (Iraq and the former Yugoslavia). The committee on the former Yugoslavia, 
established in 1991, was given a mandate that included the power to recommend measures in 
response to violations 69/ and to approve exceptions to the embargo. The committees 
established since then (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia, Haiti, UNITA in Angola, and 
Rwanda) have similar mandates. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United 
Nations in the field of Verification, General Assembly, UN A/50/377, 22 September 1995, 
point 179. 
549 Art. XII C of the IAEA Statute; Art. VI BWC; Art. XII (4) CWC; Art. V (4) CTBT. 
550 J. Dahlitz, Security Council Powers and Possibilities, in: J. Dahlitz (ed.), Avoidance and 
Settlement of Arms Control Disputes, op. cit., pp. 57-83. 
551 The first measures again South Africa were not binding on the states and were set out in 
resolutions 181 (1962) and 182 (1963). Sanctions that were compulsory for the Member States 
were: 418 (1977), 473 (1980), 558 (1984), 591 (1986), 919 (1994). 
552 T. Christakis, Les Mesures économiques, politiques et diplomatiques contre la Serbie et le 
Montenegro (1992-1996), in: R. Mehdi, Les Nations Unies et le sanctions: quelle efficacité? 
Pédone 2000, pp. 117 and 121. Resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992), 820 (1993). 
553 A. Vines, Monitoring UN sanctions in Africa: the role of panels of experts, VERTIC, 
Verification Yearbook, 2003. 
554 D. Cortright and G. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, 
Boulder, CO 2000; and D. Cortright and G. Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security, 
Boulder, CO 2002. 
555 Security Council Resolution 724 (1991). 
556 Security Council Resolutions 787 (1992) and 820 (1993). 
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The sanctions committees are usually asked to perform a series of tasks and to report 
on their work to the Security Council with their observations and recommendations. 
There are several types of tasks that the committees may be asked to perform:557 
1. Development of guidelines for the implementation of measures imposed by the 
Council or to study ways and means by which such measures could be made 
more effective; 558 
2. Collection and examination of information submitted by States on actions they 
have taken for implementation with a view to making recommendations to the 
Council. They are also asked to examine the Secretary-General's progress 
reports on implementation and to make appropriate recommendations to the 
Council; 
3. Dealing with violations through consideration of information brought to their 
attention by States concerning violations; making periodic reports of such 
violations to the Council (identifying where possible persons or entities, 
including vessels, reported to be engaged in the violations) and recommending 
appropriate measures in response;559  
4. Approval of exceptions on application by States to the measures imposed by 
the Security Council, for example, on grounds of significant humanitarian 
need.560  
In monitoring and enforcing sanctions the UN has, as usual, been dependent on the 
co-operation of individual nation-states. Even if the Security Council receives a 
report that sanctions have been violated, the investigation is left to the country 
involved. Since national governments have little incentive to report violations which, 
if stopped, could hurt political or economical interests, the routine reply is that the 
matter has been fully investigated and that there is no foundation to the allegation of 
a violation of the sanctions.561  
In Iraq and Yugoslavia, however, a more active approach has been taken by putting 
in place a blockade to enforce compliance. This has been implemented by the WEU 
and NATO under UN authorization. In the case of Iraq, Security Council resolutions 
661 and 715 established an import/export monitoring regime, of which some of the 
items involved must be notified to, and permitted by either the Sanctions Committee 
or UNSCOM (see below) prior to import or export.562 The blockade of Iraq's coast 
has been accompanied by on-board inspections of passing ships and custom 
inspections at Iraq's harbours.  
                                                 
557 UN/ A/50/377, op. cit. point 180. 
558 South Africa – Security Council resolution 421 (1977); Libyan Arab Jamahiriya resolution 883 
(1993); Angola – resolution 864 (1993). 
559 Haiti – Security Council resolution 841 (1993); Angola – resolution 864 (1993). 
560 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – Security Council resolution 748 (1992); Iraq-Resolution 687 (1991); 
Haiti-Resolution 841 (1993). 
561 Political Symbol or Policy Tool? Making sanctions work, report of the 24th United Nations 
Issues Conference, Stanley Foundation, 1993, p. 20. 
562 See D. Englund, Lessons for Disarmament from the UNSCOM Experience, in: S. Mayaija and 
J.M. Beier (eds.), Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf Environment: Learning from the 
UNSCOM Experience, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York 1992. 
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It has been suggested that the UN role in assuring compliance might be reinforced by 
posting UN monitors at critical points along the borders of target countries, possibly 
following the model of the Sanction Assistance Missions (SAM) program of the 
CSCE, which has been used to enforce sanctions against Yugoslavia.563 Although 
there are obvious limits to the effectiveness of such measures, they can contribute to 
a certain extent in furthering compliance.  
Verification of the sanctions is costly and to date no satisfactory means of burden 
sharing has been devised. Problems have arisen in the assessment of the potential 
impact of sanctions on both the target country and third countries, in the monitoring 
of their application, in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups 
and in both the measurement of collateral damage and the evaluation of claims 
submitted under Article 50 of the Charter.564 The Secretary-General, in his position 
paper entitled “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”, has made a recommendation 
for the establishment of a mechanism for sanctions implementation.565  
5.5. Enforcing verification and compliance; the case of Iraq 
Having examined the regular verification functions of UN organs, the Iraq case 
offers a picture of the more extreme measures that can be adopted. At the end of the 
Gulf War the Security Council, invoking “a threat to international peace and 
security” under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted a binding cease fire resolution 
(Res. 687), part of which required Iraq to accept the verification, destruction and 
monitoring of its weapons of mass destruction. Included were Iraq's nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and its ballistic missiles with ranges of over 150 
kilometres.  
To carry out the regime, the IAEA was enlisted to deal mainly with Iraq's nuclear 
weapon program. A separate UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was set up in 
New York to take care of other aspects of the program, and to coordinate and 
supplement IAEA activities.  
In total, UNSCOM has inspected over 200 undeclared sites in the light of their 
potential for the storage of chemical and biological weapons. In the chemical field, 
Iraq has acknowledged the production or import of over 212,000 filled and unfilled 
chemical munitions, nearly 4,150 tons of agent and nearly 18,000 tons of precursor 
chemicals.566 In the biological field, in the face of mounting evidence that it was 
engaged in an advanced military biological programme, Iraq was due to hand over to 
UNSCOM a full account of its programme in early August 1995. 
                                                 
563 In this program, trained European custom officials have been dispatched to neighbouring 
countries and key transportation points to monitor compliance and act as a consulting resource 
for the local enforcement efforts. For a discussion on enforcing UN sanctions, see Political 
Symbol or Policy Tool? Making sanctions work, report of the 24th United Nations Issues 
Conference, Stanley Foundation, 1993.  
564 UN/ A/50/377, op. cit., point 186. 
565 A/50/60-S/1995/1, paras. 74-76. 
566 At the end of the Gulf conflict, Iraq had declared, as stocks remaining, over 500 tons of bulk 
agent, 28,000 munitions and some 4,000 tons of precursors. Those items which were judged 
safe to move were transported to a central location for destruction, while the remainder was 
destroyed on site by UNSCOM. In the field of ballistic missiles, UNSCOM inspection teams 
have supervised the destruction of 151 missiles, plus launchers and related equipment. UN/ 
A/50/377, op. cit., point 190. 
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UNSCOM has operated as an executive organ of the Security Council. An innovation 
in this already unique regime, is that a number of countries, particularly the U.S., 
also Britain, France and Russia, have passed to the Special Commission intelligence 
which has helped it in its site selection and in the actual conduct of inspections at 
particular sites. The IAEA has now agreed with certain reservations to use a 
somewhat analogous process to manage “special inspections” at non-declared sites in 
other countries that are member states of the NPT.567 
Together, these two unprecedented organisations have proved their ability to plan, 
organise and rapidly deploy a verification operation in the most difficult political 
circumstances, that of enforced, contested disarmament, and in the most difficult 
physical terrain and conditions. Not only were they able to conduct a thorough, 
systematic, on-site inspections and other in-country monitoring and verification 
activities, they also successfully dismantled or supervised dismantling of extensive 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, and other elements of WMD 
programmes in the chemical and biological fields. Both organisations were able to 
use information, including from national technical means and open sources, wisely 
and to great effect, as well as protecting confidentiality where necessary.568  
5.5.1 The UNSCOM verification regime in practice 
UNSCOM started its activities soon after resolution 687 had been adopted on 3 April 
1991. The 21 members of the Special Commission were chosen on the basis of their 
expertise and appointed in a personal capacity. There has been a preponderance of 
members from industrialized countries, mainly because of the expertise available. 
The organisation changed dramatically according to the needs of the day. Experts 
came and went on an ad-hoc basis for a few days or for a few months, working on 
special and multiple tasks and subjects. This extremely flexible approach was made 
possible by the fact that there was no established budget, no permanent positions and 
no salaries, most members being offered as contributions from their respective 
governments.  
The verification of Iraqi compliance entailed three phases, which do not have distinct 
dividing lines:  
1. Inspections to verify Iraqi declarations of proscribed equipment and material, 
and to ensure that this material is not held at undeclared sites.  
2. Destruction of the banned material or actions to render such material harmless  
3. Monitoring and verifying future compliance of Iraq in accordance with 
pertinent Security Council resolutions.  
Each inspection team averaged 20-25 members with a length of stay in Iraq varying 
from one to five weeks. Since resolution 687 had not been precise on the 
intrusiveness of inspections, detailed provisions were established in an agreement 
with Iraq which came into force on 14 May 1991. These include the right to 
unrestricted access to any site in Iraq, the right to request and retain data, information 
and documents and photographical evidence, the right to conduct interviews, install 
equipment, and to collect and export samples.  
                                                 
567 See section on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
568 T. Findlay, A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Mechanism? Regional Meeting, 
sponsored by the Japanese Government, with the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, Kyoto, Japan, 6 July 2004. 
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In identifying Iraq's weapon potential and the sites to inspect, declarations of the host 
country had to form the basis of action, even though distrust obviously prevailed 
from the outset.569 Declarations clearly had to be backed up by other methods. 
Initially, the inspections relied heavily on intelligence provided by individual 
countries, mostly imagery and analysis based on imagery. These sources proved to 
be indispensable for detecting Iraqi activities at non-declared sites, and also in 
persuading the Council to take action when Iraqi officials would obstruct UNSCOM 
inspections.570 As UNSCOM gained experience on the ground, it accumulated its 
own information and became more independent. It also greatly benefited from high-
altitude surveillance aircraft put at its disposal by the US government.571 Despite 
Iraqi protests, flights started on a regular basis in September of 1991, backed by the 
explicit wording of Council Resolution 707. The advantage of these operations was 
that, in contrast to imagery provided by governments, the aerial photographs 
resulting from the flights could be kept and analyzed by the Commission or used for 
reference and comparison. 
Cataloguing, sealing and destroying items were relatively simple activities, although 
Iraq managed to cause problems by deliberately re-interpreting what had been agreed 
upon previously to be reused or destroyed, thereby playing upon the discontinuity of 
UN personnel. Another problem was the unavoidable length of time between 
identification and destruction, which in the case of leaking chemical weapons could 
have dangerous consequences.572 
The final phase of the verification effort concerns long term monitoring and 
verification of Iraq's undertakings not to acquire, develop or use any of the prohibited 
items.573 The Special Commission and the IAEA elaborated plans for long term 
verification on the basis of resolution 715. These include extensive declarations by 
Iraq on activities undertaken in the relevant areas, limits on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, and the right to perform intrusive on-site inspections, anywhere, any 
time, and without notice. On 19 February 1992, Iraq committed itself only to 
providing the declarations, but failed to keep even that promise. It wasn't until July 
1993 that it committed itself to accept the long term monitoring provisions. This 
acceptance was a result of negotiations with UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus after the 
Iraqi's had obstructed placement of camera's and sealing of items at missile sites. 
As a result of UNSCOM operations, substantial parts of a clandestine nuclear-
weapons programme were unmasked, Iraq's huge chemical weapon arsenal was 
accounted for, and a programme for biological weapons was discovered and 
investigated.  
                                                 
569 One UNSCOM participant gave the organization the motto “Distrust and verify once, and 
distrust and verify again”. D. Englund, op. cit., 1992, p. 96. 
570 For example, US satellite imagery was shown at a closed session of the UN Security Council to 
prove that the Iraqi's were hiding equipment related to their nuclear weapon programme. P. 
Lewis, US Shows Photos to argue Iraq hides nuclear material, in: New York Times (27 June 
1991). 
571 See, for example, M. Krepon, Iraq inspections offer lessons to US, in: Defence News (7 
October 1991). 
572 D. Englund, op. cit., 1992, p. 97. 
573 The Director of the CIA has testified that Iraq would need only two years to get the nuclear 
program back into business. See D. Albright and M. Hibbs, Iraq's quest for the nuclear grail: 
what can we learn?, in: Arms Control Today (July/August 1992), p. 5. 
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However, many confrontations, delays and compromise solutions illustrate the 
constraints that even such a well-supported, intrusive operation must confront. The 
most difficult part proved to be the nuclear- and ballistic missile related items, both 
concerning extremely costly high tech equipment, which the Iraqi's have been eager 
to preserve.574 For example, in March 1992, after several warnings of the Security 
Council accompanied by threats of using military force from the US and the UK, Iraq 
finally communicated its readiness to destroy designated equipment, and declared 
certain items, which had been concealed. These kinds of confrontation are very time 
consuming and run the risk of eventually 'tiring out' the Council's political 
willingness to continue to press for full implementation of the resolutions. There 
have been many cases in which Iraq refused to provide information, or access to 
certain facilities. In some instances inspectors have been physically threatened. In 
serious crises only military threats from the Security Council or actual punitive 
military actions could make the Iraqi's comply. This often caused considerable delay, 
from which Iraq could benefit, and has often induced UNSCOM to favor negotiated 
compromises rather than to steer towards another confrontation.575 In his 1996 report 
to the UN Secretary General, Hans Blix declared that “All quantities of special 
nuclear material [highly enriched uranium or plutonium] found in Iraq have been 
removed and the industrial infrastructure, which Iraq had set up to produce and 
weaponize special nuclear material has been destroyed.” 
Consequently, UN resolution SCR 1284 in December 1999, sought to entice Iraqi 
compliance through the promise of lifting trade sanctions on civilian goods once 
cooperation with arms inspections was achieved. The United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created to put back 
UNSCOM.576  
While UNSCOM did have difficulties in its relationship with foreign intelligence 
agencies, UNMOVIC learned the correct lessons and avoided such difficulties. Both 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC successfully withstood the political pressures from the 
inspected state and from other countries that could have derailed or diverted their 
work. In short, both agencies demonstrated that the United Nations could organise an 
effective, efficient and suitably independent verification mechanism outside the 
structure of a specific treaty regime.577  
                                                 
574 T. Findlay and B. Mines, UNMOVIC in Iraq: opportunity lost, Verification Yearbook 2003, 
The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London 2003, pp. 45-
62; D. Albright and M. Hibbs, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 1991, pp. 14-23. 
575 In 1995 Iraq declare its offensive biological weapons program, in 1997 UN inspectors discover 
evidence of production completed on prohibited missiles in 1992. In 1997 Iraq declare an 
additional 187 pieces of specialty equipment used to produce deadly chemical agents. In 2003 
Iraq disclosing an additional 6,500 bombs with 1,000 tons of the blistering agent mustard gas. 
UNMOVIC’s Report, 6 March 2003 and Historic Review of UNMOVIC’s Report on 
Unresolved Disarmament Issues, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 10 
March 2003. 
576 UNMOVIC was to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with 
the latter’s mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological 
weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing 
monitoring and verification to check Iraq’s compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the 
same weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council. 
577 T. Findlay, op. cit. 
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5.5.2 Issues of contention and lessons 
The operation in Iraq must be seen against the background of special 
circumstances.578 It coincided with drastic changes in international politics (most 
notably the break-up of the Soviet Union) and came about after a US-led coalition 
under the authorization of the UN Security Council had defeated Iraq, in response to 
a clear-cut breach of the UN Charter – the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The regime was 
imposed on Iraq as part of the conditions for a cease-fire. Distrust prevailed from the 
outset, and it was apparent that the Iraqi authorities were determined to cheat and to 
obstruct UNSCOM's activities as much as possible. These attempts, however, met an 
unprecedented resolve of the UN Security Council and the military power of the US-
led coalition.  
In spite of the special circumstances, the experience of UNSCOM may have some 
conceptual and operational lessons579 regarding verification in general, and 
specifically for UN activities in this field.580  
The importance of political and military backing of verification efforts. UNSCOM 
had a strong mandate and unwavering support from the Security Council under 
strong leadership of the United States. In the face of a determined cheater like the 
Iraqi government, it was important that the Council continue to take appropriate 
measures to enforce compliance.  
But even in this case, it has been difficult to maintain a staunch position, and 
compromises had to be made (sometimes involving other parts of the UN regime, not 
directly dealing with the disarmament efforts). The Iraqi obstruction also has shown 
an interplay between political and technical processes. If the Council is to enforce its 
mandatory resolutions, it has to provide the political and if necessary military 
backing to enable the inspectors to do their work and in order to persuade political 
authorities to act, it is necessary to provide compelling evidence of non-cooperation 
and non-compliance.  
Use of imagery and aerial reconnaissance was decisive. For future operations, use of 
commercial satellites could avoid an excessive reliance on information from one 
                                                 
578 For a review of UNSCOM see S. Black, Verification under duress: the case of UNSCOM, in: 
T. Findlay (ed.), Verification Yearbook 2000, The Verification Research, Training and 
Information Centre (VERTIC), London 2000, pp. 115–129. R. Butler, Saddam Defiant: The 
Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of GlobalSecurity, London 2000. F.R. 
Cleminson, What happened to Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction?, in: Arms Control 
Today 33/7 (September 2003), available at www.armscontrol.org. 
579 The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM: An Interview With Ambassador Richard Butler, in: 
Arms Control Today 29/4 (June 1999), available at 
www.armscontrol.org/ACT/jun99/rbjun99.htm; S. Ritter, The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative 
Disarmament, in: Arms Control Today 30/5 (June 2000), pp. 8-14, available at 
www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm; Anticipating Inspections: UNMOVIC Readies 
Itself for Iraq: An Interview with Hans Blix, in: Arms Control Today 30/6 (July/August 2000), 
pp. 3-8, available at www.armscontrol.org/ACT/julaug00/blixjulaug.htm.  
580 For the 47th GA session in 1992, Canada put a lot of effort in getting a resolution adopted 
asking for a follow-up study on the UN role in verification, which among other things would 
have to focus on the experience of UNSCOM. The Canadians failed, because most states 
considered it too soon for another study, and Security Council members did not want the 
General Assembly to touch too much on the delicate UNSCOM issue. 
 
 161 
country (in this case the US) and create an indigenous capability for data gathering 
and analysis.581 
In face of a determined cheater, verification can only work to a limited extent. Even 
in the unique circumstances UNSCOM enjoyed (strong political backing, 
intelligence services at its disposal, sophisticated technical means, intrusive on-site 
inspections), it has proven extremely difficult to identify key parts of the weapon 
programmes.582 Some aspects of Iraq's nuclear programme are still not completely 
understood.583 
Economic incentives were not sufficient to induce cooperation. The 'carrot', which 
was supposed to encourage Iraq to comply was the promise to lift economic 
sanctions. Apparently, the sanctions did not hurt Iraq enough to have that effect. 584 
The U.N. imposed economic sanctions immediately after Saddam invaded Kuwait. 
Many observers believed that, given enough time, economic sanctions would bring 
Saddam to the bargaining table. Economic sanctions hurt Iraq, but not enough to be 
sufficient to force Saddam out of Kuwait. This analysis has proven correct. As 
economic sanctions have continued in force since 1990, and Saddam has not yet 
complied with the U.N. Security Council's resolutions, it is not likely that Saddam 
would have left Kuwait solely due to the economic sanctions.585  
The organizational culture. Since UNSCOM is a temporary ad hoc organization with 
a specific mandate to be completed within a certain time, there was a sense of 
urgency and common purpose among its highly motivated personnel. The 
organization was not hampered by history, organizational culture or ethos. It had no 
future, therefore little need for bureaucratic politics. While these were clear 
advantages, there were also some drawbacks in the scarcity of human expertise, and 
difficulties in planning and coordinating inspections. 
The cooperation between UNSCOM and the IAEA ran into some difficulties, but this 
was a relatively small price to pay for the advantage of combining IAEA experience 
with nuclear weapon expertise and intelligence information provided by UNSCOM. 
The IAEA conducted the inspections in the nuclear area, while UNSCOM was given 
a role of coordination and assistance, and made solely responsible for designation of 
additional inspection sites on the basis of supplied intelligence. The Security Council 
gave UNSCOM the overall responsibility, so that it could keep full control of 
decision-making. In this manner the involvement of the IAEA's General Conference 
                                                 
581 See A.V. Banner and A.G. McMullan, Commercial Satellite Imagery for UNSCOM, in: S. 
Mataija and J. M. Beier (eds.), op. cit., pp. 153-171.  
582 See, for example, D.D. Dorn, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: a case study, in: S. Mataija and 
J.M. Beier (eds.), op. cit., pp. 103-109. 
583 See inter alia the Statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the 37th session of its 
General Conference, 27 Sept 1993, p. 16, para 2. 
584 S. Danielson, Sanctions Hurt Iraqi People But They Do Not Weaken Saddam, 23 February 
2001. available at: www.brunchma.com/~acsumama/com/com022301.html. 
585 One advocate for continued military pressure short of armed conflict was Colin Powell, 
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, who advanced military containment with increased pressure 
on Iraq, but could not find any allies in the Bush administration. A major reason was that 
Powell admitted that it would take a longer time to force Iraq from Kuwait. Bush and others 
believed that their Coalition was fragile and could not be held together for prolonged period of 




and Board of Directors was avoided.586 In February 1992 an incident occurred when 
the IAEA performed an inspection on the basis of UNSCOM information that Iraq 
had built an underground reactor at a particular site. This information proved to be 
based on highly speculative material. After this inspection, the IAEA assumed a 
stronger role in assessing information587 for itself. On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director 
General Mohamad ElBaradei reported to the UN Security Council that “After three 
months of intrusive inspection, we have to date found no evidence or plausible 
indications of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.”588  
The Iraqi case could probably be best compared with the Armistice and Versailles 
treaty of 1918-1919, which imposed a regime for disarmament and arms control 
measures589 on Germany. In this case, the destruction of weapons was mainly carried 
out by the inspected state itself, and the regime was backed up by a credible military 
threat. The differences are more significant, though. The aim in Iraq was not 
complete disarmament, but only destroying the weapons of mass destruction 
potential. By leaving the conventional forces in place, Iraq's security in the region 
was maintained. To a considerable extent Iraq's sovereignty has been maintained, 
and its political leadership remained unchanged. Hopefully, the lessons learned from 
Germany's case and the benefit of modern technological means and Security Council 
authority. The best way to ensure this in the long term is probably a political 
settlement in the Middle Eastern region. 
The UNSCOM experience provides many lessons relevant to today's inspection 
process. Among the most important are the following:590 
Maintain the unity of the Security Council. Although Iraq never fully complied with 
the earlier resolutions of the Security Council, neither did it fully ignore them. As 
long as the Security Council remained united, Iraq reacted in a way that at least kept 
UNSCOM operational. When unity collapsed, Iraq ignored the Security Council.  
                                                 
586 See R. Ekeus, The Iraqi experience and the future of nuclear non-proliferation, in: Washington 
Quarterly (Autumn 1992), p. 71. In Security Council Resolutions the IAEA would not be 
addressed, but only its Director-General, so as to involve only IAEA's executive part and not 
its policy making organs.  
587 D. Albright and M. Hibbs, op. cit., p. 4.  
588 M. ElBaradei, Statement to the UN Security Council, March 7, 2003. 
589 See J. Molander, The United Nations and the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction: the implementation of a cease-fire condition, in: F. Tanner (ed.), From Versailles 
to Baghdad; post war armament control of defeated states, UNIDIR, 1992, pp. 154-155. 
590 The conclusions are summary of J. Krasno, and J. Sutterlin, The United Nations and Iraq: 
Defanging the Viper, Westport, CT 2003. Understanding the Lessons of Nuklear Inspections 
an Monitorung in Iraq. A Ten-Year Review, Sponsored by the Institute for Science and 
International Security 14-15 June 2001; Garry Dillon, former Leader, IAEA Action Team, 
Ephraim Asculai, Senior Research Fellow, ISIS, Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow, Disarming 
Iraq Problems and Prospects, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 December 
2002. To examine the problems and prospects of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), the United States Institute of Peace held a briefing for senior 
congressional staff on 20 November 2002. Panelists James Sutterlin, Yale University lecturer 
and co-author (with Jean Krasno) of Defanging the Viper: The United Nations and Iraq (an 
Institute-funded book on the UNSCOM experience); David Kay, Potomac Institute senior 
fellow and former UN chief nuclear weapons inspector; and Jonathan Tucker, Institute senior 
fellow and former member of UNSCOM, provided their perspectives and engaged in a wider 
discussion of the issues. 
 
 163 
Maintain the credibility and relative independence of the inspection process. 
UNMOVIC's leadership must be credible and retain the confidence of the Security 
Council, especially the five permanent members. The first executive chairman of 
UNSCOM was able to do this, the second was not.591  
On-site inspections are critical. UNSCOM demonstrated that there is no substitute 
for on-site inspections keyed by timely and accurate intelligence in generating the 
critical information necessary to determine compliance. Information provided by 
defectors and informants was often invaluable in uncovering hidden weapons 
programs.  
Maintain a credible military threat for non-compliance. Inspections backed by a 
credible threat to use force to ensure compliance are essential, according to Kay. But, 
as Sutterlin argued, “Resort to a limited use of force is likely to be 
counterproductive. In fact, American and British bombings attempting to force 
Saddam Hussein to cooperate with inspectors had the opposite effect. They gave him 
an excuse to stop all cooperation without fear of a full-scale attack and at the same 
time weakened support in the Security Council for UNSCOM.”  
The capability and experience garnered by UNMOVIC still of course exists pending 
a decision by the Security Council about the organisation’s future. Leaving aside the 
question of whether UNMOVIC will ever be permitted to complete its mission in a 
sovereign Iraq, it would seem that the international community would be unwise to 
simply let UNMOVIC be abolished or to waste away. Having invested an enormous 
amount of effort and funding in the organisation, a way should be found to preserve 
and nurture its capacities, both human and material, and its institutional memory.592 
The international community should overcome its fragile consensus593 and use the 
occasion to encourage and provide support to regional countries interested in 
establishing Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zones (WMDFZ), such as the zone 
that has been proposed in the Middle East. The regional approach, which has gained 
favour in recent years, suggests that whenever possible, regional organizations can 
join with international organizations, such as the IAEA, to ensure the application of 
the obligations of the international non-proliferation regimes. This could lead to 
more effective in integrating the countries of the region in bearing responsibility for 
overseeing the fulfillment of the regional states' international obligations. 
                                                 
591 Hans Blix, the executive chairman of UNMOVIC, must spend a great deal of time and energy 
personally briefing the Security Council. At the same time, UNSCOM's effectiveness derived 
to a large extent from remaining relatively independent of the UN Secretariat, allowing it to 
maintain the necessary freedom for highly intrusive action the respect of the Iraqi leadership, 
and to obtain and process the sensitive intelligence that the success of the operation depended 
upon. See the discussion idem. 
592 T. Findlay, op. cit. 
593 Fragile Consensus of the Security Council. While the UN Security Council voted unanimously 
in favor of inspections, there are nevertheless significant divisions among its members, not 
least the permanent representatives, on the threat posed by Iraq; the inspections process could 
expose these divisions and thereby undermine its unity.  
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5.6. Prospects and proposals: United Nation Verification Agency for 
Peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building 
It has been suggested that the UN Security Council act more often on proliferation 
issues, or as a last resort to make states comply to treaty obligations.594 Yet, it seems 
doubtful that the Council will be able to gain consensus on such action.595 The Iraqi 
case is rather unique; most situations are less clear cut. The failure of North Korea to 
comply with the NPT has been a test-case in this regard. The Security Council has 
reacted very cautiously, as it wanted to avoid provoking a veto from China, which 
has preferred to take a non-confrontational approach toward North-Korea. In July 
1993 the US concluded an agreement with North Korea, in which the latter would 
accept IAEA inspections. Under the terms of a subsequent Security Council 
resolution, the IAEA Director-General is required to report back to the Council on 
compliance. This resolution could pave the way for Security Council action in the 
case of non-compliance, but that is mainly dependent on China's position. In fact, 
most Council members might want to avoid punitive action, when a cooperative 
approach possibly including an agreement with South-Korea can in the long term 
provide better chances. However, if UN mandatory inspections (not necessarily in 
the framework of sanctions or military action) would be undertaken in the future, the 
experience of UNSCOM offers a wealth of expertise and infrastructure.  
Another issue related to the future role of the United Nations in verification, is the 
lack of coordination of diverse international efforts on non-proliferation. Several 
proposals have been made ranging from establishing a UN 'umbrella' verification 
organization to a UN function as 'clearing house' for information. The latter option 
seems to be the most realistic one, and several UN activities in data exchanges 
already point in that direction. In addition, some distribution of roles may emerge 
between the UN and regional organizations, most notably the CSCE and NATO.  
In addition, arms control and verification must be placed in the wider framework of 
UN activities as described in table 9 with respect to preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping596 and post-conflict peace-building.597 More attention 
should be paid to the disarmament dimension of peace and security and the 
operations aspect of peace-building including, inter alia, the verification of overall 
mission objectives, including supervising, monitoring and verifying the withdrawal 
of foreign forces and their non-return; monitoring the cessation of outside military 
assistance to parties; locating and confiscating weapons and military supplies; 
supervising the regrouping and relocation of military forces to designated 
cantonment areas and verifying the process of demobilization, arms limitation and 
arms reduction. The United Nations may, upon request, provide such monitoring and 
could assist the parties involved in their monitoring activities in other instances. The 
United Nations should better prepare itself for its increasing, and increasingly 
complex, verification tasks in peace operations by exploring how it might better 
                                                 
594 See, for example, R. Ekeus, op. cit., p. 73. 
595 See, for example, T.R. Pickering, in: Arms Control Today (June 1992), p. 9.  
596 Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through 
peaceful means.  
597 See the report by the UN Secretary General B. Boutros-Ghali, New dimensions of arms 
regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era, op. cit., and his report An Agenda for 
Peace, New York 1992.  
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standardize its verification procedures, including the development of a range of 
verification “protocols” outlining the verification methods applicable to particular 
objectives.598  
Verification and monitoring in peace operation remains a neglected backwater of 
study in the peace operations field. Trevor Findlay, in the recent publication of 
VERTIC on Peace operations and the military dimensions of verification599 explain 
the differences between the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements 
on the one hand and of peace agreements on the other. 
The verification of peace agreements is usually less well defined and less well 
organised than is the case with arms control agreements. Particularly in the case of 
arms control agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruction, where even 
minor breaches can have enormous strategic and political implications, verification 
systems are minutely negotiated and highly organised. In peace agreements there is 
almost an expectation of imperfection, since it is recognised that during the winding 
down of armed conflict there is often a period of prolonged uncertainty before the 
situation settles down. Minor infractions are often overlooked on the grounds that 
they may not necessarily presage the emergence of more significant challenges to an 
agreement and that to overreact to them might jeopardise the continuing peace 
process. In the implementation of peace agreements there is often an expectation that 
monitoring and verification activities will not be prolonged and that therefore they 
can be makeshift and hence easily terminated. In arms control it is at least implicitly 
recognised that monitoring may be required in perpetuity. More robust systems 
therefore tend to be instituted.600 
Table 8: Selected UN activities in peace related verification missions601 
UN peace operation Mandate source for verification 
(including military tasks) 
Measures  
UN-Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group (UNIMOG) 
1989-91 
Security Council resolution  
Verify and supervise ceasefire and 
troop withdrawal 
No special measure 
UN Angola Verification Mission I 
(UNAVEM I) 
1989-91 
Security Council resolution Verify 
redeployment and withdrawal of 
Cuban troops 
Military observers (Milobs) teams 
for ad hoc inspections; joint 
Commission for liaisons and 
coordination. 
UN Angola Verification Mission 
II (UNAVEM II) 1991-93 
Security Council resolution 
Verify compliance with peace 
accords 
Verify that the parties are 
adequately monitoring ceasefire 
Milobs: observation posts, patrols; 
Joint Political Military Commission 
and subsidiary committees. 
                                                 
598 UN/ A/50/377, op. cit. point 279. 
599 T. Findlay, Peace operations and the military dimensions of verification, Verification 
Yearbook 2001, The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), 
pp. 160-172. 
600 Idem, p. 161. 
601 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, third edition, New York 1996; United Nations, The United 
Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, UN Department of Public Information, New York 1995; 
United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, UN Department of Public 
Information, New York 1996; United Nations, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait 
Conflict, 1990-1996, UN Department of Public Information, New York 1996; United Nations, 
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Managing Arms in Peace Processes Series, 
Geneva 1995 (all volumes). 
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UN peace operation Mandate source for verification 
(including military tasks) 
Measures  
UN Observer Group in Central 
America (ONUSAL) 
1989-92. 
Security Council resolution 
Monitor verification with 
agreement to end the civil war in El 
Salvador includes verification of 
ceasefire, separation of forces and 
changes in armed forces 
Milobs and verify weapons 
inventories. 
UN Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 
1991-present 
Security Council resolution 
Monitor ceasefire, verify reduction 
of troops and confinement of 
certain troops to specified locations. 
Milobs with short-notice 
inspections. 
UN Angola Verification Mission 
III (UNAVEM III) 
1995-97 
Security Council resolution 
Lusaka protocol and Accords de 
Paz 
Monitor and verify cease-fire, 
assembly of troops and 
demobilisation, disarmament, 
formation of new armed forces 
Milobs and Joint Commission 
framework 
Implementation Force (IFOR), 
1996 Stabilisation-Force (SFOR) 
1996-present 
Dayton Agreement and Security 
Council resolutions 
Verify compliance with ceasefire; 
withdrawal of forces from zone of 
separation; collection of heavy 
weapons; demobilisation, various 
arms control and confidence-
building measures 
NATO and UN member troops; 
notifications and inspectors; Joint 
Military Commission with IFOR as 
chair. 
In the new international context, exacerbated ethnic, religious, linguistic or other 
group interests represent sources of tension leading, when they take the form, inter 
alia, of aggressive nationalism or aggressive separatism, to open armed confrontation 
in an intra-State context. Peacekeeping was pioneered by the United Nations (UN) in 
May 1948, with the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization during 
the first Arab-Israeli war.602 The maintenance or restoration of peace, is one of the 
central tenets, in fact even the raison d'etre,603 for the existence of the UN, and this is 
reflected in the Preamble to the UN Charter, which states unequivocally, that the 
“peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war”.  
As table 9 demonstrates, United Nations as a neutral third party could be valuable for 
restoring confidence between the parties involved. United Nation could play the role 
of fact-finding missions and related activities to, inter alia, ascertain the accuracy of 
declarations respecting the nature, deployments or activities of military forces. Such 
measures, however, can make meaningful contributions to peacemaking only to the 
degree that they are credible; that is, they must be seen to address the concerns of the 
parties and they must be effectively implemented and these measures have to be 
undertaken from the very beginning of the crisis. 
United Nation verification activities can be an essential ingredient in this process if it 
is able to provide credible evidence about compliance with obligations that are 
assumed during the peacemaking process or timely evidence of non-compliance so 
that breaches can be satisfactorily addressed. 
                                                 
602 Basic Facts about the United Nations. UN Dept of Public Information 1998. 
603 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Avaible at www.un.org/Dept/dpko 
Accessed 15 Nov 2000. The panel described the UN's principal mission as helping 
communities engulfed in strife and maintaining or restoring peace. 
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These suggests to the reform of U.N. peacekeeping in an effort to strengthen the 
verification regimes and build new ones to support the peacekeeping effort. These 
should include among others a Satellite Monitoring Agency to augment the 
capabilities of the verification agency to monitor undeclared weapons facilities and 
assist in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and confidence-building measures and 
economic sanctions.604  
Efforts to limit arms proliferation can only be effective on a twin track with political 
solutions and security guarantees. It is also in this context that the spreading use of 
verification in such fields as peacekeeping and elections must be seen. 
Legal procedures to facilitate the collection and destruction of small arms and light 
weapons have gained considerable importance for peace agreements and mandates of 
peacekeeping missions. Specific and adequate measures for the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants are essential for the success of 
efforts to secure reconciliation and stable peace building.605  
6. Export Controls 
The notion of export controls was born at the beginning of the cold war with the aim 
of controlling all exports of sensitive items and technologies that could not only be 
diverted to military use but could also contribute to a potential enemy's capability.606  
Export controls are an aspect of arms control that is characterized, not so much by 
one particular verification regime, but by a propensity to layer various negotiating 
frameworks and verification systems. The network of monitoring systems reflects the 
perception of national interest in maintaining sovereignty over all aspects of trade 
activities, particularly those of sensitive military items, and an increasing proclivity 
to strengthen regimes through mutually-reinforcing layers.607 
The effort to limit the transfer of militarily sensitive technology has been dominated 
by political circumstances and objectives, as well as national economic goals, and 
only recently have certain states begun to recognize a common interest in limiting the 
spread of this technology. Perceptions of national interests have long discouraged 
individual states from delegating their authority over export controls to any 
multilateral or supranational organizations, and have led to disputes over 
interpretation of those multilateral agreements that have been implemented. 
However, the end of Cold War confrontation and the demonstration by the Gulf War 
of the dangers of proliferating weapon technology have opened the way for the 
                                                 
604 UN/ A/50/377, op. cit., point 280. 
605 As stated in Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999), the excessive accumulation and 
destabilising effect of small arms and light weapons pose a considerable impediment to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and have a potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts, 
endanger the lives of civilians and undermine security and the confidence required for a return 
to peace and stability. Hence clear and detailed arrangements for the destruction of surplus 
arms and ammunitions are to be worked out, often under high time pressure.  
606 See R. Cupitt, Reluctant Champions: U.S. Presidential Policy and Strategic Export Controls, 
Truman, Eisenhower, Bush and Clinton, New York 2000. G. Bertsch and M. Beck, 
Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global Evaluation, Athens 2000. D.A. Hicks, Final 
Report of the Defence Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Washington, 
DC December 1999.  
607 See US Export Control Act 1949. 
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addition of common perspectives and efforts that should match the globalization of 
trade forces with globalized means of control and verification. 
Today one can identify three different frameworks for the implementation, including 
verification, of export controls – national, multilateral, and regional. It is important to 
note, however, that the framework that actually ensures the implementation of export 
controls may not be identical with the framework within which the principles behind 
the controls are agreed. The following discussion illustrates, that common precepts 
are often established within an organization of states, and implemented but the states 
themselves.608  
6.1. National Controls 
Within the “national framework” of implementation and verification individual states 
are responsible for all aspects of applying restrictions on trade. A nationally 
implemented export control system may also be conceived at the national level, as 
was the American MacMahon Act of 1946, which restricted the transfer of nuclear 
technology to any other nation. However, one also finds multilateral agreements on 
the principles of limiting technology transfers within which each individual state 
remains singly responsible for the implementation and maintenance of these controls. 
Today's various systems of national responsibility for export controls date from the 
beginning of the Cold War when they were directed primarily at preventing the 
export of items that would add to the military and economic capabilities of the Soviet 
Union, its satellite states, and the PRC. 
6.2. Multilateral Controls  
The Multilateral Control system (CoCom) was set up in 1949 to coordinate export 
controls among NATO allies on an item list designed by the US Administration and 
agreed unanimously by CoCom members.609 CoCom remains an unofficial, non-
treaty, coordinating organization for NATO allies'610 nationally based trade 
restrictions. Verification remained the responsibility of national customs and 
commercial licensing officials, often of several different agencies within a single 
government. By the late 1960s, however, dissatisfaction among American allies as 
well as American industries led to a reconsideration of the strict item lists. More 
limited aims of preserving Western superiority in defense-related technologies 
replaced the practice of full-scale “economic warfare”.  
National responsibility for enforcing the agreed export controls led to debate over 
varying degrees of lenience in interpreting and monitoring controls, notably in the 
1980s as the weight of restrictions became a drag on participants' economies.611 In 
1984, a program of Third Country Cooperation was initiated with the aim of 
broadening CoCom membership and effectiveness, but “Few CoCom members have 
actively pursued such agreements; the agreements negotiated do not systematically 
                                                 
608 See C. Ahlström, Status of Multilateral Export Control Regimes, An Examination of Legal and 
Non-legal Agreements in International Co-operation, September 2000. 
609 Three separate lists actually exist: The International Munitions List, the International Atomic 
Energy List, and the Industrial List, which covers all other dual-use products and technologies. 
610 Not including Iceland. 
611 In 1987, the DOC found that nearly 90% of license applications were for transactions between 
allies and the direct costs of the system to the US economy were estimated at $7 to 10 billion. 
See, Balancing the National Interest, p. 21. 
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cover all goods controlled by CoCom; and the cooperating countries exhibit uneven 
will in implementation and enforcement”.612 A 1987 Department of Commerce study 
showed that US industry suffered proportionally more from the system than its 
partners due to a more rigorous and complex system of controls, licensing and 
enforcement.613 Whereas CoCom controls generally cover only export and import of 
restricted items, the US exercises unilateral controls on the re-export of any US items 
to third countries, on American-owned transnational companies and on foreign 
products that have any components or technologies of American origin.614  
The revolutionary events of the late 1980's and early 1990's and the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact against which CoCom restrictions were directed, led to a re-evaluation 
of the political justification and target of export controls. By May 1991, the CoCom 
list was reduced by over half of its items – the majority from the categories of 
telecommunications equipment, computers, and machine tools – A policy of 
“favorable consideration” was announced for licenses to most Eastern European 
destinations, and a “license-free zone” was created within CoCom. Where 
technology transfers to the Eastern bloc were once limited in order to weaken their 
military potential, critics of export controls now assert the benefits of increased 
technology transfers to central Europe in an effort to foster market reforms and 
democracy.615  
Consequently, demand has also grown for effective verification of the peaceful use 
of this technology. Contract-based arrangements have permitted end-use guarantees 
and on-site monitoring by officials of the supplying country.616 Such efforts to 
reduce absolute prohibitions on the transfer of technology in favour of strengthening 
control “raise difficult questions of safeguards, verification and limits to intrusions in 
national sovereignty that can be expected in a technologically interdependent 
world”.617 
Accordingly, on the 16th of November 1993, in The Hague, at a High Level Meeting 
(HLM), representatives of the 17 COCOM member states agreed to terminate 
COCOM, and establish a new multilateral arrangement, temporarily known as the 
“New Forum”, which led to Wassenaar Arrangement. Created in 1994 and governs 
international transfers of conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and 
technologies, it received final approval by 33 co-founding countries618 in July 1996 
                                                 
612 National Academies of Science and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, Finding 
Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment, National Academies 
Press, 1991, p. 176. 
613 National Academies of Science and Engineering, Balancing the National Interest, Washington 
1987, p. 21. 
614 National Academy of Science and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, opt. cit., 1991, 
p. 167. 
615 W.J. Long, Proliferating Problems: An Assessment of US Efforts to Manage Strategic 
Technology in the 1990s, p. 3. 
616 For example, Control Data Corporation's export of six CYBER 960 mainframe computers was 
permitted to a civilian nuclear power program in the former USSR on the condition that US 
officials could perform on-site inspections to guarantee the peaceful use of the technology. 
617 W.J. Long, op. cit., p. 4. 
618 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
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and began operations in September 1996. Its purpose is to contribute to international 
security and stability by promoting greater responsibility and transparency in 
transfers of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. Unlike its 
predecessor, the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM), which was created to restrict exports to the former Eastern bloc, 
Wassenaar is not targeted at any region or group of states,619 but rather at “states of 
concern” to members. Wassenaar members620 also lack veto authority over other 
members' proposed exports, a power that COCOM members exercised. 
At their last plenary meeting in December 2001, Wassenaar members agreed for the 
first time to amend the arrangement's July 1996 founding document, the Initial 
Elements. The members added a paragraph to the Initial Elements calling on 
members to continue to prevent terrorist groups and individuals from acquiring 
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Members also agreed at the 
plenary to voluntarily report on exports of bridge-launching vehicles and gun-carriers 
designed specifically for towing artillery. Meeting in Vienna December 11-12, the 
33-member Wassenaar Arrangement approved a document setting out nonbinding 
guidelines for exporting small arms and light weapons but failed to agree on other 
initiatives largely due to Russian opposition.621 
The Australia Group (AG) is another informal export control group. The OECD 
countries came together in the Australia Group in 1984 to cooperate in tightening 
export controls on substances that can be used to fabricate chemical arms. Australia 
Group was established in 1985 as a response to the use of chemical weapons in the 
Iran-Iraq War, and the MTCR was established in 1987 in response to missile 
developments in the 1970s and 1980s. Established in 1985, the Australia Group is a 
voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which 33 countries, as well 
as the European Commission, coordinate their national export controls to limit the 
supply of chemicals and biological agents-as well as related equipment, technologies, 
and knowledge-to countries and non-state entities suspected of pursuing chemical or 
biological weapons (CBW) capabilities.622 All countries are members of the 1997 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) and have stated that they view the Australia Group as a practical 
                                                                                                                                          
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. 
619 See A G-7 Embargo on Iran?, in: Mednews (19 April 1993); E. Sciolino, U.S. Asks Europe to 
Ban Arms-Linked Sales to Iran, in: New York Times (10 June 1993); K. Katzman, Iran: U.S. 
Policy and Options, in: Congressional Research Service Report 97/231 F (11 February 1997), 
p. 8. See S. Coll, Technology From West Floods Iran, in: Washinton Post, (10 November 
1992); L. Helm, Japan Reluctant to Back Embargo on Iran; Tokyo Distances Itself From Policy 
on Exports to Tehran, in: Los Angeles Times (13 November 1992). 
620 Wassenaar members agreed that all information exchanges, notifications, and Wassenaar 
discussions be kept confidential. 
621 W. Boese, Wassenaar Members Adopt Small Arms Initiative, in: Arms Control Today 
(January/February 2003). 
622 The 33 states participating in the Australia Group are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Commission also participates. Several 
other countries, including Russia, Ukraine, India, and China, have national export controls for 
some, but not all, of the items on the group's lists. 
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way to uphold the core purpose of these accords: preventing the spread of chemical 
and biological weapons, and informal agreement among a group of states with a 
common aim of limiting the transfer of chemical weapons materials and technology. 
This informal grouping performs two functions.  
First, together they agree on lists of products and materials to which export controls 
will apply. 
The Core List is comprised of production equipment and precursors to chemical 
arms, to which, according to a May 1991 agreement, export controls should be 
applied when transferred to a country outside the Australia Group.  
The Warning List describes fifty dual-use products, which should be monitored 
within national industries so that a suspect flow of these materials to any state that 
might try to develop chemical arms will trigger further investigation.  
Second, the 21 states exchange information623 regarding trade in chemical 
substances, with the aim of preventing the illegal construction or transfer of chemical 
arms and components. A similar organization, known as the Leipzig group existed 
among Warsaw Pact states prior to its dissolution but its members have since adopted 
the AG guidelines. However, no formal multilateral organization has been created, 
and states retain full responsibility for drawing conclusions from the exchanged 
information and for the implementation of agreed restrictions. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of these controls has not been consistent between 
states, many of which have been slow to put the agreed guidelines into practice. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention signed in January 1993 significantly tightens 
restrictions on chemical weapons components and dual-use chemicals by providing 
detailed lists of suspect substances,624 but it does not dismantle individual state 
mechanisms in favour of a multilateral group, as several developing states had 
suggested.625  
Developing countries have also questioned the Australia Group's relationship to the 
CWC and BWC. Countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for instance, 
have repeatedly asserted that they already made legally binding commitments not to 
acquire CBW by signing the biological and chemical weapons conventions626, and 
that the Australia Group is at odds with the BWC provision for the “fullest possible 
technical exchange” for the advancement of peaceful scientific endeavours. 
Participants of the Australia Group, however, maintain that the group complements 
CWC and the BWC and serves the same goals. A U.S. State Department official 
                                                 
623 Since 1985 the 21 adherents have met at the Australian Embassy in Paris, once every six 
months to exchange intelligence on chemical weapons proliferation and coordinate common 
controls. 
624 Article I of the CWC requires States Parties to the Convention to refrain from actions which 
would assist others to acquire chemical weapons. Article VI requires States Parties to ensure 
that the transfer of toxic chemicals does not take place for purposes prohibited by the 
Convention, and Parts VI, VII and VIII of the Annex on Implementation and Verification 
impose specific restrictions on the trade in chemicals listed in the Schedules to the Convention.  
625 The developing countries consider that the CWC has its own set of trade controls in Article VI 
and there is no need to maintaining of an export control regime outside the CWC. The 
developing countries consider AG as undermining the right to economic and technological 
development.  
626 Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, The Australia Group at a Glance, September 2003. 
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explained that “the Australia Group offers another layer of control, but one-in the 
U.S.'s view-that is consistent with the U.S.'s obligations under the chemical and 
biological weapons treaties”.627 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)628 represents a more 
contemporary export control system involving multilaterally agreed principles, but it 
too rests on the principle of national controls. Established by the US Departments of 
State and Commerce in 1987 to handle export controls on goods and technology that 
could be used to produce missiles with payloads of more than 500 kilograms and 
ranges greater than 300 kilometres, MTCR multilateral cooperation involves an 
agreement to respect the export denials of other participants and to share national 
intelligence findings on “projects of concern”.  
The Multilateral agreement is a critical element, but actual controls remain the 
responsibility of national authorities in member states. Individual states thus retain 
full sovereignty over their transactions. All transfers are considered on a case-by case 
basis and guidelines are implemented through national legislation by state agencies 
and customs authorities. The decision to allow any export remains the sole and 
sovereign judgment of the individual government and that government is responsible 
for ensuring the peaceful end use of the item.629  
The advantage of such a system is that it surmounts the need for difficult, if not 
impossible, negotiation of detailed lists of forbidden transactions, while still 
committing individual members to the principles of controlling arms trade. Each 
nation is left to interpret common principles and policy in the manner it deems 
appropriate. The regime's membership is not limited to that of any specific 
organization. Still adhesion to the MTCR has grown in recent years630 although it 
does not include all key suppliers, and even some non-members, most importantly 
China, have agreed to abide by its guidelines.  
However, several serious criticisms can be leveled against the MTCR's dependence 
on national implementation.631 
                                                 
627 Quoted in L.R. Ember, Stemming the Tide, in: Chemical and Engineering News (15 July 2002), 
p. 8. 
628 MTCR members, followed by the year they joined the regime, are: Argentina (1993), Australia 
(1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Canada (1987), the Czech Republic 
(1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), 
Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg 
(1990), the Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal 
(1992), Russia (1995), South Africa (1995), South Korea (2001) Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), 
Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), the United Kingdom (1987), and the 
United States (1987). 
629 See K, Bailey, Can Missile Proliferation Be Reversed, in: Orbis. A journal of world affairs 
(Winter 1991), p. 9. 
630 Several European states, Warsaw Pact members and Australia have all joined the MTCR. 
631 See Anthony et al, Multilateral weapon-related export control measures, SIPRI Yearbook 
1997. See also I. Anthony et al, Multilateral weapon-related export control measures, SIPRI 
Yearbook 1995, especially pp. 622-630 and A. Butfoy, Common Security and Strategic 
Reform: A Critical Analysis, London 1997, Chapter 5; D. Mistry, Ballistic Missile 




First, national controls differ widely between national legislations, thus offering a 
comparative commercial advantage to those states that have less stringent controls. 
An unfortunate consequence is the trend for all partners to adopt the position of the 
“least common denominator” or least comprehensive implementation of the agreed 
principles, in order to maintain commercial competition. In 1993 already, differences 
between the American and Chinese interpretations of the controls threatened the 
regime's fragile consensus on principles of non-proliferation. 
Second, licensing procedures for national controls are laborious and bureaucratic. 
Detailed procedures add costs to relevant exporting industries – again bestowing a 
commercial disadvantage on states with strict procedures and lowering incentives to 
abide by the rules. Meanwhile “customs controls and licensing authorities are all 
under the control of governments, which can override stated policy in the interest of 
making money”632 and can easily adapt transaction reports so that technical 
requirements are filled without any real check on intended uses.  
Third, the secrecy that surrounds the “projects of concern”, based on national 
intelligence sources, establishes an image of the regime that determines the attitude 
of non-regime countries toward cooperation. This makes it “difficult to engage the 
cooperation of other countries and industry when neither the rationale for controls 
nor the targets can be identified”.633 This factor is particularly significant given the 
emergence of a robust black market for technology in the Third World and interstate 
cooperation for ballistic missile development. Especially in the aftermath of the 
September 11th , the U.S. has been working to strengthen the AG to address better 
chemical and biological weapon proliferation and terrorism.634  
Lastly, the increasing internationalization of arms production has posed considerable 
challenges to nationally administered arms transfer controls. This in itself is the 
result of two phenomena:  
The first is the multiplying number of suppliers as states once dependent on the Big 
Five weapons producers are now investing in indigenous arms production and 
looking for markets to support these efforts. 
The second trend is the proliferation of dual-use technology in a growing number of 
consumer industries. This technology, while potentially useful to weapons 
development programs is much harder to control without inflicting heavy burden on 
non-military trade. 
Both phenomena imply a larger number of actors that should be considered for any 
effective verification of export control principles to be really effective. 
6.3. Global controls 
The globalization of trade in dual use technology and spread of arms production has 
generated support for a global “layer” of export control implementation. At a 
political level, this multilateral cooperation, even during the Cold War years, 
                                                 
632 P. Lewis, How can controls be effectively and efficiently verified and enforced?, in: 
International Control of the Arms Trade, Oxford Research Group, Current Decisions Report, 
Number 8, April 1992, p. 52. 
633 Finding Common Ground, p. 134. 
634 See, J. Schlosser, Director, Office of Export Controls and Sanctions Bureau of 
Nonproliferation, Department of State, Multilateral Nonproliferation Treaties and Regimes, 
Transshipment Enforcement Conference, Barcelona, Spain, 20 May 2002.  
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contributed to international nonproliferation norms, reduced the quantity of sensitive 
equipment, services and technology on the market and helped strengthen nuclear 
export guidelines.635 Meanwhile, as Herbert Wulf describes it, multilateral 
cooperation is capable of confronting practical realities of world trade. 
“Multilateralism in arms transfer control appears to be of particular importance to 
prevent possibilities for companies to transfer equipment or parts of weapon systems 
internationally by moving it internally within the company. National legislation no 
longer seems adequate”.636 The precedent for globally organized controls has already 
been set in the control on nuclear and biological weapons.637 
The earliest existing model for such controls are those organizations that have been 
established to restrict the uses of nuclear technology to non-military ends. The first 
of these, the Zangger Committee, was formed in 1974 by agreement among certain 
exporting parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Treaty itself is the 
principle mechanism for the control of nuclear and dual-use items, and although it 
does not specifically obligate its participants to establish and execute broad export 
controls, the commitment is implicit within the Treaty responsibilities.638 The 
Zangger Committee thus formalized NPT party responsibilities by agreeing on a 
“trigger list” of exports “especially designed or prepared” for nuclear use and thus 
requiring the acceptance of IAEA safeguards and a promise of “no explosive use”. 
Common understandings of prohibited exports have been established within the 
Committee to eliminate differing interpretations that might offer commercial 
advantages to a party. 
The Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), also called the “London Club” was 
established in 1978 in order to expand the membership and content of the nuclear 
technology export control regime in the aftermath of 1974 Indian nuclear test. The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975 after India – a nonnuclear weapons 
state – tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974 and was strengthened after the 1991 
Gulf War and revelations of Iraq’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. 
Because this group was not directly affiliated with the NPT, France639 was willing to 
participate, and the list of controls and restraints was more comprehensive than the 
Zangger Committee's NPT-based list. In addition to the Zangger list requirements, 
the NSG requires exporters to ensure that exports are not used to make nuclear 
explosives of any kind, to provide adequate physical protection to all exports, and to 
exercise restraint in the export of sensitive technologies.640 At a 1992 meeting in 
                                                 
635 W.C. Potter, New Nuclear Suppliers, in: Orbis. A journal of world affairs (Spring 1992), 
p. 206 f. See also W.C. Potter, Nuclear Proliferation: US-Soviet Cooperation, in: The 
Washington Quarterly (Winter 1985), pp. 141-154. 
636 H. Wulf, How will limitations impact on the defence industry, and how could their concerns be 
addressed?, in: International Control of the Arms Trade, Current Decisions Report, Number 8, 
April 1992, pp. 21-22. 
637 Through provisions of the 1968 NPT and 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons. 
638 Articles I and II pledge all parties not to “directly or indirectly” transfer any nuclear explosive 
devices and not to “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire” these prohibited nuclear capabilities. 
639 France had not yet joined the NPT, but under the presidency of President Giscard d'Estaing 
was willing to paricipate in other non-proliferation efforts.  
640 Including reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production technologies. 
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Warsaw, by which time the NSG comprised 27 supplier states, these countries agreed 
on common export controls for a list of 65 dual use technologies and undertook not 
to transfer nuclear facilities, equipment, material, or technology to non-nuclear 
weapons states without full-scope IAEA safeguards.641  
The NSG Guidelines include a number of important conditions to control the export 
of nuclear-related items. For export of items on the NSG Trigger List, the NSG 
Guidelines currently require (1) an agreement between the IAEA and the recipient 
state requiring the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials in its nuclear 
activities (also known as “full-scope IAEA safeguards”) – not just on the exported 
items, (2) physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred materials and 
facilities, and (3) restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and 
materials that could contribute to the acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched 
uranium. 
The United Nations Arms Register represents a further step in the globalization of 
export control measures. This register is based on the idea that increased 
transparency of arms trade will deter illicit transfers by encouraging all states to 
monitor more closely the activities642 on their territory and by “encouraging a more 
explicit customer-supplier relationship”643 It will also provide an agreed database on 
which future efforts and organizations could be built. As a means of verification, the 
Register offers two particular assets.  
The Register includes all procurement, not just exports. Although declarations are 
purely voluntary for all UN members, a greater source of information and an 
organized system of processing it offer greater opportunities to notice illicit 
transactions or suspicious procurement patterns. This is an important resource for 
Member States, but also for the various UN organs or other international 
organizations that could employ the collected data in verification of existing and 
future arms control and peacekeeping agreements. 644  
The UN Register is a landmark because it recognizes a global interest in national or 
bilateral arms deals and reinforces the legitimacy of such global efforts in a field 
long preserved by national sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, few problems still characterize the multilaterally implemented export 
controls that exist so far.  
First, the UN is based on the “sovereign equality of all its Members”, but because 
trade restrictions are oriented towards the restriction of arms technology to certain 
Members, they imply discrimination between Members. Although export controls are 
compatible with the UN recognition of the right to individual and collective self-
defense, their implementation must be balanced with the rights and norms of the 
                                                 
641 The new multilateral controls were then published as INFCIRC/254 Part 2. See Arrangements 
adopted at the Meeting of Adherents to the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines, Warsaw, 31 March – 
3 April 1992, published in PPNN Newsbrief Number 18, Summer 1992, p. 13. 
642 Initially, states are only requested to submit information on arms transfers, but they will be 
invited to also to provide reports on arms production and their overall military inventories, 
leaving the possibility of expanding the regime in the future. 
643 O. Greene, How important is the UN Register, and what improvements are needed, in: 
International Control of the Arms Trade, Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report 
Number 8, April 1992, p. 6. 
644 For a discussion of current UN roles in verification, see previous section. 
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international community. This issue is particularly important in the context of UN 
development efforts; technology controls are seen by some as a threat to Third World 
development efforts and many of these countries fail to see the advantages in non-
proliferation efforts that can hold back more vital national development. 
Second, countries who use arms transfers as an aspect of foreign policy continue to 
be hostile to the idea of international controls, which restrict their leeway to 
determine their national interest in each case.645  
Third, and probably most importantly, the advantages of objective international 
control of technology transfer restrictions must be weighed against the intrusive 
character of any regime that wishes to open a state's trading practices to international 
examination and debate.  
6.4. Regional Controls 
Regional frameworks are a third format for the organization of export controls and 
implementation of monitoring systems. In combination with the national and 
multilateral controls described above, regional controls offer a third layer to export 
control regimes. While no regional organization currently exists for the sole purpose 
of implementing export controls, some states in different regions are considering 
joint action in this field. 
The European Community has gone furthest to date in negotiating a regional export 
controls initiative. Euratom, has regulated European trade in nuclear materials as 
opposed to national authorities, since its creation in 1958, although in 1984 several 
sensitive items were exempted from this regulation in favour of intra-community 
notification and approval procedures. However, the same regional cooperation until 
recently was not possible for the control of conventional arms exports, which were 
considered vital to effective and sovereign foreign policies.  
The post-Cold War, post-Maastricht European Union has changed this stance. 
Examination of Iraqi technology sources after the Gulf War revealed that every 
member of the Community, although some more than others had, violated stated 
principles of arms and technology transfer restraint.646 This generated increased 
support for a common policy that would make Community-based controls more 
effective. The Single Market, by eliminating many of the border controls that are an 
important aspect of national export controls, provided an additional incentive to 
cooperate in the implementation of “common standards” and the “alignment” of 
national policies. 
The Maastricht agreement includes non-proliferation efforts and the transfer of 
military technology within the domain of the agreed common security policy, despite 
the original Treaty of Rome exemption of security-related trade from community 
controls. A common list of embargoed items, criteria for export, and common 
licensing procedures have been agreed to within a High Level Working Party as well 
as a list of dual-use items and guidelines. 
                                                 
645 F. Pearson, How can the foreign policy goals of exporter nations, now satisfied by exports, be 
achieved effectively with weapons transfer control, in: International Control of the Arms Trade, 
Oxford Research Group, Current Decisions Report, Number 8, April 1992. 
646 See H. Muller, The Export Controls Debate in the “New” European Community, in: Arms 
Control Today (March 1993), pp. 10-14. 
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However, many critiques have been addressed to the EC's efforts to coordinate 
export controls. The possibility of regional implementation of controls may 
overcome some of the weaknesses of uneven or biased national implementation, but 
the EC goals of aligning policies may be still quite different from actually 
harmonizing national policies. Within the EU, agreement on export controls has 
come from within European Political Cooperation (EPC mechanism). A NGO study 
indicated, “There is a need for a body whose role is to ensure that the harmonized 
system of arms and dual-use goods export control system, once agreed upon, is 
functioning effectively ... The Member States will have to adopt a common approach 
not only in the making of the policy, but in its execution”.647 
While perhaps the furthest developed as yet, EU regional export controls are not 
unique. A Peruvian proposal aims to prohibit the future purchase, transfer and 
manufacture of advanced conventional weapons in Latin America. The Mendoza 
Agreement signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay commits its participants 
not to develop, produce, acquire, or transfer biological and chemical weapons in the 
region. The Declaration of Cartagena renounced the possession, production, 
development, use, testing and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction in Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and called for stronger controls on all 
transfers.648 
6.5. Conclusion: the synergy of layered regimes 
The export control issue is currently in a broad state of flux as policy makers attempt 
to reconcile the changes in the international security system649 and the perilous 
spread of lethal conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology 
with the urgency of development issues in various regions and the demands of the 
defense industries in a time of rapid down-sizing.  
Disagreements often stem from the fact that licensing decisions are based on national 
interpretations of regime rules. These are in turn steered by the interests of 
participating states rather than a common norm or a common perception of the risks 
posed by particular transfers.650 
During this period of re-evaluation, two principles seem particularly important. 
Although the multiplicity of overlapping export control regimes described above 
may at first glance seem extremely complex and undeniably represents undesired 
duplication of bureaucracy, one cannot forget that each of these regimes has 
managed to institute valuable consensus on sensitive and crucial issues. “Melting” 
these regimes in an effort to streamline bureaucracy would risk the loss of those 
                                                 
647 Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control, 
Saferworld, December 1992, p. 102. 
648 Disarmament newsletter of the World Disarmament Campaign 10/1 (February 1992). 
649 After 11 September certain decisions that were difficult to take in the framework of the 
regimes may have become possible. Particular attention is being paid to the following 
questions: the development of procedures for sharing information related to licensing and 
enforcement; the development of a more harmonized approach to risk assessment and the 
identification of programmes of concern; the development of common approaches to end-user 
controls in countries where programmes of concern are located; and how to apply controls to 
new types of commercial practices in a changing market. I. Anthony, Multilateral export 
controls, SIPRI Yearbook 2002. 
650 I. Anthony, op. cit., 2002. 
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accomplishments. Rather, these efforts can be seen to work in synergy with actors at 
the national, global and regional level sharing the burden of their enforcement. 
Second, industry represents one “layer” of this system, which cannot remain under 
represented. States are asking certain industries within their boundaries to refrain 
from specific types of trade in the interest of international security. As it is the 
industry that will thus bear the burden of effective implementation of arms control 
regimes, one cannot ignore their role in the negotiation and implementation of export 
controls. This role for non-state actors in regards to trade across national borders is 
what sets export controls so far apart from other types of arms control efforts.  
The effectiveness of export controls during the Cold War was based on several 
factors. Most importantly, the United States possessed a significant edge over most 
other supplier countries in the production of key, enabling technologies. The United 
States and its allies clearly agreed on the target of export controls, namely the Soviet 
bloc. And we joined in a highly coordinated effort to implement such controls. 
None of these factors exist today in any large measure. While the United States most 
certainly enjoys a technological edge in some areas of production, foreign 
competitors often provide the same or similar products in the global market. And 
while many of us come together to discuss the issue of export controls quite 
frequently – and indeed, coordinate our efforts more formally in the various 
multilateral export control regimes – it is clear that the international export control 
system in place today lacks the cohesion and common purpose of the old 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.651 
Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of 
supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass 
destruction or conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in these 
technologies to keep them from proliferating states or terrorists. However, the regime 
lack effective verification regime, they cannot enforce members’ compliance with 
regime commitments. For example, Russia exported nuclear fuel to India in a clear 
violation of its commitments, threatening the viability of one regime. Despite the 
expectation to report export denials; the United States did not notify the Australia 
Group between 1996 and 2002 that the U.S. government denied 27 licenses to export 
Australia Group-controlled items to such countries as China, India, and Syria.652 The 
summary of the Report of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to 
Congressional Committees on Non-proliferation strategy needed to strengthen 
Multilateral Export Control Regimes653 is relevant.  
The U.S. government faces a number of interrelated obstacles in trying to: 
First, the difficult process of making consensus-based decisions limits options for 
reforming the regimes. Under the current process, a single member can block regime 
decision-making.  
                                                 
651 Remarks of J.J. Jochum, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Bureau 
of Industry and Security, Globalization of Export Controls and Sanctions London, England, 11 
November 2002. 
652 Report of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to Congressional Committees 
on Non-proliferation strategy needed to strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes 
October 2002. Appendix III describes the export denial reporting procedures for each regime, 
available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-43. 
653 Idem.  
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Second, the voluntary and nonbinding character of the regimes means that they have 
no explicit tools to enforce members’ compliance with their non-proliferation 
commitments. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had no direct means to 
impede Russia’s export of nuclear fuel to India, an act that the U.S. government said 
violated Russia’s commitment to that regime.  
Third, the rapid pace of technological change in a globalized economy makes it 
difficult to keep control lists current because these lists need to be updated more 
frequently.  
Fourth, “secondary proliferation”, the growing capability of non-member countries to 
develop technologies used for weapons of mass destruction and trade them with 
other countries of concern, undermines the regimes’ ability to prevent proliferation. 
For example, North Korea has exported significant ballistic missile-related 
equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries of concern, 
including Iran also, Pakistan. 
Finally, there are no specified or agreed-upon criteria for assessing the regimes’ 
effectiveness, despite the stated goal of strengthening their effectiveness.  
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Chapter 3 The Trends and Future of Verification 
The preceding chapters have described the development of verification agreements. 
They have analysed and compared the various elements. This last chapter will 
attempt to go beyond the facts of existing agreements and trace observable trends in 
the principles and practice of verification and identify issues that mark the continuing 
debate over this subject. 
In trying to understand the fundamental reorientation and restructuring of the 
verification regime and its role in international relations (in view of today threat to 
international, regional and nation security). It is necessary to evaluate the core 
principles of the “Sixteen Principles for Verification,” that have dominated the 
negotiation of most of the verification regimes and those, which are suggested as a 
basis for governing the establishment and performance of verification systems. 
Section II demonstrated that the “Sixteen Principles for Verification,” 654 have been 
used in most of the verification regimes as guiding principles. This first part of this 
chapter would first draw four important conclusions that highlight the required 
modification in the guiding principles: adequacy, non-discrimination, transparency 
and confidentiality655 in order to fulfill the challenges of verification in 21st century. 
Adequate and effective verification could require the employment of different and 
varied information gathering techniques, such as national technical means, 
international technical means, and internationally accepted inspection procedures, 
including on-site inspections. 
 As the discussion in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland 
concerning the issue of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) leading to the 
adoption of INFCIRC/540, the Model Protocol, demonstrate that positive verification 
activities are insufficient for providing the necessary assurance that an inspected state 
is not producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosives. Negative verification, 
which is more difficult than positive verification, requires much more sophisticated 
equipment and the use of additional information to direct the inspectorate to the 
proper place, site, or facility.656  
All states have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification 
of agreements to which they are parties. All regional states have equal rights to 
participate in the process of regional verification of agreements to which they are 
parties. 
Even though, equality of rights among states is a principle, in practice, most of 
developing countries have no technical and financial capacity to participate in the 
process of negotiation and effective implementation of international verification 
agreements. For instance, in 2003 a number of allegations were made that states had 
                                                 
654 Which were formulated in 1987-88 by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) 
and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1988. 
655 They draw from and take into account, in part, the “Sixteen Principles for Verification”. 
656 J. Sokolsky, The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Future of Arms Control and 
Verification, prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme 
International Security Bureau, February 2001. pp. 76-78. 
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acquired or possess chemical or biological weapons.657 Many of the published 
allegations are from United States.  
Therefore, one of the challenges of future verification regime is to assure mutuality 
and reciprocity in order to avoid the state that is not granted equal rights (technically 
or financially) distrust the verification mechanism, and to impose unilateral 
restrictions on the verification teams’ freedom of action. Enabling the states to fully 
participate in the inspection activities not only brings trust to the system, but also 
opens up all states to all mechanisms and techniques of verification. In turn, this 
mutuality creates a better understanding of the verification activities. 
Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a 
timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of non-compliance. Continued and 
thorough effort to ascertain compliance is essential to building and maintaining 
confidence among the parties to treaties or agreements. 
The manner in which some intelligence information was characterized and used by 
the UK and the USA regarding Iraq has raised doubt as to whether ad hoc coalitions 
can be sufficiently certain of the accuracy of their information. The public estimates 
of Iraq’s capabilities that were produced by the coalition partners differed from those 
reported by UNMOVIC. According to a February 2003 fact sheet produced by the 
US Department of State, 1.5 tones of VX were still unaccounted for. The fact sheet 
also stated that the UN estimated that Iraq was able to produce 26 000 liters of 
anthrax spores and 38 000 liters of botulinum toxin.658 British assessments of Iraqi 
capabilities and Iraqi concealment efforts were presented in two dossiers: the first 
published in September 2002,659 and the second published in February 2003.660 Both 
dossiers appear to contain inaccuracies. For example, the September dossier stated 
that “some of these [chemical and biological] weapons were deployable within 45 
minutes of an order to deploy them”.661 
Confidentiality is critically important for effective multilateral verification. For a 
state to agree to disclose sensitive information relating to its national security, or for 
a business to divulge commercial proprietary information, strong assurances must be 
offered that such information will be properly protected by the responsible 
international verification agency.  
The effort put into verifying each state should be the amount required for this state, 
taking into account not only its size, and the number of nuclear sites, installations, 
                                                 
657 Owing to the frequent, and sometimes exclusive, use of the term “weapon of mass destruction” 
in some allegations, however, it is unclear in a number of cases what type of weapon (nuclear, 
chemical or biological) is referred to. 
658 UNMOVIC Working Document and US Department of State, Iraq’s hidden weapons: failing to 
disclose and disarm, Fact Sheet, 27 February 2003, available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/18130.pdf. 
659 British Government, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Assessment of the British 
Government, London 24 September 2002, available at URL 
www.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf. 
660 Iraq: its infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation, in: No. 10 Downing Street 
(January 2003), available at www.number-10.gov.uk/files/pdf/Iraq.pdf. This dossier was the 
subject of some controversy after it was revealed that sections had been taken from a doctoral 
thesis without attribution. 
661 British Government, op. cit., 2002, p. 5. 
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and facilities on its territory, but also the assessment – based in part on the 
information available from NTM and other sources, on past cooperation and 
transparency history, and on the verification experience with this state – on the effort 
needed for verification. 
Multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes offer a framework for states to 
agree politically sensitive matters that might not otherwise be resolved. The 
implementation of routine verification measures also offers a degree of transparency 
and confidence that ad hoc coalitions cannot provide. Most countries do not have the 
resources or capability to follow international developments related to the possible 
misuse of chemical and biological substances.662 However, transparency is more 
important in cases where the goal is negative verification. When a state engages in 
concealment activities, as Iraq had under the Action Team’s inspection effort, the 
fruits of verification are tainted. The relationship between the Iraqi authorities and 
the Action Team was non-cooperative and full of mutual distrust. Iraq only 
acknowledged aspects of its program when independent physical evidence came to 
light. Iraq limited the Agency’s verification activities. The lesson is that a 
“technically coherent” picture of a state’s activities is not necessarily a complete 
picture. The IAEA has recognized this distinction in many statements it has made, 
but remains ambiguous in other statements and is trying to maintain that some 
negative verification goals are fully achievable and capable of reaching conclusive 
results.663 
1. The Trends 
One group of trends in the evolution of the concept and implementation of 
verification concerns the participants in these negotiations and resulting regimes. 
The variety of agreements signed at bilateral, global, and regional levels illustrate the 
growing number and variety of participants in verification arrangements. Whereas 
early arms control verification provisions were negotiated in bilateral frameworks 
between the superpowers, or, despite the formal adhesion of a greater number of 
states, could only be implemented by a small number of states in possession of 
advanced technologies664, today's arms control negotiations incorporate a broader 
range of actors. This expanded cast results from (two) separate phenomena. 
First, following the model of the NPT verification regime, both “haves” and “have 
nots” are commonly included in multilateral negotiations and the methods of 
verification defined are designed not to exclude any participant from their 
implementation. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention has been signed 
by many states that are not known to possess any such arms, and representatives 
                                                 
662 See J. Hart, F. Kuhlau and J. Simon, Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms 
control, SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford 
2003, p. 231; N.A. Sims, Biological disarmament diplomacy in the doldrums: reflections after 
the BWC Fifth Review Conference, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 70 (April–May 2003), 
available at www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd70/70op2.htm; and M. Chevrier, Waiting for Godot or 
saving the show? The BWC Review Conference reaches modest agreement, in: Disarmament 
Diplomacy 68 (December. 2002/January. 2003), available at 
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68bwc.htm. 
663 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, avaible at www.m-w.com/home.htm. 
664 Although the Antarctica Treaty, the Enmod Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty were all signed 




from all signing states participate in the verification organization (the OPCW). 
Likewise a comprehensive test ban treaty, not just among the declared nuclear 
powers in the Security Council and proposals for verification focus on an 
international seismic monitoring network, this globalisation of arms control and 
verification agreements is supported by the ever-increasing membership to the NPT 
regime, highlighted in 1993 when South Africa became the first unofficial nuclear 
weapon state to dismantle a nuclear weapons program and adhere to the treaty. The 
decision by Libya to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that it no 
longer possesses chemical, biological and other weapons suggests that, in at least 
some cases, it is less tenable in the current international security environment for a 
country to maintain a policy of ambiguity as to whether it possesses NBC weapon 
programmes.665 The decision also suggests that more and more nations demonstrate 
the willingness to accept and participate in verification measures than been isolated 
from international communities.  
The introduction of verification schemes within regional agreements represents a 
second factor in the multiplication of participants. By negotiating verification 
mechanisms with a small number of neighbours, regional frameworks often recruit 
participants who have rejected larger frameworks. For example, Argentina and Brazil 
have not signed the NPT but cooperate in a bilateral verification regime that accepts 
full-scope IAEA safeguards. 
The importance of a diversity of negotiating frameworks is thus an important factor 
in extending the principle of verification. These “overlapping” systems reinforce one 
another, and, as in the case of the Euratom safeguards, which under agreed terms 
substitute for IAEA activities, can reduce the costs of global efforts while 
maintaining a satisfactory level of effectiveness. Perhaps more importantly, the 
overlap of such regimes is often an essential factor in establishing the credibility of 
verification efforts. Global systems that are acceptable for open, democratically-ruled 
states outside regions of acute tension may not offer an adequate level of credibility 
among less trusting actors. In such cases, stricter measures of verification and 
sanction, which would not be acceptable within larger, and more diverse 
frameworks, may be implemented. For example, a complete ban on nuclear 
materials, unacceptable within a set of actors that includes the industrialized 
countries, may be implemented on a regional level to provide adequate levels of 
security among a smaller set of actors in a region of high tension.  
A regional verification regime has the following responsibilities: 
Monitor refreezing/dismantling  
Verify Compliance with treaties and coordination with international organisations (so 
far mainly with IAEA) 
Verify Denuclearisation Agreement  
Verify Dismantlement and Reduction Terms  
                                                 
665 In December, Libyan President Colonel Muammar Qadhafi made a public commitment to 
disclose and dismantle his country’s WMD, including its CW stockpile, following several 
months of secret negotiations with the UK and the USA. This commitment includes accepting 
international inspections in Libya to verify the destruction and the dismantling of such 
weapons and programmes. Libya publicly urged that the Middle East and Africa be made free 
of WMD. In January 2004 Libya acceded to the CWC. 
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Verification of mutual reductions or redeployment of conventional forces 
Regional verification regime is a trend in “free zone” proliferation of nuclear 
weapons free zones in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatleloco), the South Pacific 
(Rarotonga), Africa (Pelindaba) and Southeast Asia (Bangkok).666 Similarly, the 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is based on a regional 
approach of verification.  
In both the Middle East and South Asia, the negotiation of agreed limits on nuclear 
weapons is dependent on the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements 
and of a broader regional security structure.667 Assuming that the DPRK agrees to 
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons and freeze its long range missile programs, 
there are proposals668 to establish a regionally managed verification regime, staffed 
and sustained by all interested parties (Russia, China, ROK, DPRK, Japan, IAEA, 
and the US). This regime’s charter could be verification of all present and future 
nuclear agreements for both North and South Korea: Safeguards, weapon program 
dismantlement and measures included in the ROK/DPRK Denuclearisation 
Agreement of 1992. The “grand bargain” may require verification of missile and 
conventional force terms, as well. In order to contribute to a lasting and broadening 
reduction of inter-Korean tensions, a role in monitoring agreements on biological or 
chemical weapons could be considered for the future.669 
On the other hand, purely regional systems may not be universally credible, so the 
duplication of commitments and verification mechanisms within a broader 
membership is important. 
A second group of trends pertains to the objects of verification. As precedents of 
verification are established and the principles and methods refined, one can see a 
willingness to address more difficult tasks and to address a widening variety of 
objects and activities. 
Early agreements provided for verification of easily identifiable activities and 
objects. For example, the original SALT accords were constrained by the abilities of 
NTM, the sole agreed method of verification. Thus, the treaty addressed only the 
number of ballistic missile launchers and defence systems that each country could 
possess. Strategic arms reduction treaty (START II), contrastingly addresses the 
specific number of warheads that each state may mount on missiles or stockpile. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention is another example of the trend toward more difficult 
verification tasks, tackling the identification of microscopic weapons whose dual-use 
                                                 
666 M. Hamel-Green, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Peeling the Nuclear Orange. From the Bottom 
Up, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 9 (October 1996). 
667 See S. Freier, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and Effective Verification, in: 
Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations 16/3, pp. 66-91; G.M. Steinberg, 
Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, in: Survival 36/1 (Spring 1994). For a 
general discussion of the link between conventional weapons limitation and nuclear arms 
control, see H. Muller, Reforming the CD Agenda, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 5 (May 1996). 
668 As Joel Sckolski, in his paper The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Future of Arms 
Control and Verification, February 2001, propose a universal verification mechanism that 
would be based on regional safeguards systems formed for this purpose. The basic arrangement 
for these systms will include mutual verification and regional judgment procedures. 
669 J. Olsen, Sandia National Laboratories Regional Verification of a Denuclearized Korean 
Peninsula: A Strategy for Success after the Current Impasse Is Overcome, SAND2003-1390P, 
CMC paper, September 2003. 
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character necessitates a careful assessment of the context in which they are 
developed before compliance can be assured.  
The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMVIC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq is one of the most intensive and 
intrusive international verification undertaking ever.670 The United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM), created by Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, was mandated 
to verify the disarmament of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and missiles 
with a range of more than 150 km and to operate a system of Ongoing Monitoring 
and Verification (OMV) to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to 
reacquire WMD. The IAEA was mandated to verify Iraq’s disarmament of its 
nuclear weapons program. On 17 December 1999 Security Council Resolution 1284 
disbanded UNSCOM and replaced it with UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC inherited the 
mandate and responsibilities of UNSCOM as well as being tasked to establish a 
system of Reinforced Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (R-OMV). The IAEA 
resumed its mandate with regard to nuclear weapons. The whole decision about 
whether the UN Security Council should authorize war against Iraq or, alternatively, 
whether the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies should go it alone, 
was made contingent on the answer to a verification question: was Iraq already 
sufficiently in verifiable non-compliance or should UN inspectors be given 
additional time to make the case? Questions about the veracity, interpretation, and 
use or misuse of national intelligence information by both the British and the US 
governments in making the case for war reinforced for many observers the need for a 
multilateral verification process to be allowed to discern the truth.671 
At the same time, verification schemes are not limited to arms control agreements. 
The concept of a formal monitoring system was not born in the context of arms 
control and the technological and political developments that have surrounded the 
issue of arms control verification can be identified in many other verification projects 
as well. Environmental agreements, peacekeeping missions, and election monitoring 
are just a few of the issues to which the principles of verification and the relevant 
technologies are now applied.  
Despite this remarkable “spread” of verification, verification regimes remain 
exclusively object-specific. With each new treaty, new coordinating mechanisms, 
databases, and, regulations are designed. Discussion on “melting” the various 
regimes or creating an over-arching verification organization has attracted very little 
interest. In fact, the distinction between the many different monitoring systems 
serves as a safety valve to ensure that disputes within one regime need not hinder the 
success of another.  
As table 10672 demonstrate that the rules for monitoring and verification of 
environmental standards, as laid out by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the 
Environment, to rules laid out by the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations for 
                                                 
670 T. Findlay, Multilateral verification in flux, Verification Yearbook 2003. “Those of us who 
support multilateral verification can only despair at the fact that this endeavour – hastily 
deployed and equally hastily ended and superseded by war – was not given the opportunity to 
prove itself fully.” p. 1. 
671 Idem. 




Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration integrates are based on the basic 
principles of verification regimes of arms control and disarmament.  
Table 9: Comparison of Montoring Standards: Environmental, arms control and 
disarmament and general rules of monitoring. 
Environmental Monitoring 
Standards673 
Disarmament & Demobilization 
Monitoring Standards 
Generalized Monitoring Rules 
Transparent and open communication 
of information 
Develop monitoring plans prior to 
implementation 
Transparency 
Respect mandates and jurisdictions Disputant parties have right to 
oversee monitoring 
Open involvement of all parties 
Shared responsibility for 
implementation 
Military observers used for D&D; 
Civilian police monitors for public 
security 
Third-party access to, provision of, 
verification of data regarding 
compliance 
Timely sharing of data between 
parties 
Verify compliance by Data cross-
checking  
Reporting non-compliance 
Supplementary action by sanctioned 
military forces in search, seizure, and 
destruction 
Open access to and cross-checking of 
data by all involved parties. 
Third-party access to data Cross-check data with disputant 
parties and independent sources 
Use open and standardized measures 
for compliance 
Protection of proprietary information Procedures should be transparent Take active role against spoilers 
Use of scientific standards Flexible methods: shift between self-
enforcement and search & seizure 
Allow fluid shift between 
observation, verification, and 
enforcement roles 
Standardized data and data 
management 
Persistent non-compliance should be 
referred to joint monitoring 
commission containing 
representatives from disputant parties
 
Public accountability; transparency Include disincentives for non-
compliance 
 
Reciprocal notice in case of 
termination 
Forcibly disarm spoilers  
A third area of trends in the evolution of verification regimes is found in the methods 
used. Technological advances facilitate verification efforts in two ways.  
First as specific technologies become increasingly reliable, states are more willing to 
place their trust in monitoring systems. For example, the mastery of many seismic 
monitoring techniques is an important contributor to the renewed willingness of 
some states to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban.674 A major breakthrough in 
processing the seismic data came in the early 1970s with the declining cost and 
increasing power of small computers. In 1974 tape recording system was replaced by 
an on-line computer, which was programmed to automatically detect seismic signals, 
steer the array to locate the source of the signals, and store the data on digital tape. 
This leading to the possibility of achieving the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear test explosions, was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996, when it was signed by 71 States, including the 
five nuclear-weapon States.  
                                                 
673 Peacekeeping Tasks. John Hopkins University: P.H. Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies. Johns Hopkins University: P.H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
Conflict Management Program, available at cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu. 
674 The first multilateral negotiations on a CTBT took place in Geneva in 1958. These negotiations 
failed because the experts could not agree on the monitoring system to verify compliance with 
a ban on underground testing. 
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Second, technology is increasingly available to all parties. Given the widening 
membership of verification regimes, equal access to the methods of verification is an 
important factor for legitimacy. Technology plays a vital role in verification by 
permitting the rapid and systematic collection, collation, manipulation, analysis, 
storage, retrieval and dissemination of information. The extraordinary growth in 
computer power – a standard personal computer today is more powerful than the 
computers used for designing the first nuclear weapons.675 The commercialisation of 
high-resolution satellite imagery is just one example of how the spread of 
verification technologies creates greater opportunity for arms control and verified 
agreements. Soon in the near future any actor will have access to materials that were 
hitherto the exclusive domain of highly industrialized states or national defence 
departments.676 
Another methodological trend is the recognition of the importance of multiple 
sources of information. The ability to compare data sets acquired from on-site 
inspections, national technical means, country reporting and other methods reinforces 
the conclusions drawn in the process of verification. Not only are anomalies more 
likely to be detected by multiple probes, but ambiguities are less likely to be falsely 
judged if a suspicious source can be cross-checked with the data obtained by another 
method. This layered approach escapes dependence on either human intelligence or 
technology, neither will ever be infallible. 
Increasingly there is willingness for states to provide NTM-derived information for 
multilateral verification purposes. For example, the United States provided satellite 
photographs and other information from NTM to the United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq. In addition it allowed UNSCOM the use of an 
NTM technology, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, to enable it to do its own 
information gathering.677 The provision of information from NTM in these 
situations, however, can create dilemmas for verification organizations as well as for 
the States involved. An international organization will not want to become reliant on 
one or a small number of countries, as this may compromise its impartiality. For their 
part, States need to take great care in revealing information obtained through NTM to 
avoid revealing confidential information about the scope and capabilities of its NTM.  
Consequently, the value of multiple sources acting in synergy demonstrates the 
advantage of sharing intelligence through any acceptable means. Voluntary 
information exchanges, such as the UN Conventional Arms Register, can provide an 
additional layer of data to compare with more technical monitoring techniques.  
                                                 
675 See www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1931.pdf. 
676 Space Liason International is now marketing 2 meter resolution images from the Russian 
archives and active satellites and Lockheed Aerospace and Missiles has announced plans to 
offer sub-meter resolution images on the commercial market as well as the CIA. 
677 Data from NTM was shared beginning with the very first Iraqi inspection; as they became 
available clues on the Iraqi arms programs gained from HUMINT were shared; data collection 
techniques and analytical capabilities were put at the service of the inspection efforts; and even 
a collection asset a U-2 aircraft with sensors--has been leased to the United Nations. While the 
US intelligence community has taken the lead in assisting the United Nations, significant 
contributions have also been made by other coalition partners. None of these resources and 
techniques are panaceas, but without them it would not have been possible to mask a program 
as well hidden as that of Iraq. David Key, Iraq and Beyond: Future Non-proliferation 
Inspection Challenges, available at www.npec-web.org/essay/kay.htm. 
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Nor can the utility of national intelligence to multilateral verification efforts be 
ignored. Although the use of national intelligence sources has long been a taboo in 
the IAEA, the Agency now asserts the merit of incorporating outside intelligence 
sources in verification analysis.678 The use of national intelligence does not act as a 
sole source, but can confirm the positive correlation of collected information679, and 
indicate anomalous activities to be further investigated within the limits of an 
international verification regime. 
This brings up the question of institutional set up. Some centralised data bank must 
be established so that information can be exchanged as close as possible to real time 
at least between governments willing to cooperate (a possible role for NACC or a 
transformed CoCOM). Yearly declarations as for the UN register is simply not quick 
enough particularly for trade in dual-use goods – in this sense the more transparency 
national governments can establish the better.  
In recent years, the international community has become increasingly cognizant of 
the need to support and strengthen the United Nations. With a verification and 
compliance capability, the United Nations can play an important role in the 
implementation of an objective and effective verification regime for arms control. In 
the same way that peace-keeping has become a vital part of the United Nations' 
contribution to peace and security, UN verification can be a tool to help maintain 
international peace and security in the coming decade and through the coming 
century.680 
2. Issues for the Future 
 This paper has attempted to provide an overview of verification principles and their 
development through various experiences, but if verification is to really achieve its 
aims, at least three issues remain to be addressed.  
(a) The interdependence of verification technologies and political developments must 
be highlighted. No single technology can provide confidence in an agreement. Nor 
can one round of negotiations introduce lasting harmony and trust in an international 
relationship. The scientific and political foundations of a verification regime are 
worthless if separated.  
Even though, technology plays a vital role in verification by permitting the rapid and 
systematic collection, collation, manipulation, analysis, storage, retrieval and 
dissemination of information. The political dimension, the questions of availability, 
utility and cost, will determine the advantages and the disadvantages of the 
technology.  
In the future, technology would provide more detailed information but still they 
would require skilled human experts and analysts in order to be used as verification 
instrument and find the balance between inspection and confidence building. For 
                                                 
678 See Discussions in: IAEA on 93 +2 programme on strengthening the effectiveness of 
Safeguards and improving the efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, Vienna 1993. See also IAEA 
Press Release, PR 91/43 from 21 October 1991.  
679 See I.H Daalder, The future of Arms Control, in: Survival Spring (1992). 
680 D. Walter, Verification Agency Inside or Outside the UN?, available at 
www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn21_e.html; see also D. Paul et al., (eds.), Disarmament's 




instance, today’s advanced remote monitoring satellite from outer space has the 
advantages that their use does not need permission of the State that is being 
monitored.681 This advanced monitoring technology can also generate unnecessary 
false alarms about non-compliance unless systems are in place to screen and analyse 
data carefully.  
The other important issue is the equal access to verification technology. For the great 
majority of countries the access and the acceptance of advanced technologies are 
linked to the cost. High technology are expensive to purchase and maintain. 
Moreover, most nation, don’t have the specialized personnel needed to install, 
operate and maintain particular types of technology and to analyse the resulting data. 
In the future, this may be overcome by restricting the system to commercially 
available technology or by making all the technology to be used and available to all 
parties. 
A perfect verification system is impossible, even with quite intrusive means of 
inspection as in the case of Iraq. For example, even in the case of positive 
verification, it is unlikely that one can verify to the exact number compliance with 
any agreements that set a numerical limit in arms control regimes. Fortunately, this is 
not the requirement for verification of arms-limitation agreements, any more than it 
is for monitoring an intense arms race. What really matters is whether or not the 
inspection system offers a high degree of confidence that it could provide a warning 
before a dangerous situation develops.682 
The existence of scientific methods and institutional precedents of verification does 
not guarantee the success of negotiations today unless the political will to enter into 
those negotiations is solid. Strategic revolution in superpower relations has offered a 
window of political will for the conclusion of many regimes, but many conflict-
ridden regions have not experienced similar changes. It remains to be seen whether 
political will for verified arms control or other forms of conflict management can be 
successfully “imported” based on the observation of others' experiences.  
For instance, the future success of the test ban treaty regime will depend on the 
strong political support of state-parties and their willingness to provide their political 
commitments technical, and financial support.683 And the many experts, scientists,684 
                                                 
681 They are also flexible: their operators can determine the timing and type of monitoring they 
want to carry out. Since the first successful launch of the first reconnaissance satellite by the 
United States in 1960, there has been a steady growth in the capabilities of space-based 
monitoring. In addition to optical (photographic) capabilities, satellites can now carry an array 
of sensors, including radar and multi-spectral sensors that can detect heat, soil disturbances, 
aerosols and gases. 
682 J.B. Wiesner, op. cit., 1997, p. 1. 
683 Clearly, the future of the CTBT verification system depends on the continued financial and 
technical support of the United States. Not only is the United States the single largest financial 
contributor for the establishment of the official verification system, but also the United States 
is a major source of technical support and expertise. In addition, the future of the CTBT 
verification system depends on the renewal of political support from the United States for the 
treaty itself. The United States is one of the nuclear-weapon states – if not the key state – that 
must ratify the CTBT in order to help secure the entry into force of the treaty. 
684 Civilian researchers worldwide have continued to add additional seismic stations in key 
locations that enhance the overall nuclear test explosion monitoring capabilities and increase 
the overall verifiability of the CTBT.  
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diplomats, educators, and ordinary people around the world who support a permanent 
halt to nuclear weapons test explosions.  
Characterizing the whole verification system of the START Treaty, one may 
conclude with confidence that it evolved into a reliable means by which to achieve 
the declared goals. Nevertheless, one should not forget the fact that without a solid 
political will and commitments from both side this system is diffusing, and that there 
is a danger that it will totally collapse before START officially ends in 2009. It is 
true – the U.S. and Russia have signed the so-called Moscow Treaty, and there is a 
good chance that the new agreement will get approval in both countries. However, 
the Moscow Treaty does not require any verification procedure for its 
implementation.685  
The main reason for the existing situation is that the U.S. intends to take their dual-
capable strategic delivery systems out of the arms control regime. Today, these 
platforms include submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles and strategic 
bombers. This list may also include land- and submarine-based ICBMs in the future. 
In the author's opinion, the principle danger to the multilateral reduction of nuclear 
arms is the reorientation of nuclear delivery means to conventional platforms.686 It is 
increasingly apparent that in order to build an efficient verification system, 
conventional delivery platforms must be covered as well. 
(b) The changing nature of state sovereignty must also be taken into account in 
future implementation of verification principles. 
Verification introduces an element of organized transparency within interstate 
relations. Access to and influence on military arsenals, national territory, and trade 
practices, all crucial factors in traditional definitions and of state sovereignty, are 
bargaining chips in international negotiations. Information once tightly guarded, and 
perhaps still classified even from the citizens of a state, can no longer be the 
exclusive domain of the sovereign state when commercial satellite operators are 
capable of collecting and marketing it. This is a reality, which must be faced before 
accepting or rejecting any agreement. 
It follows that if a state does not hold exclusive domain to certain information, other 
actors may require consideration in future negotiations. The best examples of this can 
be found in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Conventions and the 
negotiation of export controls. In both cases, a state's ability to keep commitments 
hinges on the cooperation of industrial actors within its territory. 
The existing verification regimes and export control mechanisms would need to deal 
with the threat posed by non-state actors “Mass Destruction Weapons (MDW) 
terrorism”. Here there are two important areas where the actual and future of 
verification regimes challenges:  
The spread of nuclear and biological weapons and their convergence with terrorism 
poses the gravest danger to international peace and security. The actual verification 
                                                 
685 A. Diakov, T. Kadyshev, E. Miasnikov and P. Podvig, What to Do with the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions?, in: Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (20 September 2002). The 
text in Russian can be found at www.armscontrol.ru/start/publications/nvo092002.htm. 
686 E. Miasnikov, Precision Guided Weapons and Strategic Balance, Center for Arms Control, 
Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, November 2000. The summary in English and 
links to the full report can be found at www.armscontrol.ru/start/publications/vto1100.htm. 
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regimes have to deal with the actual challenges of the 21st century the danger posed 
by failed, failing or weak states687; and the need to address global problems through 
multilateral approaches. 
The other challenges is that so far, neither of the Export Control group nor the 
existing verification regime of bilateral and multilateral regimes are currently 
positioned to address a newly-identified concern: such as vulnerability the of 
multinational nuclear companies to possible penetration by employees loyal to non-
state actors.688 
The second important future actors in verification regimes require to consider is the 
relation between governments and non-governmental advocacy actors with respect to 
policy formulation and implementation on international security policies, in 
particular, within the context of the arms export control regime. The past years has 
demonstrated, that this development saw the close involvement of non-governmental 
actors in regional organizations. However, in the process of policy formation in 
international security in bilateral, multilateral as well as in the United Nations, 
Governments are still virtually the sole players. Of course, NGOs helped found the 
United Nations and are mentioned in the Charter. And NGOs have a long and proud 
history of fighting against tyranny, and providing humanitarian assistance to the 
victims of conflict and natural disaster.  
And Kofi Annan says:  
“NGOs have helped give life to the idea of an international community, an 
idea that is often questioned and mocked. The international community is, 
admittedly, a work in progress. And the State is not disappearing or ceding 
authority. But we have entered an era of ever-greater partnership, and there are 
few limits to what civil society can achieve.”689 
(c) Most important of all, for verification to succeed, the issue of compliance must be 
addressed.  
Although most verification regimes to date have included some sort of procedure to 
follow in cases of discovered non-compliance such as reference to the UN Security 
Council, the dismantlement of the Iraqi nuclear and chemical programs is the first 
example of multilateral enforcement of non-compliance to a regime agreement. The 
debate over the North Korean situation, however, drives home the fact that this 
punitive mechanism is far from accepted as a universal principle. Failure to respond 
to violations remains the greatest threat to the success of verification regimes, as 
enforcement is primarily a legal term. When an aggressor is collectively identified, 
there should be an escalating ladder of means until the situation is reversed – it is 
                                                 
687 Important security threats emanate from ungoverned space, the territory of failed and failing 
states, and areas within otherwise minimally functioning states where governance is absent. 
ISDP has been reviewing lessons learned from American-led post-conflict interventions and 
investigating how these might be applied in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Korean peninsula has 
also been a significant area of focus. The Center has been examining the military and economic 
implications of the end of the North Korean regime and of Korean unification. 
688 Vann H. Van Diepen, Director, Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile Nonproliferation 
Testimony Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International 
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Washington, DC July 29, 2002. 
689 Secretary- General Kofi Annan at the non-governmental organization (NGO), Forum on 
Global Issues, UN Press Release SG/SM/6973, April 29, 1999. 
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only at the end of the ladder that enforcement would entail “all necessary means” i.e. 
military ones such as under Resolution 678 of the Security Council.  
It is important to note at the outset that the non-proliferation regime, as it is framed 
by the NPT, serves to address the problem of vertical proliferation (by those states 
already possessing nuclear weapons) as well as that of horizontal proliferation (by 
those states which do not possess nuclear weapons but which actively seek to acquire 
them).  
The sad fact is that since the NPT’s inception, the nuclear weapons states have 
shown scant inclination to fulfil their part of the bargain. As recently as the year 
2000, the nuclear weapons states agreed to 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. Their near-perfect record for failure in this pursuit is due primarily to 
the lack of political resolve in these countries to pursue complete disarmament. 
Without a serious effort by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear 
disarmament, the discriminatory nature of the NPT will continue to allow nuclear 
weapons states to promote double standards that provide them special privileges 
while denying these same privileges to the non-nuclear weapons states a recipe for 
increased ill-will and distrust. 
Today, the non-proliferation regime is in serious danger of unraveling altogether as 
witnessed by the fact that India, Israel and Pakistan have joined the list of states in 
possession of nuclear weapons; North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and 
claims to have developed nuclear weapons; nuclear powers are seeking to upgrade 
and improve their nuclear arsenals; and a nuclear black market – capable of 
providing states and extremist groups with nuclear technology and weapons-grade 
material – has emerged. In order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, the NPT 
– and the non-proliferation regime in general – is in urgent need of reconstruction.690 
In order for a non-proliferation regime to be successful in the long term, the same 
standards must be applied to all states. This means that nuclear weapons states must 
engage with determination in fulfilling their long-overdue obligations to achieve 
nuclear disarmament. In today’s world, the only way to halt nuclear proliferation is 
to eliminate existing double standards and implement a more equitable universal 
regime that includes a strict timetable for nuclear disarmament, the criminalization of 
both horizontal and vertical proliferation, effective international enforcement 
mechanisms and adequate funding to achieve these goals. 
However, the inherent double standard of the NPT, allowing the original nuclear 
weapons states to maintain their nuclear arsenals without a time framework for their 
elimination, while forbidding other treaty parties from possessing nuclear weapons, 
was a central weakness that has grown increasingly important over time. 
Dissatisfaction with the double standard has been exacerbated by the fact that the 
NPT failed to achieve its goal of preventing the nuclear arms race of the 70's and 
80's, and also has had little success in facilitating significant progress towards 
elimination of nuclear arsenals in the post-Cold War period. 
Finally, one should mention that entirely new challenges will emerge on the way to 
creating a multilateral verification system for nuclear disarmament. In particular, 
what could be the mechanism for information exchange between the parties? To 
what extent can the shared information be transparent to the world community? How 
                                                 
690 D. Krieger and C. Ong, Disarmament: The Missing Link to an Equitable Non-Proliferation 
Regime, available at www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/03/26_road-prolilferation.htm. 
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can national technical means be efficiently implemented while taking into account 
that the parties have entirely different capabilities? What is the best strategy for 
implementing inspections? Should the parties inspect each other, or is there a need to 
create an international organization that will be responsible for inspections? 
The importance of these questions can be illustrated during the UN inspections in 
Iraq. On one hand, the U.S. claim that they can prove that Iraq violated UN 
resolutions and therefore threaten to use force against Iraq, and on the other hand the 
U.S. is hesitant about providing the international community with the alleged proof. 
Faced with this reality, must we conclude that it is futile to try to combat the spread 
of WMD through a collective, rule-based system of international security – and that 
we have to acquiesce to living in a world plagued with the constant threat of a 
nuclear holocaust or other disasters? I do not believe so. But reliance on a system of 
collective security to curb the proliferation of WMD will require bold thinking, a 
willingness to work together, and sustained effort. The following steps, among 
others, are in my view urgently required:691 
In order to be effective,692 mechanisms addressing non-compliance should perhaps 
consist of three stages. A first stage involves a priori decision to take some form of 
action when a violation is discovered. Most regimes have addressed this stage in 
theory, if not in practice. The existence of a consultative forum is one version. In 
establishing such a mechanism for addressing anomalies, a regime has already 
indicated that violations will not be passively tolerated.  
The second stage in the handling of non-compliance should spell out the 
consequences that follow the violation of the international norm at varying degrees. 
By objectively outlining suitable penalties in advance of sensitive situations and 
implementing at least symbolic sanctions even for very minor violations, a regime 
can bare its teeth to would-be violators.  
In the absence of such established plans of recourse, the existence of the verification 
regime is threatened at the first moment it actually discovers the anomalies it has 
brought to the parties attention. In practice, one has avoided the disintegration of the 
regime, by using consultative mechanisms to present complaints of violations and 
then forgive them. These mechanisms have thus become fora to “consult, cooperate 
and complain”, but not to sanction. By implementing even minor penalties for un-
cooperative or anomalous activities and thus removing the stigma against finding 
cases of non-compliance, the verification regime could become more credible and 
more effective. 
The last stage of a non-compliance policy must ask the question “and then what?”693 
Although a successful verification regime would serve as a deterrent to violations 
and could catch such aggressive action in time to prevent a situation where this 
question need ever be answered in practice, the credibility and contribution to 
                                                 
691 M. ElBaradei, Must We Conclude That It Is Futile To Try To Combat The Spread Of WMD 
Through A Collective, Rule-Based System Of International Security?, Combating the Spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some Reflections', in: Le Monde (5 May), English translation 
provided on the IAEA website, www.iaea.org. 
692 Many sources of non compliance can be managed by routine international processes. It is in the 
case of wilful non compliance that coercive sanctions have to be examined. See inter alia A. 
and A.H. Chayes, On compliance, International Organization, Spring 1993.  
693 See F. Iklé, After detection what?, in: Foreign Affairs 39/2 (1961), pp. 208-20. 
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security made by any verification regime is in the end, contingent on the limits to 
which a state is willing to prosecute a determined violator,694. Ultimately, one must 
decide whether action against internationally agreed principles is equivalent to an act 
of war against the parties or not. Only by asking this question early enough and 
committing oneself to answer, can a state realistically pursue its national interest 
through a multilateral or international verification regime. 
                                                 




Table 10: Proliferation Controls of Weapons of Mass Destruction695 
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Table 11: Membership States of multilateral military related export control 
regimes 













Argentina X X X X X 
Australia X X X X X 
Austria X X X X X 
Belarus  X    
Belgium X X X X X 
Brazil  X  X  
Bulgaria X X X  X 
Canada X X X X X 
Cyprus  X X   
China X     
Czech Republic X X X X X 
Denmark X X X X X 
Estonia      
Finland X X X X X 
                                                 
695 Source: Adapted from G.K. Bertsch and R.T. Cupitt, Non Proliferation and Export Control, in: 















France X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X 
Greece X X X X X 
Hungary X X X X X 
Iceland   X X  
Ireland X X X X X 
Italy X X X X X 
Japan X X X X X 
Kazakhstan  X    
Korea, South X X X X X 
Latvia  X    
Lithuania      
Luxembourg X X X X X 
Moldova      
Netherlands X X X X X 
New Zealand  X X X X 
Norway X X X X X 
Poland X X X X X 
Portugal X X X X X 
Romania X X X  X 
Russia X X  X X 
Slovakia X X X  X 
Slovenia X X    
South Africa X X  X  
Spain X X X X X 
Sweden X X X X X 
Switzerland X X X X X 
Turkey X X X X X 
Ukraine X X  X X 
UK X X X X X 
USA X X X X X 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14: Principles of Verification; extracts from UN document A/45/375 
In 1988, the General Assembly endorsed a set of 16 principles of verification developed by the Disarmament 
Commission (Assembly resolution 43/81 B). The 16 principles resulted partly from the preceding three 
paragraphs of the Final Document, which were used as a basis for the work of the Commission. The principles, 
which could be useful guidelines in the negotiations of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, are: 
“(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament 
agreements. 
(2) Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and 
disarmament agreements. 
(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build 
confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties. 
(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical 
means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections. 
(5) Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness. 
(6) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party 
undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are 
operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of 
international law. 
(7) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party 
undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the 
agreement. 
(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and 
disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where 
possible, time-frames should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment. 
(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific 
arms limitation and disarmament agreements. 
(10) All States have equal right to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which 
they are parties. 
(11) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear 
and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential 
ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties. 
(12) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements 
intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be 
made within the context of that agreement. 
(13) Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament agreement 
is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization at 
the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign right of States to 
enter into such arrangements. 
(14) Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and 
disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal component of the verification process. Such requests 
should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses. 
(15) Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their 
purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State parties or other States, or jeopardizing their 
economic, technological and social development. 
(16) To be adequate and effective, a verification regime for an agreement must cover all relevant weapons, 
facilities, locations, installations and activities.” 
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Table 15: Summary of Inspections in 2002 (Source: OPCW. www.opcw.org) 
Number of Inspections, by Type Total State Party 
ACW CWDF CWPF CWSF DHCW696OCW SCHED1SCHED2SCHED3 DOC   
Argentina          1 1 
Austria          1 1 
Belgium         2 1 3 
Brazil         1  1 
Bulgaria        1  1 2 
Canada       1   1 2 
Chile          1 1 
China 1      2 4 1 1 9 
Costa Rica          1 1 
Croatia          1 1 
Czech 
Republic 
         2 2 
Finland          1 1 
France      2 1  1 1 5 
Germany      1  1 3  5 
India  7 2 2     3  14 
Iran (Islam. 
Rep. of) 
         2 2 
Ireland          1 1 
Italy      1  1 1  3 
Japan   1      3  4 
Mexico          1 1 
Morocco          1 1 
Netherlands       1   1 2 
Norway        1  1 2 
Panama 1          1 
Poland          2 2 
Republic of 
Korea 
          24 
Romania          1 1 
Russian 
Federation 
 8 20 7 2   1   38 
Slovakia       1   1 2 
Slovenia          1 1 
Spain        2 1  3 
Sweden          1 1 
Switzerland        1  1 2 
Turkey          1 1 
Ukraine          1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
  1   1 1 2 2  7 
United States   20 15 12  1 1 7 3 1 60 
                                                 
696 Destruction of hazardous chemical weapons. 
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Number of Inspections, by Type Total State Party 
ACW CWDF CWPF CWSF DHCW696OCW SCHED1SCHED2SCHED3 DOC   
Yugoslavia697          1 1 
 TOTAL : 210 
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Journal of Conflict Resolution  
Journal of Defense and Peace Economics 
Journal of Peace Research  
Études polémologiques  
Foreign Affairs  
International Affairs International Studies Quarterly  
Orbis. A journal of world affairs  
Politique étrangère 
Politique internationale 
Revue internationale et stratégique  
The Washington Quarterly 
Accadamic institutions 
Table 20: General overiview of almost all Research Institutes & Universities 
worldwide dealing with the issue of Security, Peace, Arms Control and 
Disarmament.698  
ABI – Arnold Bergstraesser Institute for Socio Cultural Research, Freiburg i. Brsg., Germany  
Acronym Institute  
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)  
American Council on Germany  
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI)  
American Friends Service Committee  
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (German Association for Peace and Conflict 
Research)  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF), Institut für Politische Wissenschaft der Universität 
                                                 




Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (AFES – PRESS)  
Arbeitskreis Militärgeschichte e.V.  
Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn (AFB) – Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (PRIUB)  
Arbeitsstelle Transatlantische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik  
Arms Control Association  
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS)  
Aspen Institute  
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)  
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)  
Bellona Foundation  
Bendrath, Ralf; Ph.D. Project on Infowar,  
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management  
Bioethics and Health Law (formerly the Center for Medical Ethics)  
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)  
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)  
Bochum Verification  
Brookings Institution  
Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (BIOSt)  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
Cato Institute  
Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT  
Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity (CBHD)  
Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, John Hopkins University  
Centre for Defence & International Security Studies (CDISS)  
Center for Defence Information (CDI)  
Center for Defense Studies, King's College  
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)  
Centre For European Policy Studies (CEPS)  
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)  
Center for International Policy (CIP)  
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (CISAC)  
Center for Research on Disarmament, Peace & Conflict (CDRPC)  
Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments  
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand  
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas  
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS)  
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)  
Center for Political and International Studies CPIS  
Center for Political Studies in Russia (PIR)  
Center for Science and International Security at the University of Hamburg (CENSIS)  
Center for Security Policy (CSP)  
Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zürich  
Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS)  
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)  
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Center for Strategic Leadership – Collins Hall, US Army War College  
Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Etudes Stratégiques (CIRPES)  
Centre For Security Studies, University of Hull  
Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster  
Centro Español de Relaciones Internacionales (CERI)  
Centro de Investigación para la Paz (CIP)  
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute  
Chemical and Biological Warfare Project at SIPRI  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado  
Council on Foreign Relations  
CP/CBD Web-Counterproliferation and Chemical Biological Defense  
Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI)  
DANTE  
Demographic, Environmental and Security Issues Project (DESIP)  
Department of International Politics – The University of Wales, Aberystwyth  
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University  
Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University  
Deutsche Aussenpolitik – German Foreign Policy, Universität Trier  
Deutsche Stifftung Friedensforschung (DSF) 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)  
Deutsches Orient-Institut  
Deutsch-Französisches Institut  
EastWest Institute  
Environment and Conflict Project , Bern u. ETH Zürich (ENCOP)  
Environment Institute  
European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU)  
European Centre for Minority Issues  
Evangelische Akademie Loccum  
European University Institute, Florence, Italy  
European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU)  
Europainstitut der Universität Basel  
Federation of American Scientists  
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA / UPI))  
Forschungsgruppe Informationsgesellschaft und Sicherheitspolitik  
Forschungsverbund Naturwissenschaft, Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit, Universität Hamburg (FONAS)  
forum on early warning and early response (FEWER)  
Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft e. V.  
Forum per i problemi della pace e della guerra  
Fridtjof Nansen Institute  
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Aussenpolitikforschung  
Friends and Partners  
fundación CIDOB  
Gandhi Information Center  
Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space  
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Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la la paix et la sécurité (GRIP)  
Groupe de recherche sur les interventions de paix dans les conflits intraétatiques (GRIPCI)  
Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation (HSP)  
Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung  
Heritage Foundation  
Henry L. Stimson Center  
Hessische Gesellschaft für Demokratie und Ökologie – HGDÖ  
Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)  
Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik Hamburg  
Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V. Tübingen  
Information Warfare Research Center @ Terrorism.com  
Initiative on Confict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE)  
Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)  
Institute for Contemporary International Studies (ICIS), Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Russian Federation  
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)  
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER)  
Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, Universität Duisburg (INEF) 
Institute of International Affairs, University of Latvia  
Institute for International Relations (IMO)  
Institut für Internationale Politik, Universität der Bundeswehr, München  
Institue for Public Accuracy  
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)  
Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia (ISIS )  
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)  
Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare (IASIW)  
Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISCRAN)  
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IPWR)  
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy (ISCIP)  
Insitute of Development Studies  
Institute of Europe  
Institute of International Relations Prague (IIR)  
Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University  
Institute of World Affairs  
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)  
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California (IGCC)  
Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien  
Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde  
Institut d'Etudes Européennes et Internationales du Luxembourg (IEIS)  
Institut für Afrika-Kunde  
Institut für Allgemeine Überseeforschung  
Institut für Asienkunde  
Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (IFA)  
Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, Universität Duisburg (INEF)  
Institut für Frieden und Sicherheitpolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH)  
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Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht (IFHV)  
Institut für Internationale Politik, Universität der Bundeswehr, München  
Institut fur Ostseeforschung, Warnemünde  
Institut für Politkwissenschaft, TH Darmstadt  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Hamburg  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Salzburg  
Institut für Regionalforschung, CAU Kiel  
Institut für Theologie und Frieden  
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel  
Institut québécois des hautes études internationales  
Interdisziplinäre Arbeitsgrruppe Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Sicherheit (IANUS)  
International Boundaries Research Unit  
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)  
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)  
International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES)  
International Peace Bureau (IPB)  
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)  
International Relations and Security Network, ETH Zürich (ISN)  
International Security Information Service (ISIS)  
Istituto Affari Internazionali  
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)  
Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership  
Japan Institute of International Affairs  
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University  
Kings College  
Kittler Institut, Humboldt-Universität Berlin  
Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreich  
Landmines Project  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: LLNL  
Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre  
Life and Peace Institute  
Los Alamos Study Group  
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung  
McMaster Centre for Peace Studies  
Mine Action Information Center, James Madison University  
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS)  
Moscow Public Science Foundation (MPSF)  
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies  
National Center for PTSD  
National Defence University (US)  
National Security Archive at George Washington University  
NaturwissenschaftlerInnen-Initiative "Verantwortung für Friedens- und Zukunftsfähigkeit" e.V.  
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development  
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael  
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA)  
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Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)  
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  
Nuclear Control Institute  
Österreichisches Institut für europäische Sicherheitspolitik (OEIES)  
Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik (OIIP)  
Open Society Institute Landmines Project  
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin  
OXFAM  
Paix 2000  
Peace and Conflict, University of Colorado  
Peace & Conflict Studies, Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster  
Programme for Strategic and International Studies (PSIS)  
Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute  
Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz  
PUGWASH  
RAND  
Red de Universidades pro la Paz y la Convivencia  
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo  
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)  
Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA)  
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI)  
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC)  
Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für Friedenswissenschaften (SCHIFF)  
Schweizerische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (SPN)  
Science for Peace  
Scientists for Global Responsibility  
South African Institute of International Affairs  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC)  
Strategic Issues Research Institute of the United States  
Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College  
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden -SEF – Homepage  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)  
Swedish Institute of International Affairs  
Tami Stienmets Center for Peace Research (TSC)  
Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI)  
Terrorism Research Center  
Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research  
Transcend: A Peace and Development Network  
Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF)  
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
United Nations University  
United States Institute of Peace  
Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Organisationswissenschaften, Sicherheits- 
und Militärökonomie  
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Uppsala universitet, Sweden  
U.S. Naval Institute  
Uranium Institute  
Union of Concerned Scientists  
Universität Tübingen, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Abteilung Internationale Beziehungen/Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung 
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)  
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)  
Verein für Friedenspädagogik Tübingen  
Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University  
Wilton Park Conferences  
Worldwatch Institute  
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University  
York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS)  
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI )  
Zentrum für Europäische Umfrageanalysen und Studien / Universität Mannheim (ZEUS)  
Zentrum für Nordamerika Forschung (ZENAF)  
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